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Abstract 
How should the relationship between literary texts and nationalism be explained? 
What is the difference between texts that resist nationalism’s logic aesthetically and 
those that do so discursively? The answers to these questions form the core of this 
study whose central inquiry focuses on how the internal operations of fictional 
narrative handle the persistent depositories of national culture represented by a 
visceral bond between individual and nation. Most crucially, the potential of 
unraveling this resilient bond is located in the narrative’s aesthetic operations, not in 
its discursive pronouncements, irrespective of how critical such pronouncements 
may be.  
 Rather than promoting or rejecting the bond while leaving intact its guiding 
premise of representational identity, the narratives considered in this study unravel 
this bond by pushing its logic to its breaking point so as to expose the fault line at its 
heart—its pure difference. This study delineates how this narrative-based critique 
deals with the debilitating problematics of national identity by rethinking its 
operation so that it becomes possible to envisage a non-rhetorical resistance to 
national identity. 
 The literary analysis of Elias Khoury’s Little Mountain and Salman Rushdie’s 
Midnight’s Children demonstrates that although following different trajectories, both 
novels ultimately deploy the resources of fictional narrative to advance such a 
critique of national identity. The narrative styles of these two novels speak a 
language through which a current is created, a current resisting the assumptions of 
conventional national identity. Little Mountain isolates the symptoms of national 
identity through a circular narrative movement fuelled by repetition. Repetition then 
shakes the foundation of all continuities—the necessary component of temporally 
solid identity. Midnight’s Children’s narrative movement begins by deploying the 
body of nationalism’s central metaphor of nation as individual—a body extracted 
from the depositories of national culture—and ends by obliterating that body into 
pieces out of which neither the ghost nor the body could be resurrected. 
 This study’s final chapter contains a reflection on the broader consequences of 
this rethinking of national identity through an exploration of the connections 
between modernity and nationalism.  
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Introduction: Toward a Feasible Critique of National Identity 
All identities are only simulated, produced by an optical ‘effect’ by the 
more profound game of difference and repetition. 
Gilles Deleuze, from the preface to Difference and Repetition 
 
Art requires philosophy, which interprets it in order to say what it is 
unable to say, whereas art is only able to say it by not saying it.  
Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 
 
The relationship between literature and nationalism is undoubtedly a problematic 
subject matter for literary criticism. As a socio-political phenomenon arising from a 
type of mediation between individuality and affiliation, nationalism is certainly 
easier to examine from a social science perspective than from a literary one. One 
could begin by imagining the potential errors of a study that seeks to elaborate on 
this relationship from a literary standpoint. An error that comes to mind would be 
an attempt to analyze the link between the literary text and nationalism by means of 
an explanation as to how literature can serve as a vessel for or as an aesthetic 
exposition of a set of concepts produced by this resilient type of mediation between 
individuality and affiliation.  
 The problem with such explanations is all too obvious: it starts from the 
(usually undeclared) premise which holds the literary text to amount to little more 
than a second-hand representation—a Platonic Shadow, pure mimesis. It is also not 
too difficult to imagine what the modus operandi of such a study might look like: W. 
B. Yeats’ “Second Coming” as an illustration of the National Bard’s engagement 
with the projects of national liberation and decolonization in early twentieth-century 
Ireland, or George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda as an early document to be placed on the 
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trajectory of the formation of the Jewish national consciousness in the final decades 
of the nineteenth century.  
 The conclusion of this sort of analysis, then, will probably turn to either 
approbation or condemnation: an approbation of given formulations and the type of 
literary text that espouses them, or a condemnation of the regressive nature of 
certain ideologies and the text that serves as their aesthetic guise. There is, of course, 
a great deal of simplification in this sketch. The key point, however, appears not to 
be far off the mark because even the most complex of analyses (from a linguistic 
standpoint) can revert to a value judgment of representations instead of pressing on 
for a critical assessment of representation as such.    
 To avoid this error, a few key questions must be raised: how should the 
relationships between literary texts and the socio-political phenomenon of 
nationalism be explicated? How is the uniqueness—the distinctive aesthetic 
quality—of the literary text to be maintained when it is placed in conjunction with a 
socio-political phenomenon that usually finds its expression in political rhetoric? 
How is a meaningful distinction to be made between literary texts that embody the 
logic of nationalism and those that resist it? And, finally, how should one discern the 
vital difference between literary texts that resist nationalism’s logic aesthetically and 
those that do so discursively. The answers to these questions form the crux of this 
study. For the present moment, I should indicate that all of these answers are to be 
revealed by way of a theoretical approach that traces the internal operations of the 
literary text, mainly its narrative style but also its literary devices and tropes. 
 To be more precise, this study’s central inquiry focuses on the manner in 
which the literary text’s internal operations handle the persistent depositories of 
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national culture aesthetically rather than seeking only the text’s discursive 
pronouncements with regard to that culture whose excessive influence is anything 
but escapable. This is certainly not to say that discursive content has no place or that 
it is of no significance to the text’s internal operations, but that its consideration 
must come into play as part and parcel of the creative force that constitutes the way 
a literary text operates.  
 Having briefly stated the key questions of this study, I would also add that 
there are two choices to be made. While the first of these choices has to do with the 
treatment of the literary text as being inherently distinctive, the second is related to 
the ideal literary form to be targeted—the novel. Unlike, say, a pamphlet or a piece 
of propaganda couched in an art form, both of which might seem to offer a more 
direct access to their discursive or rhetorical content, the literary text’s 
distinctiveness is the result of its ability to be simultaneously a cause and a sign: in 
other words, of having the capacity to be at once the originator of experience as well 
as its expression. This is of utmost significance to this particular context. Only by 
way of a consideration that passes through the aesthetic nuances of the literary text 
can one avoid the fruitless (and perhaps hopeless) effort to make sense of 
nationalism as a product of false consciousness, as being necessary for efficiently 
conducting the business of nation-states, or as simply being the cynical concoction of 
Machiavellian politics.  
 Hence, as both the forger of experience and its prism, the literary text 
constitutes the fundamental ground for critically assessing the experience of being 
entrapped within the logic of nationalism, even if this logic appears to be unrelated 
to the text’s internal operations by virtue of its seeming reliance on discursive 
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representations to produce the optical illusion of similarity. This experience’s 
dizzying multiplicity, however, prevents it from ever being neatly condensed only 
in discourse. In Aesthetic Theory, Theodor Adorno famously writes that “art requires 
philosophy, which interprets it in order to say what it is unable to say, whereas art is 
only able to say it by not saying it” (99). Adorno’s pithy statement is especially 
pertinent to an analysis concerned with nationalism and the literary text, precisely 
because of the tendency for (and perhaps the ease of) taking the literary text “at its 
discourse.” Adorno’s basic yet often forgotten reminder provides me with the 
opportunity to lay stress on my own methodology which is informed by the 
conviction that the literary text can meaningfully and forcefully articulate what it 
says only through its aesthetics, not by way of its discourse or rhetoric.     
 With that in mind, I come to the second choice: the novel. Claiming that the 
novel is the ideal form for understanding better the workings of national 
consciousness has little to do with it being a prose genre. To make this assumption 
would be the equivalent of a critical analysis that speaks of the content of a novel 
and a political speech in the same breath, an analysis fixated on discourse as such. 
Rather, the novel is ideal because of the narrative resources it offers. These narrative 
resources, after all, are fundamental to both the creation and sustenance of this 
particular mediation between individuality and affiliation. 
 This study’s contribution comes forth out of the notion that narrative is 
fundamental to the creation and sustenance of national consciousness. This 
contribution’s bare outline can be condensed in the following statement: not only do 
these narrative resources put the novel in the position of being instrumental to the 
formation of national consciousness but also to the attempt of taking that 
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consciousness apart, of examining it as well as pushing its premises to their 
inevitable and logical end—to their ultimate breaking point. While the plasticity of 
narrative allows it to mobilize the resources of the story so as to consolidate identity 
diachronically and synchronically, thus giving it its own “sacred history,” that same 
plasticity also allows it create a story that brings that identity into the realm of 
profane difference.   
 Before I move on to discussing the specifics of my analysis, there is an 
explanation to be made with regard to the meaning of “taking national 
consciousness apart.” To begin with, resisting national consciousness or taking it 
apart ought not to be read as suggesting that nationalism can simply be overcome, 
or as promoting the view that it is actually possible to be entirely insulated from its 
influence. As I explain here briefly, but at length in the chapters to follow, resisting 
the logic of national consciousness within the parameters of this study means 
something quite different. My analysis of novels that push national consciousness to 
its breaking point, as the analysis to follow will make abundantly clear, should not 
be mistaken as a variant of the research which either celebrates or condemns the 
new “globalized world.” If the constant and steady flare up of nationalist fervour is 
to demonstrate anything at all, it would show clearly that despite all the discourse 
on globalization, multiculturalism, living “on the hyphen,” hybridity, and the new 
forms of mobility that facilitate the crossing of national boundaries, nationalism in 
all its forms is still far from becoming a spent force.  
 The resisting of national consciousness coupled with rejecting even the mere 
feasibility of the utopian ideal of a post-national order might present a debilitating 
dilemma for those interested in going beyond rhetorical defiance and in formulating 
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a viable alternative. This dilemma transpires as the result of the false choice one is 
forced to make between two views, one of which can be regarded as naïve, while the 
other as passive. It is to some extent naïve to oppose nationalism’s identification 
pattern, the first view would imply, knowing that we have no real alternatives—
perhaps not even the imagination required to bring into being a new form of 
identification that governs the relationship between individual and group. The 
second view, however, would imply that it is utterly passive to accept the logic of 
nationalism, given its regressive and limiting nature.  
 The true alternative, however, begins with refusing to subscribe to either 
view. This, though, involves examining the mechanisms of national consciousness, 
not only to show how it is prone to crumble under its own weight, but, more 
importantly, to allow for the disclosure of the aporia of difference that is already at 
its heart—the starting point of “taking national consciousness apart.” Through 
putting this crucial procedure in motion, one stands the chance of being able to 
provide avenues for formulating individualized ways of relating to the nation. 
Doing so is not so much a choice but an unavoidable necessity, especially since, as I 
argue, it is neither feasible to mount a successful opposition to national identity nor 
is it possible to accept its elemental premises which draw on the similitude of the 
copy and disregard the power of difference.  
 To put the above in more specific terms, instead of the choice to either accept 
or reject the idea of the nation according to its principal guiding premise of 
representational identity, it is necessary to push this premise to its breaking point so as 
to expose its fault line—the pure difference at its heart. In Difference and Repetition 
Gilles Deleuze mounts his seminal critique of the subordination of this pure 
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difference to the identity of representation. His critique, in fact, affords us the 
opportunity to deal better with the debilitating problematics of national identity by 
rethinking national consciousness itself, which in turn allows for the readjusting of 
the proverbial scale as far as identity and difference are concerned.  
 With regard the interplay of sameness, identity, and difference, Deleuze has 
the following to say:  
In reality, the distinction between the same and the identical bears fruit 
only if one subjects the Same to a conversion which relates it to the 
different, while at the same time the things and beings which are 
distinguished in the different suffer a corresponding radical 
destruction of their identity. Only on this condition is difference 
thought in itself, neither represented nor mediated. The whole of 
Platonism, by contrast, is dominated by the idea of drawing a 
distinction between ‘the thing itself’ and the simulacra. Difference is 
not thought in itself but related to a ground, subordinated to the same 
and subject to mediation in mythic form. Overturning Platonism, then, 
means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over 
image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections. (66)  
 
From this, one begins to see the outline for a cogent and ethical critique of national 
identity: cogent because it does not seek to refute what cannot be subjected to 
refutation and ethical because it mitigates nationalism’s violence whose point of 
reference is the original form which must be approximated at any cost. Accordingly, 
the resisting of national consciousness as it is structured—by way of privileging 
representational sameness at the expense of what Deleuze calls difference in itself—is 
not only viable but is also ethically necessary as “the equal or identical always 
moves toward the absence of difference, so that everything may be reduced to a 
common denominator” (DR 65).  
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 One of my central objectives, then, is to locate the Deleuzian difference in itself 
in the way the text deploys its structuring literary devices. In other words, the 
objective is to explicate the literary procedure that creates stylistic “conditions” 
through the deployment of narrative devices—conditions which in turn forge the 
space necessary for rethinking national consciousness along the lines of pure 
difference rather than in accordance with representational similitude. These 
conditions, in a nutshell, constitute the driving engine of the thoroughly singular 
force of narrative.  
 This approach to the critique of national identity achieves two interrelated 
aims, the first of which serves as the foundation of the second. It is a critique that 
makes it possible to form a fuller understanding of the mechanisms of national 
consciousness, especially insofar as these mechanisms function in the bounds of 
narrative. It is, most crucially, a critique that moves away from formulations 
focusing either on the rights and wrongs of national consciousness or on its real or 
imaginative nature. This foundation consequently opens up avenues for the 
conceiving of different forms of relating to the nation. Writing about Deleuze’s 
critique of identity and representation as they take shape in the Platonic worldview, 
James Williams explains that 
through a critique of illusions of identity we allow ourselves to become 
open to the expression or thought of virtual becomings and to their 
structural relation to actual individuals. Critique clears the way…by 
allowing us to divest ourselves of the strong tendency of thought to 
return to identity and representation. (Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and 
Repetition 19) 
 
These possibilities of “virtual becomings” stand as further proof that what is at stake 
is neither the rejection of certain identities nor the embracing of alternative ones. 
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Rather, what is really at stake is a more general procedure whose aim is the ultimate 
shifting of the concept of identity itself. 
 Notice also that in the above quotation William uses the term “actual 
individuals,” which is a reference to a point he makes earlier in his text. His 
previous point is meant to clarify that rather than treating the individual as a 
conscious being implying the existence of solid, temporally continuous identity—a 
move that would take us back to square one—Deleuze speaks of the individual as 
a thing where thought takes place as an event but not necessarily [as] 
the conscious thought of a human being. The individual is a take on 
the whole of reality, where reality is not restricted to actual things that 
we can show or identify in the world. The individual is, rather, a series 
of processes that connect actual things, thoughts and sensations to the 
pure intensities and ideas implied by them…An individual is not a 
self-conscious ‘I’, it is a location where thoughts may take place. (6) 
  
In my own analysis I do not wish to go as far as speaking of the individual only as 
the confluence of ideas and intensities. Such a contention which views individuality 
as being restricted to a site where ideas materialize would not suffice in the context 
of fictional narrative, unless one intends to turn the text into a mere illustration of 
philosophical ideas. Having said that, the Deleuzian individual is certainly an 
important element that adds consequential shades of signification to my analysis of 
individual characters. Rather than going so far as embracing the notion of the 
individual character as lacking the self-conscious “I,” I hold that in addition to 
speaking of individual characters in the customary sense, I also see them as having 
greater significance because they help us identify that point of convergence at which 
different visions of national identity emerge or, to continue with Deleuzian 
terminology, become actualized.  
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 Such a flexible definition of individual characters makes it possible to 
formulate a critique that leaves behind the view of identity as necessarily standing 
for a localized or personalized issue and instead think of it as also being a 
designation of an approach which has the potential to transcend any single local 
context, thus forming a sketch or an outline of a broader style of thought.  
 It remains to be mentioned that this definition of the individual character 
should not be construed as an attempt to have the cake and eat it too. It is, rather, 
part of the effort to maintain the distinctiveness of the literary text—the individual 
character, from an aesthetic viewpoint, is simultaneously a cause, originating the 
experience as it happens to take shape in the text, as well as an expression, giving 
that experience an actualized form out of an infinite series of virtual forms. 
 The overriding aim of this study, then, is to interrogate the manner in which 
two novels address the problematics of national consciousness as it relates to the 
individual character. The discussion of nationalism as such, though lengthy in some 
parts, is necessary because it illuminates the background of the main concern of this 
study—the different ways in which Elias Khoury’s Little Mountain and Salman 
Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children use the resources of fictional narrative to provide 
different visions of national identity, visions which still deploy elements of this 
inescapable phenomenon of our age. The potency of these visions lies in their taking 
apart of national consciousness through the placing of pure difference at the centre 
of national identity, thus exposing the breaking point of representational sameness 
that has been established as that identity’s principal hallmark. 
 My analysis of the two novels departs from the argument that their form, 
narrative style, and literary devices speak a language through which a current is 
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created, a current that resists the assumptions—of representational sameness—
through which conventional national identity is formed. It would be relatively 
unchallenging to find narratives that seek to do the same at the level of discourse, 
but the difficulty of this project lies in its insistence on locating this resistance at the 
structural level, at the level of narrative form rather than remain fixated on the 
novels’ discursive content.  
 As I indicate at the outset of the third chapter, we can think of form, narrative 
style, and literary devices as the basic grounds for comparison in this project. After all, 
the subject matter, the genre, and the tone of Little Mountain and Midnight’s Children 
are quite distinct. The tone, for instance, ranges from the tragic in Khoury’s novel to 
the absurd in Rushdie’s. The genre ranges from fragmentary storytelling to magic 
realism. The subject matter ranges from the fractured memories of street fighters to 
the Bildungsroman of an Indian boy. The form, narrative style, and literary devices of 
the two novels, my argument goes, form the site where one finds the possibility for a 
comparative approach—a site which comes into being as a result of non-discursive 
features these novels share.  
 From this viewpoint, the choice to analyze these particular novels is very 
much related to their being so far apart in terms of their approach to storytelling. 
The choice in itself serves as a demonstration of this study’s spirit, a spirit which 
stimulates the conviction that difference ought not to be subordinated to similarity. 
One could also see in this juxtaposition of difference a non-rhetorical statement 
whereby each of the two novels becomes a counterweight to the other, each 
preventing the other from an undue and disproportionate influence. 
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 Both Saleem of Midnight’s Children and the unnamed fighter we encounter in 
Little Mountain’s first chapter come together in this analysis through their different 
enactments of actualizing new visions of national identity. Rather than simply 
offering new forms of identification, their actualized visions, more importantly, 
point to the virtual side which is often eclipsed by the concreteness of the actual. In 
this sense, each of these two characters embodies as a key part of its individuality 
principle a site where a confluence of ideas takes shape, a point of intensity where a 
thoroughly different vision of national identity is revealed. “Forward-looking 
movement,” as Deleuze envisions it in Difference and Repetition, “depends on creative 
experiments by individuals…[who] must experiment in a way that expresses reality 
as the virtual and the actual, and according to principles that apply to all 
individuals” (Williams 30), with each individual initiating this as a procedure whose 
attributes are varied and multifarious. Not only do these characters stand for this 
productive site of experimentation, they also exhibit the fluidity of characters who 
do not function a mere set of ideas. 
 Both of these narratives, it should be added, employ stylistic and formal 
features that surprise or disrupt the conventional as well as upset that which is 
normally taken for granted vis-à-vis national identity—by opponents and 
proponents alike. To put it in yet more specific terms, the primary stylistic features 
that guide the discussion on Little Mountain are repetition and fragmentation. It is 
true that one could find these features in countless other narratives, but the general 
point I want to begin with is that these relatively common features function 
differently in Khoury’s novel. On the surface, the incessant repetition of loosely 
connected stories that turn into endless and imperfect cycles results in a chaotic and 
disfigured narrative about an incomplete, incoherent, and ultimately stunted life. 
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According to this reading, which would be correct if we were to stop at the novel’s 
discursive surface, stylistic repetition symbolizes a search for an order that has yet to 
be articulated. The original order that existed prior to the calamity for which the 
Lebanese civil war stands was nothing but a mere collective formula (i.e. an identity 
that seemed whole in its proposed representational similitude, possible only by way 
of ignoring the split at its heart).  
 In contrast, my reading of Little Mountain in the second chapter involves 
treating repetition from a structural standpoint instead of stopping at its outer 
manifestation. This reading is one that benefits from Deleuze’s formulation of 
repetition as, first, being closely connected to pure difference and, second, as 
holding the potential to disrupt the “strong tendency of thought to return to identity 
and representation” (Williams 19). 
 While the stylistic features guiding the discussion on Midnight’s Children are 
quite distinct, they end up producing (via different but related means) a similar 
effect insofar as the different vision of national identity is concerned. Hyperbole and 
digression—the principal features under consideration in Rushdie’s novel—also 
seek to remake a collective formula that no longer holds together. Instead of reading 
hyperbole as applying pressure to the collective formula, for instance, 
interpretations of Midnight’s Children tend to read it as a straightforward—if 
comical—articulation of the chief nationalist metaphor which equates the nation 
with the individual and vice versa.  
 In other words, these interpretations take Saleem’s hyperbole at face value 
instead of considering its function as the principle according to which the entire arch 
of the narrative is structured. If there is a paradigm of interpretation that Midnight’s 
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Children seems to invite, it is this paradigm which reads the novel’s central metaphor 
only as a re-enactment of national identity’s birth. In addition to the hyperbolic 
amplification of the nationalist metaphor, the other stylistic feature under 
consideration in the third chapter is digression. Digression—the novel’s dominant 
motif of things, events, stories, histories, and characters “leaking into each other”—is 
brought into sharper relief for its generation of a sense of connectedness. This facet is 
crucial to both the act of storytelling as well as the act of creating a community. 
Digression also plays the pivotal role of naturalizing and maintaining the 
connectedness necessary for the advent of the national community across time and 
space.   
After laying down the theoretical groundwork in the first chapter (focusing 
on the intersection of narrative, nation, and individual as well as on literary style) 
and concentrating on the literary analysis in the second and third chapters, I devote 
the fourth chapter to the consideration of the connections between the larger 
question of modernity and the conventional understanding of national identity. As a 
result of these connections, the novels’ engagement with national identity represents 
in a way an indirect engagement with modern identity as such. This final chapter 
discusses the ramifications of the advent of modernity on the question of national 
identity as well as the interaction between cultural and industrial modernities. This 
discussion provides an explanation as to how the force that unravels national 
identity does not only relate to the question of identity but is additionally part of an 
intervention that seeks to readjust conventional assessments of modernity. Given 
that the interconnections between the projects of nationalism and modernity cannot 
be overlooked, this chapter also examines modernity’s seemingly unshakeable 
attachment to a conventional understanding of national consciousness.  
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 Having provided a sketch of the study’s main arguments, I will conclude by 
way of a meta-clarification concerning my theoretical approach. There is no doubt 
that any literary analysis that takes form seriously faces an intractable problem as it 
instantly conjures up the stale image of the now ossified New Criticism. This is 
indeed a sad state of affairs which results in the continued influence of New 
Criticism, not positively, of course, but negatively in that the strong aversion against 
any type of formal literary criticism leads to the steering away from anything that 
might be associated with that most stale of approaches.  
 Taking narrative form seriously, as I do in this study, ought not to be judged 
merely based on a presumptuous association with a defunct school of literary 
criticism. Rather, it should be seen as an attempt to allow formal analysis to occupy 
once again its rightful place, a place it had lost as a result of a flood of discourse 
analysis that has yet to subside. Mark Currie expresses this very sentiment in his 
About Time, published in 2007. He writes that “it is only when a degree of formalism 
is allowed back into the analysis that the critic can do justice to the nature of 
narrative” (28). In an interesting twist in the tumultuous and constantly shifting 
history of literary criticism, the analysis of form and style appears to be becoming 
something of an underdog! 
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Chapter 1  
1 The Narrative Structure of National Affiliation 
It is only when a degree of formalism is allowed back into the 
analysis that the critic can do justice to the nature of narrative. 
Mark Currie, About Time  
The nations are not something eternal. They had their beginnings 
and they will end. 
Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” 
But nationalism as a phenomenon, not as a doctrine presented by 
nationalists, is inherent in a certain set of social conditions; and 
those conditions, it so happens, are the conditions of our time. 
To deny this is at least as great a mistake as to accept nationalism 
on its own terms. 
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 
Part One: The Cultural Depositories of Nationalism  
In a dialogue from Elias Khoury’s novel, As Though She Were Sleeping, the reader 
comes across a reflection on the difference between the novel and poetry. 
Meelya, the novel’s protagonist whose world is a complex mixture of dream and 
reality, is in conversation with her husband, Mansour. An avid lover of poetry, 
Mansour makes the following plea to convince Meelya of the superiority of 
poetry to the novel:  
Every mortal is compelled to relive his own story…Every mortal is 
a story. What is life, my darling? We live a story written by 
someone else, we don’t know who. That’s why I’m afraid to read 
novels. Whenever I read one, I feel the writer must be a monster, 
putting people into tragic situations just to entertain his readers. I 
feel as though I’m being stuffed with stories that never end, as 
though at any moment I might fall out of life and find myself inside 
a book. No, poetry’s better. For the Arabs, poetry was the highest 
art because it described without telling a story. When they wanted 
 17 
to make a story readable they put poetry into it, so the poetry’s the 
story and the story’s structure, and so on. (186) 
 
Whereas Meelya appears to have found a balance between the plastic inner 
world of her dreams and the givenness of the outer world, Mansour continues to 
search for such tranquility to no avail. His fear of novels is mainly associated 
with their ability of engulfing the individual, of mixing the inner and outer 
elements of that individual’s existence. Unlike poetry, which, according to 
Mansour, describes without telling, the novel is the creation of a monster 
precisely because it captures individuality (in the sense of apprehending or 
imprisoning it) through a structure that gives it no hope of ever escaping.  
 Not only is the individual unable to break free from a novel created by 
someone else, the novel is even seen as being the antithesis of life! There is surely 
an unresolved contradiction in what Mansour says, namely in his equating of the 
mortal and the story, before equating being-in-a-story and falling out of life. 
Nevertheless, the more important connection being made is the one between the 
inexhaustible nature of novels and the existential fear that they might actually 
succeed in blurring the distinction between “life,” the mainstay of the 
individual’s consciousness of itself, and story, which provides that individual 
with the ability to project that consciousness outward, thus grasping the external 
world in all its multiplicities.  
  The novel, therefore, is a terrifying genre as it can be an instrument 
whereby the individual’s private life loses its own privacy and becomes only one 
story among innumerable stories, all dictated by an external, god-like author. 
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What is to be found in this case is a frightening alignment between the exteriority 
and interiority of experience. The melancholia which Mansour suffers from (and 
his rather romantic notions about poetry) has its roots in the loss of privacy he 
unsuccessfully mourns, a loss that the proliferation of novels, he believes, bears 
the responsibility for.  
 One should be aware that the events in As Though She Were Sleeping take 
place in Nazareth and Beirut during the 1930s and 40s, a period during which 
great changes are in the making and new states are being carved out of what 
previously had been a single geopolitical entity. Needless to say, this law-making 
carving up of states and the dangers associated with it are accompanied by a 
proliferation of narratives (for which the novel provides an ideal home) meant to 
create a ground for that dramatic change: narratives of independence, of liberty 
from foreign aggression, of Arab unity, of local nationalisms, and so on. The 
basis of such narratives is of course the anonymous, fluidly defined collective 
and not the autonomous individual. What this perspective occludes, as to be 
shown later on, is the possibility of a sort of novel that is capable of providing a 
home for a storytelling that reverses the alignment that makes Mansour fear all 
novels without exception.  
This distinction between the novel and storytelling proper forms one of 
the axes of Walter Benjamin’s seminal piece, “The Storyteller,” which deplores, 
from the outset, the loss of the storyteller, a figure Benjamin sees as the bearer of 
an authentic artistic tradition, the beginning of whose rapid decline coincided 
with the onset of modernity. I should also add that Benjamin prefers not to see 
this decline as a “symptom of decay,” but rather as a long process that gains 
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great momentum with the rise of capitalist bourgeois culture. The rise of the 
novel—contemporaneous with the rise of capitalism—is “the earliest symptom of 
a process whose end is the decline of storytelling” (Benjamin 87). The 
relationship between the novel and storytelling, Benjamin’s analysis suggests, is 
one based on a zero-sum game: as the novel gains in prominence, storytelling 
recedes into the archaic. This picture gets more complicated with the rise of 
“information,” a menace to both storytelling and novel. It turns out that 
information “confronts storytelling as no less of a stranger than did the novel, 
but in a more menacing way, and that it also brings about a crisis in the novel” 
(Benjamin 88). By characterizing it as a danger to both novel and story, Benjamin 
sets information apart. But what he actually does is affiliate the novel with 
information, namely in the way he presents the menace of information as an 
amplification of that of the novel.  
The trouble with this view is its disregard for the plasticity of the novel as 
a genre, one which holds the potential of incorporating both story and 
information, as Benjamin defines them. In fact, it is possible to find a great deal of 
overlap (as far as the culprit is concerned) in the two condemnations of the novel 
mentioned above. On the one hand, the danger lies in the proliferation of novels, 
which Mansour regards as turning all experience (including private one) into 
pure anonymity or exteriority, while robbing the individual of the precious sense 
of distinctiveness or interiority. (It is no wonder, then, that he subscribes 
wholeheartedly to the romantic notion that poetry is the only genre that gives us 
access to interiority, which compels him to find refuge in it.)  
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On the other hand, what Benjamin calls information can creep into any 
narrative, be it story or novel, with a differing degree of influence. The ubiquity 
of information functions in a similar way in that the alignment of the external 
with the internal leads to the primacy of exteriority over interiority (something 
Mansour sees as inherent to the novel). Benjamin writes that  
the founder of Le Figaro, characterized the nature of information in 
a famous formulation. ‘To my readers,’ he used to say ‘an attic fire 
in the Latin Quarter is more important than a revolution in 
Madrid.’ This makes strikingly clear that it is no longer intelligence 
coming from afar, but the information which supplies a handle for 
what is nearest that gets the readiest hearing. (88-9)  
 
While the founder of Le Figaro makes this point by emphasizing the importance 
of the near (Latin Quarter) as opposed to the far (Madrid), what really sets that 
type of information apart from the wisdom of storytelling is that its exteriority 
(i.e., anonymity) is camouflaged with interiority (i.e., sameness). The victims of 
the fire across the city are not simply characterized by their physical proximity, 
but rather by their belonging to what appears to be the same collective; their 
anonymity, in other words, is circumvented and made subjective to the reader 
who mistakenly sees in it the appearance personalized facts.   
The above two examples lead to the recognition that what is at stake in 
Benjamin’s text is not the novel or storytelling as such, but the way in which 
narrative as a category, be it oral or written, organizes experience. Therefore, the 
distinction which Benjamin makes between the novel as a form or as a book and 
storytelling as an activity reliant on attitude and expertise can be misleading 
because it comes at the expense of those novels, which, no less than storytelling, 
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resist both the proliferation of information as well as the exteriority camouflaged 
with subjectivity that information represents.  
As is the case with storytelling, the novel is capable of both shunning 
information and serving as the channel for collective, distant memory, as long as 
it is written in a style that treats its reader not as the anonymous subject of that 
memory but as its rightful inheritor. Storytelling as a craft, then, cannot be the 
determinant factor as Benjamin maintains when he writes that “what 
differentiates the novel from all other forms of prose literature—the fairy tale, the 
legend, even the novella—is that it neither comes from oral tradition nor goes 
into it” (87). The comparison between a form and an activity, one could argue, is 
bound to obfuscate the productive strands of both.  
Benjamin’s judgment of the novel is quite understandable if one were to 
think of the realist novel and its cousin the historical one. The historical novel, I 
argue, is an excellent example of novelistic narration whose essence depends on 
information, whose main function is to swallow individual characters into the 
externality and anonymity of history, and whose conclusion is the stuffing of 
readers with stories coupled with conveniently provided explanations.1 Even if 
one disagrees with most of Georg Lukács’ pronouncements on the characteristics 
                                                
1 In Metahistory, Hayden White shows that a similar procedure is deployed in 
supposedly disinterested historical accounts whereby meaning is generated via the 
narrative structure the historian chooses. He writes that “providing the ‘meaning’ of a 
story by identifying the kind of story that has been told is called explanation by 
emplotment. If, in the course of narrating history, the historian provides it with the 
plot structure of a Tragedy, he has ‘explained’ it in one way; if he has structured it as a 
Comedy, he has ‘explained’ it another way” (7). Though White is concerned with 
historical accounts, his reading is crucial to the central argument I develop in this 
chapter because it captures the movement from explanation through discursive 
information to explanation by way of narrative structure.  
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of a “good” historical novel, his discussion of it in The Historical Novel still 
provides us with an excellent description of what he holds as the accomplished 
historical novel and what I prefer to call the “novel of information.” In short, his 
description shows us how the pre-eminence of information in the novel, which 
coincides with what I call the alignment of the exteriority with the interiority of 
experience, can lead to the masking of the individualized element, even when 
that element appears to be the central concern.  
Lukács’ book I mention above is essentially a study of the rise and fall of 
the historical novel with a short note on the prospects for (positive) change to its 
predicament in the works of authors such as Thomas Mann. More specifically, 
one of the central arguments Lukács advances goes as follows: what is lacking in 
historical novels before those of Sir Walter Scott is the derivation of the 
individuality of characters from their historical epoch (19). For him, this 
shortcoming on the part of the novelist who tries to reproduce a historical era, i.e. 
give the reader information about it, results from the failure to connect narrated 
events with the psychology of principal characters, as Flaubert does in Salammbô 
(193), or from failing to give human embodiments to historical-social types (35).  
1.1 Narrative and Nation: Some Basic Assumptions 
Lukács materialist and teleological approach to the novel is pertinent to the 
discussion at hand: it gives us an extreme instance of the role the novel could 
play in the formation of affiliation between the individual and external forces, in 
his case, the social antagonism of history, social trends, and historical forces, in 
ours, the idea of the nation. Before proceeding further with the question of how 
narrativity figures into the individual’s relationship with what I call the 
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exteriority of experience, we should take a step back and take stock of some basic 
assumptions about the link between narrative, nation, and the formation of 
national consciousness. Although somewhat rudimentary, these assumptions 
will prove to be invaluable throughout this dissertation. 
In the opening pages of Nations and Nationalism, Ernest Gellner 
approaches the discussion on the difference between nation and state by way of 
calling attention as to how, in the modern imagination, the idea of nationality is 
utterly indispensable to the individual. While many of us can quite easily 
imagine an individual who is stateless, an individual who lacks a nationality is 
almost incomprehensible: 
A man without a nation defies the recognized categories and 
provokes revulsion…a man must have a nationality as he must 
have a nose and two ears; a deficiency in any of these particulars is 
not inconceivable and does from time to time occur, but only as a 
result of some disaster, and it is itself a disaster of a kind. All this 
seems obvious, though, alas, it is not true. But that it should come 
to seem so very obviously true is indeed an aspect, or perhaps the 
very core, of the problem of nationalism. Having a nation is not an 
inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as 
such. (6)  
 
An individual who is not affiliated with a nation, then, is not only a curiosity or 
an anomaly but does not fit in the modern world altogether! This individual is, to 
use Gellner’s metaphor, a person who no longer casts a shadow. Even if we are 
conceptually aware of the constructed nature of the nation and that it is far from 
being an inherent attribute of humanity, the perception itself has the formidable 
influence so as to endow it with a givenness, thus making it very much part of 
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“reality.” It is for this reason that refutation and affirmation cannot be used as 
poles for a system meant to judge the nation.    
If we try a more metaphorical standpoint, the homophonic quality of the 
terms “nation” and “narration” (which Homi Bhabha capitalized on in his 
collection of essays, Nation and Narration) would point us to an intimate, visceral 
connection between the two terms and what they signify. Narration, from this 
symbolic perspective, could be seen as at once a precondition of the nation as 
well as the mechanism which metaphorically gives birth to the nation. The story 
of the nation—from the Latin natio, literally meaning “that which has been 
born”—comes to life from the travails of narrative. 
One can take this metaphorical conception even further and elaborate on 
the ways in which nationhood is often spoken of through analogies which 
transform the entity (or should I say the hypothesis?) we call “nation” into 
something akin to a human subject: the nation was born out of its people’s 
distinctive culture, language, or civic laws, it came of age during one era or 
another, it holds certain religious or secular values, visions, and even a 
worldview. Ernest Renan, for instance, invokes this principle several times in his 
essay, “What is a Nation?” “The nation,” he says, “like the individual, is the 
culmination of a long past of endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion,” and its 
existence resembles an individual’s existence in that both are a sign of the 
“perpetual affirmation of life” (19). In addition, the moral qualities of a nation are 
to be judged based on the same moral yardstick applied to those of the 
individual: “I often tell myself that an individual who had those faults which in 
nations are taken for good qualities, who fed off vainglory, who was to that 
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degree jealous, egotistical, and quarrelsome, and who would draw his sword on 
the smallest pretext, would be the most intolerable of men” (Renan 20). This 
demand for consistency insofar as moral standards are concerned, moves the 
bond between individuality and nationhood from metaphor onto a more tangible 
level. 
Narrative also has the more concrete function of providing a model for the 
embodiment of individual and nation, an embodiment that any nationalism must 
naturalize in order to become established and perpetually disseminate in order 
to overcome the test of time. Of course, nationalists are in the habit of making the 
claim that nationalism is a characteristically grassroots movement, one which 
comes into existence through people’s loyalties, certainly not through narrative 
qualities. It is true that nationalism needs to “infect” a large number of people in 
order to become a sizable force, but we must be careful as not to confuse the 
effect of nationalism with its genesis. Nationalism becomes visible when it 
mobilizes the crowds, but that visibility should not be confused with its ontology 
as such. There are, as Gellner points out, an almost unquantifiable number of 
nationalisms that do exist. Their failure to attract the crowds, however, results in 
a lack of visibility that would otherwise give them an assured existence in the 
world of quantifiable facts.  
Unlike Eric Hobsbawm, who, in Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, 
professes his preference for an inquiry that pays special attention to the view 
from below (10-11), i.e., the crowds, Gellner points out that the introduction of 
the standardized high culture of nationalism from above is the phenomenon to be 
scrutinized. What is to be noted, however, is how the two approaches (though, to 
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a lesser degree in Gellner’s case) fail to assess nationalism’s genesis adequately 
because they both need visibility in order to produce their findings. For Gellner, 
the age of nationalism is not so much the age of mass movements, but rather the 
period during which there is an  
imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low 
cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of 
the totality, of the population. It means that generalized diffusion 
of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the 
requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological 
communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous, 
impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized 
individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, 
in place of previous complex structure of local groups. (57)  
 
Gellner reaches his conclusion from a socio-political angle, while Hobsbawm 
does so from a historical one. We know that the footprints of mass movements 
and the vital changes to the world of bureaucracy are very conspicuous. Because 
of their conspicuous nature, these phenomena become the ideal ingredients of a 
procedure that develops explanations and puts them in the service of facts. A 
given configuration of explanations and facts, if it gains a certain level of 
influence, makes the next step on this ladder and becomes a theory. Materialist 
theories, as Aijaz Ahmad succinctly puts it in his In Theory, evolve in the 
following manner: “facts require explanations, and all explanations, even bad 
ones, presume a configuration of concepts, which we provisionally call ‘theory.’ 
In other words, theory is not simply a desirable but a necessary relation between 
facts and explanations” (34). This, obviously, would not be credible enough to 
make the cut in the context of aesthetics, where it would not be possible to say 
that narrative simply institutes a homogenized high culture, and it would not be 
 27 
enough to show how narrative gives voice to that high culture. The literariness of 
fictional narrative necessitates that it be read as a cause as well as a sign of what 
it embodies and not as an explanation or an illustration. 
1.2 Narrative and Identity: From Individual into National 
Subject 
To sum up the point of departure developed thus far, we can say that in what 
Gellner terms as “the modern imagination” the individual and the nation are 
inextricably linked, that the nation owes its existence and resilience to narration, 
and that fictional narrative ought to be evaluated according to its literary 
components, not only its discourse. This point of departure, then, leads us to 
recognize that there is something to be learned from bringing together the three 
focal points—narrative, nation, individual.  
Bringing the three together allow us to ask the right questions with 
regards to how their confluence give rise to national consciousness and the 
specific form of identity it engenders; it also makes it possible to put the three in 
conjunction laterally rather than hierarchically. In other words, this lateral 
approach helps us avoid seeing one simply as the result of another or as its 
cause. In addition, national consciousness, though riddled with bad faith and 
contradictions, develops within a complex set of factors and never as a chain 
reaction. Treating national consciousness as such can either lead to its promotion 
through crude ideology or produce a feeble attempt to refute it, an attempt that 
may well invoke another set of theories and ideologies but can never be coherent 
enough to form either a theory of nationalism or of anti-nationalism. We can 
start, then, by asking the following question: how does the individual acquire a 
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national identity or become a “national subject,” and how does this subject 
configure into the tripartite of narrative, nationhood, and individual?  
Before going further, however, I think a qualification is in order: I use the 
term “national subject” not in the sense of a subject that possesses or has 
acquired a strong, ideological identification2 with a given nation (or, even, a 
subject that has been nationalized out of its presumed privacy), but simply to 
denote the end result of a process of formation whereby individuals come to 
understand their selfhood as implicated in a bigger whole, as constituting a part 
of a certain nation, which is quite different from the pernicious associations we 
draw from any noun to which the adjective “national” is attached. It is worth 
remembering that the usage of the term “nationalism” as a term that implies a 
racist worldview is a relatively recent development in the history of what 
Hobsbawm calls “the principle of nationality,” a development which, he argues, 
took place in Europe from 1880s onwards. Hobsbawm writes that one of 
principal changes to occur in the period between 1880-1914 is a shift “which 
affected not so much the non-state national movements…but national sentiments 
within the established nation-states: a sharp shift to the political right of nation 
and flag, for which the term ‘nationalism’ was actually invented in the last 
decade(s) of nineteenth century” (102). Hobsbawm chronology, to start with, is 
belated. What should be noted, however, is that the overlap between nationalism 
and a racist, exclusivist worldview ought not to convince us that nationalism and 
a racist worldview are constant facets of the phenomenon of nationalism. 
                                                
2 Also known as “patriotism.” 
 29 
Nationalism, by definition, is exclusivist, but different nationalisms draw the line 
in various ways. The main concern, then, is not whether Hobsbawm’s 
chronology is accurate, but simply to point out that some nationalisms draw the 
line based on race, others deploy different exclusionary measures such as 
language, culture, or legal status.   
On the connection between racism and nationalism, Hobsbawm holds that 
“what brought ‘race’ and ‘nation’ even closer [in the nineteenth century] was the 
practice of using both as virtual synonyms, generalizing equally widely about 
‘racial’/’national’ character, as was then the fashion” (108). This shows that the 
pernicious connotations of right-wing politics and racial purity that the word 
“nationalism” sometimes elicits are connected to specific historical developments 
rather than part of nationalism as such. They pertain, in other words, to some 
nationalisms at certain historical junctures and are not wedded to national 
consciousness itself.  
Thus, for the purposes of this discussion, the national subject, at its most 
fundamental level, is an individual who has come to base his understanding of 
his selfhood on a double narrative rather than on a singular one. The identity of 
the individual as such has been theorized as being formed through a private and 
singular narrative that (selectively) incorporates life events in order to assemble a 
“history of oneself.” Looking back at this history from the vantage point of the 
present is what allows the individual to form an identity whose current 
attributes are the consequence of what appears to the individual as an 
evolutionary past. Although taken for granted, this identity-through-narrative is 
the crucial baseline for any assessment of the way an individual becomes 
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viscerally implicated in the foggy entity we call nation. Paul Ricœur, to take one 
example from a long line of philosophers and critics,3 starts his essay “Narrative 
Identity” with the following remark: 
Do not human lives become more readily intelligible when they are 
interpreted in the light of the stories that people tell about them? 
And do not these ‘life stories’ themselves become more intelligible 
when what one applies to them are the narrative models—plots—
borrowed from history or fiction (a play or a novel)?... It is thus 
plausible to endorse the following chain of assertions: self-
knowledge is an interpretation; self interpretation, in its turn, finds 
in narrative, among other signs and symbols, a privileged 
mediation; this mediation draws on history as much as it does on 
fiction, turning the story of a life into a fictional story or a historical 
fiction, comparable to those biographies of great men in which 
history and fiction are intertwined. (188) 
 
Narrative, from this perspective, is an organizing pattern, an Urmodel for the 
synergy of specific, localized events and their possible temporal arrangement. 
Although the combined effect of this synergy is self-knowledge or knowledge of 
one’s own identity, this type of knowledge, Ricœur stresses, is dependent on a 
necessary interaction with and opposition to other exterior identities within a 
social milieu that is saturated with signs and symbols—something that the title 
of Ricœur’s book, Oneself as Another, captures well.  
There are, nevertheless, two interrelated problems with this explanation. 
First, there is an absence of differentiation between what could be termed as 
tangible identities and purely abstract ones. Second, the investigation is 
                                                
3 See Jerome Bruner’s “Life as Narrative,” Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, Paul J. Eakin’s 
How Our Lives Become Stories, Donald E. Hall’s Subjectivity, and Christopher Lasch’s 
The Minimal Self. 
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restricted to narrative as it pertains to individual selfhood. Interactions between 
individuals in a given society could be split into two categories: tangible or 
concrete interactions with other individuals and abstract or possible ones.  
Possible interactions remain virtual and are never actualized. Such 
“interaction” is abstract or hypothetical, “taking place” only on a conceptual 
level. This abstract interaction is neither actualized nor can they be actualized as 
both individual identities in question, those of oneself and of another, are not 
defined by concrete social determinations, but only by a common affiliation to a 
collective. Unlike the possible interactions, tangible ones are first and foremost 
defined by one or more social determinations and never simply by a common 
affiliation which could come into play either rhetorically or as an added layer of 
signification. 
Ricœur’s explanation also fails to account for complimentary forms of 
identity such as the national one. The point to note about the nation’s narrative is 
its capacity to be both separate from and part of the subject’s narrative of itself. 
This function is the underlying condition that could lead to mistaking purely 
abstract identities for concrete ones. While the private narrative allows one to 
conceive of one’s own identity and those of others through actual interactions, 
the national narrative allows one to conceive of those abstract identities without 
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always requiring actualized interaction.4 What occurs is essentially a 
misrecognition whereby purely abstract identities are misrecognized as 
actualized ones, which in turn leads to eradicating the possibility of difference 
inherent in abstract identities.  
The influence of those abstract identities, however, arises conceptually 
through the hypothetical mediation between the private narrative and the 
national one. Therefore, unlike the private individual, the national subject must 
draw on a double narrative. This double narrative, as the name suggests, is a 
product of two narratives, the first of which is private and the second is 
collective. The point at which the two understandings meet is the point at which 
the private individual is effectively turned into a national subject. 
 The private strand of the national subject’s narrative become determined 
by the larger narrative, which gives the nation a story and a life of its own, while 
at the same time that private strand comes to be conceived as constituting an 
essential component of the larger narrative. The national subject is a nationalized 
subject who is at once a product and a component of the collective nation. In 
other words, what I call the national subject is a subject morphed by a narrative 
that is always larger than life while at the same time perceiving itself as a 
component that influences (or at least ought to influence) that larger narrative.  
                                                
4 This is in part the result of the time conception within which nationalism is possible. 
See Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: “An American will never meet, or even 
know the names of more than a handful of his…fellow-Americans. He has no idea of 
what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, 
anonymous, simultaneous activity” (26). 
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The structure of this double narrative is captured by two Latin phrases: 
the first is e pluribus, unum, meaning “out of many, one,” and the second is e 
unibus, pluram, which means “out of one, many.”5 The connotations of the first 
phrase are quite obvious: the nation is a harmonious whole, a whole which 
though comprised out of numerous elements is characterized by oneness 
nonetheless. The connotations of the second one, however, are more intricate. If 
the national subject constitutes an essential component of nationhood, then the 
oneness that defines it turns out to be oneness out of which the plurality of the 
nation is generated. While this might seem  as evident as not to require comment 
as collective narratives always existed in one form or another, it ceases to seem 
evident when we consider the distinction which must be made between other 
collective narratives that may be described as concrete and the narrative of the 
nation. The affiliation with the narrative of the nation has the following major 
differences. 
First: the double narrative in the case of nationalism is not determined 
through a chosen affiliation, or through a “daily plebiscite” as Renan puts it,6 but 
presented as the default. (Gellner’s metaphor of the individual who lacks 
nationality as one without a shadow comes to mind here.) To grasp the 
difference between other affiliations and the national one, it is enough to think 
                                                
5 I borrow this Latin phrase from David Foster Wallace’s essay “E Unibus Pluram: 
Television and U.S. Fiction.”  
6 After considering and dismissing several criteria of the nation, namely history of 
conquest, race, language, material interest, religion, geography, Renan concludes his 
“What is a Nation?” by insisting that common will is the single, most decisive 
criterion: “A nation’s existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite” 
(19). 
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about how some nations owe their formation to the fact that their borders, 
whether physical or more fluid, have been determined by the outer borders of 
other, already established nations. In the age of nationalism, even if the national 
affiliation is not constituted by a set of historical, cultural, or linguistic 
developments, nationalist sentiments will still come about nonetheless simply as 
a result of being squeezed between other, perhaps more resilient, national 
affiliations. This is certainly not applicable to other collectives such religious or 
tribal ones. (This also explains the difficulty of determining the criteria of 
nationhood through religion, language, customs, or cultural inheritance as the 
“by-product” nationalisms always form insurmountable exceptions.)7 Most 
important, the “affiliation by default” presents a serious difficulty when it comes 
to writing. The narratives which will be discussed in the coming chapters will 
elucidate this point further: because they try to forgo the logic of the national 
affiliation, they must always begin at this default position and work their way 
from there. 
Second: it is virtually impossible to cast away the national affiliation 
procedurally. We can see this at work in countries that require immigrants to 
assimilate: they can do so in bureaucratic and civic terms, but they can neither 
fully cast away their original nationality nor fully adopt the new one. 
                                                
7 The difficulty of determining a universal set of criteria of nationhood is also the result 
of nationalism’s tendency to demarcate the nation in hindsight. The end result is a 
process of selection rather than an attempt at providing a definition. This is to say that 
each nationalism selects from a community’s unique histories and mythologies (or a 
mixture of the two) those criteria which happen to be useful. This is also to say that all 
attempts to isolate those “essential” criteria of nationhood are doomed to failure 
which is an unavoidable component of the approach itself.  
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Consequently, states that drop this requirement and define civic assimilation as 
being sufficient have been much more successful in integrating immigrants into 
society. In comparison, religious affiliation, to take one example, can be cast 
away through non-practice or conversion, procedures that the individual has the 
capacity to undertake. Obviously, the process of renouncing or revoking 
citizenship also does not apply because it is a function of the state, not the nation.    
The third and most important distinction is that the national affiliation 
comes by way of a double narrative does not simply signify a conflation of two 
narratives that have morphed into a singularity; it is rather the crucible, a 
matching point, or a point of binding, at which the national narrative meets the 
private narrative of the national subject. The nature of this double narrative 
represents a fertile ground for ideology as it binds subject and nation in a way 
that is extremely difficult to be undone. It is crucial at this point to distinguish 
between the acts of binding and superimposition and account for the difference 
in the way ideology operates in each case.  
To approach this distinction, let us turn to Benedict Anderson’s classical 
study of nationalism, Imagined Communities. Anderson articulates the 
incorporative nature of the nation’s narrative saying that “the nation’s 
biography8 snatches, against the going mortality rate, exemplary suicides, 
poignant martyrdoms, assassinations, executions, wars, and holocausts. But, to 
serve the narrative purpose, these violent deaths must be remembered/forgotten 
                                                
8 Notice how even the most impartial critics of nationalism frequently use words 
applicable to individuals when discussing the nation.  
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as ‘our own’” (206). Anderson’s intention is to draw attention to the selective (in 
some cases, sinister) process through which national history is usually 
constructed. What inadvertently comes across in this comment, however, is how 
these occurrences do not always become remarkable on their own “merit” but as 
a result of their superimposition onto the nation’s narrative.  
The straightforward superimposition of discrete occurrences onto the 
nation’s narrative arc is most evident in the historical novel in which the 
character’s private story becomes remarkable by virtue of its occurring as part of 
the foreground of an important juncture in the nation’s story. Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, for instance, exhibits this kind of superimposition. 
Hester’s story, a woman’s adulterous love affair with a young priest, is surely a 
story worth telling, even without the national background. Nevertheless, the 
backdrop of puritan America, a story that is the property of the nation as whole 
with all its repressions and its witch hunts, puts the novel on a completely 
different level of significance and possibly makes it a better candidate, as far as 
the literary historian is concerned, for the inclusion in the American literary 
canon. (A more mundane and certainly less accomplished example of this 
process is the Hollywood historical film, which tends to be conventional and 
unremarkable when it comes to the character’s private story and very heavy on 
the grander, national level.) Lukács’ emphasis on the individualization of the 
historical epoch is thus misleading because such individualization does not 
produce an autonomous individual but an automaton. Ideology in the case of 
superimposition is mainly projected onto the background itself. Even if the 
character’s actions or discourse are part of that grand ideology (how we 
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overcome this and the motivation for making amends for it), such actions and 
discourse remain a function of the domineering background.  
In the case of binding, however, something more subtle happens: the 
national narrative in the background does not necessarily serve as the validation 
of the private narrative, nor does it dominate it openly. Rather, the two 
narratives are no longer simply superimposed, no longer run parallel with their 
interaction restricted to the surface, but they are connected through various 
structural literary mechanisms, the most important of which is the plot itself.  
To illustrate this point, let us consider how this pertains to plot in a 
somewhat cursory manner before giving this critical point its due treatment in 
the discussion of specific novels in the second and third chapters. In addition to 
being the most visible organizing pattern, the plot is also the site at which two 
often confused notions of identity overlap. Ricœur argues in the essay I quote 
above that the failure to distinguish between these notions is the source of the 
difficulties contemporary discussions face with regards to the question of 
identity. Ricœur labels these notions with the Latin terms ipse and idem: “identity 
as sameness (Latin: idem; English: same; German: gleich) and identity as selfhood 
(Latin: ipse; English: self; German: Selbst)” (189). Identity as ipse is the notion of 
selfhood as uniqueness (or the fundamental differentiation between the self and 
the other), whereas identity as idem is the notion of identity as maintaining 
coherence over the course of time (i.e. being one and the same or having a solid 
temporal permanence). For instance, retrograde amnesia would impair identity 
as idem more significantly than it would identity as ipse. From this, Ricœur draws 
the conclusion that “the basis for the discontinuity in the determination of the 
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identical is that identity as uniqueness does not thematically imply time, which is 
not the case with identity as permanence” (190). How does narrative plot figure 
into this distinction? Plot, according to this thesis, is the mechanism that creates a 
dynamic link between the two forms of identity, a link that can only be located in 
narrative, irrespective of how complex or primitive it happens to be. This 
capacity is a constitutive element of narrative which “constructs the durable 
properties of a character, what one could call his narrative identity, by 
constructing the kind of dynamic identity found in the plot which creates the 
character’s identity” (195).  
It is possible, then, to account for both private and national identities by 
keeping Ricœur’s scheme but supplementing it by arguing that there is at the 
centre of the binding model an axes point at which four different strands 
coalesce. The first two strands belong to the character (or national subject) and 
the other two belong to the nation which gets a characterization of its own. This 
characterization posits the nation as having its own identity through being 
distinctive from other nations and through having a degree of coherence or 
permanence in time, permanence that often stretches to a period preceding the 
official establishment of the nation state.  
If we separate the dual plot, the private segment and the national one, 
each of which with own idem and ipse, then look at its arrangement, we would 
find that the two segments are aligned so that their critical turning points are 
inextricably bound together in two complementary ways. First, the nation’s 
identity mirrors the individual’s in both respects, uniqueness and sameness. 
Second, this mirroring is reinforced so that there are on the narrative’s arc key 
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matching points: the reversal, conflict, and resolution in one segment of the plot 
match those in the other. All this may be done without resorting to making the 
connection between the turning points overt discursively. The end result is a 
double and synchronized narrative that generates national consciousness or 
reinforces it by way of its specific arrangement of the private and the national. 
This procedure would not be greatly affected by narratological variations such 
linearity or fragmentariness.9 
Drawing on Louis Althusser’s terminology, one could call the cumulative 
effect of this process “the literary interpellation of individuals into national 
subjects.” In “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Althusser, argues 
that the subject is always a product of ideology in the sense that it is through 
ideology that individuals get interpellated into subjects (170). “The category of 
the subject,” he adds, “is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology 
has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as 
subjects” (171). In this essay, Althusser describes how the ideological state 
apparatuses generally use non-violent means to maintain the status-quo by 
turning individuals into subjects. Despite suggesting that individuals become 
subjects, he still holds “that an individual is always-already a subject, even 
before he is born, is nevertheless the plain reality, accessible to everyone and not 
a paradox at all” (176). While Althusser speaks of a process entailing becoming a 
subject, he still posits the subject as always-already a subject. 
                                                
9 This is in contrast to Anderson’s argument that it is the realist novel that succeeds in 
cementing national consciousness (Imagined Communities 25), though it is certainly 
easier to recognize this procedure in the realist novel than it would be in a 
fragmentary or nonlinear narrative.  
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The first part of his argument, therefore, is persuasive. The second part, I 
think, is in need of some refinement as it is much too deterministic to be 
plausible, not to mention that it remains irreconcilable with the first part. 
Introducing the distinction between the two models of double narrativity to 
Althusser’s deterministic ontology of subjecthood makes it possible to refine it so 
as to allow for an opening in Althusser’s closed system. While the fictional 
narrative based on the background-foreground model establishes the subject as 
an always-already national subject, my argument goes, the one based on the 
binding model begins with establishing an individual before using literary 
mechanisms to turn that individual into a national subject.  
Unlike what takes place in the superimposition model, the national 
narrative in the binding model does not need to have a domineering and 
palpable presence in the economy of the fictional narrative as a whole. The 
national narrative could coexist as another, remote level of action and events, or 
could simply recede and thus appear to bear little significance to the dynamics of 
the private narrative. The key point, however, is that the two narratives are 
bound together in a way that allows them to provide mutual validation of each 
other. Moreover, the national subject arises “naturally” as part of a process of 
becoming rather than a process of authorial imposition.  
It is for these reasons that the superimposition model tends to produce a 
less sophisticated ideological structure than does the binding model. We can take 
this further and imagine the difference between the two models to be akin to the 
difference between the repressive state apparatuses and the ideological state 
apparatuses as Althusser describes them: while one functions in overt, direct, 
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and often violent manner, the other functions covertly, indirectly, and is often 
more effective than its counterpart. Finally, because the binding model is 
embedded within the narrative’s structure, rather than on its outer surface, it 
tends not to need to draw on the resources of discourse in order to be effective. 
In this situation, the national narrative no longer determines the private one 
openly through providing the purpose or cause for the subject’s actions. The 
mutual validation instead makes it possible for the private narrative to give the 
national one its purpose and raison d’être.       
The result of this ideological structure can be a reversal of the usual 
operation of ideological principles. Because it is possible for the national 
narrative to be determined by the private one, the hegemonic elements of that 
determination become so muted so as to make such elements appear either as 
benign or non-existent altogether. The other consequence of this ideological 
structure is to give the national subject the prerogative of law-preserving as it is 
defined in Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence.” Although the national subject has a 
particular, private orientation, other subjects belonging to the same nation must 
by definition have either the same orientation or at least ones that significantly 
overlap with that of the national subject. Thus, national affiliation becomes 
constituted through these orientations which come into existence through the 
private narrative rather than imposed through the national one.  
1.3 Narrative and Ethics: The Individual and the National 
Community 
This drive toward homogeneous orientations effectively transforms the question 
from one concerned with whether affiliations are free choices or default 
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submissions into one that plays out in the territory of ethics. This reformulation 
of the question is of great significance since the success of a school of thought 
depends more on its ability to reformulate questions rather than on its ability to 
provide satisfactory answers to them. This procedure of changing the territory of 
the question at hand is not to be understood as a method for creating confusion. 
Confusions, after all, could be dispelled through making more reliable 
information available, an effort that is relatively easy to undertake. What this 
procedure accomplishes, rather, is a change of the field in which ideas operate, 
and that is where its true power is to be found. Furthermore, the reformulation of 
the question from choices to ethics is quite logical and in many ways inescapable 
since it is perfectly in line with the putting forth of national affiliation as a default 
position rather than as part of a social, cultural, or historical development. The 
novel, which Lukács neatly describes as the epic of a world abandoned by God,10 
could play a massive role as a result of its capacity to shape ethical orientations 
that come about not as dictations by a transcendental figure but as ones which 
transpire out of a structural mediation between the individual and the group.  
According to what rubric, then, is the ethic of national affiliation 
formulated in this environment, and what coordinates should one use in its 
evaluation? Answering these questions requires an outline of the interplay 
between narrative and ethics before the issue of ethical adherence to community 
can be properly addressed. A good starting point is the deep-seated connection 
                                                
10 A few pages later in The Theory of the Novel, Lukács writes that “irony, the self-
surmounting of a subjectivity that has gone as far as it was possible to go, is the 
highest freedom that can be achieved in a world without God” (93). 
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between narrative and ethics, a connection that is the subject of a key section in 
Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self. At the end of this section, entitled “The Self in 
Moral Space,” Taylor provides the following convenient summary: 
My underlying thesis is that there is a close connection between the 
different conditions of identity, or of one’s life making sense, that I 
have been discussing. One could put it this way: because we cannot 
but orient ourselves to the good, and thus determine our place 
relative to it and hence determine the direction of our lives, we 
must inescapably understand our lives in narrative form, as a 
‘quest’. But one could perhaps start from another point: because we 
have to determine our place in relation to the good, therefore we 
cannot be without an orientation to it, and hence must see our life 
in story. From whichever direction, I see these conditions as 
connected facets of the same reality, inescapable structural 
requirements of human agency. (51-2)11  
 
According to the passage quoted above, individuals do not only read a narrative, 
encounter an ethical frame of reference, then deal with it through adopting its 
frame of reference, rejecting it altogether, or by forming a more nuanced position 
with regard to the coordinates it establishes. Rather, Taylor argues that ethical 
orientations and the narratives they compel individuals to develop are the 
conditions that precede identity itself. Unlike Ricœur, who believes that 
individuals draw on the resources of fictional and historical narratives to form 
the knowledge of the self, Taylor holds the formation of self-knowledge to be a 
more innate process than Ricœur would acknowledge. In addition, self-
knowledge has a rooted linkage to ethics. In other words, individuals become the 
                                                
11 The first thing we must do is put Taylor’s “good” in quotation marks, as it were, not 
because of the postmodernist ethos which absolves us from having to make judgments 
or grapple with definitions, but because I am not concerned with the specific content 
of this “good,” but in its function as a structural principle. It is, for our purposes, only 
a compass that defines direction, regardless of its specific direction. 
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way they are through an inevitable and inescapable “cognitive instrument” 
whose basic elements are narrative and ethics.  
Putting aside the moralizing tone of Taylor’s argument, I want to glean 
two conclusions form this understanding of one’s life as an unfolding story with 
an identifiable orientation: first, narrative should not be considered as either 
exterior or interior from the individual’s perspective, but as one that privileges 
one over the other. To account for narrative’s dual nature is to form a more 
comprehensive picture of its role in the formation of affiliation—perhaps one of 
the most important tokens of one’s ethical orientation. Put differently, narrative’s 
duality means that it does not play out only as a narrative read, but also as a 
narrative lived. Second, the “concealed” narrative (or the one lived), is critical to 
the formation of private identity, and consequently comes to be the essential 
mechanism through which the “revealed” narrative (the one read) is grasped. 
This partly explains the resilience of the binding model as its instinctual appeal 
greatly exceeds that of the background-foreground model: because the privileged 
domain of the binding model is the private narrative, whose instinctual qualities 
are imbued with the characteristics of the “concealed” narrative of identity, it 
proves to be more difficult for the critical faculties to tackle as this type of 
narrative lacks the more explicit or discursive separation between interiority and 
exteriority one finds in the “revealed” one. 
With this in mind, let us go back to the question about the ethic of national 
affiliation. Commonsensical notions suggest that such ethical structure is very 
much part of a commitment to a national community, to a substantial and largely 
anonymous group of people. The main issue with these notions is their ability to 
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obscure the fundamental core of this ethical commitment to a community, a core 
that is mistakenly seen as being the national community at large. As a result, two 
principal views on this ethical community are formed.  
The first camp finds in such ethical commitment a way for the individual 
to connect with a unified national community and thus manage to overcome an 
impersonal and alienating world, a world where individuals live as isolated 
monads bent on achieving maximum, selfish benefits. It is also possible to add to 
this camp its strategic version which is based on the following argument: in 
perilous times, when there is a legitimate struggle for liberation and/or 
emancipation, the ethical commitment to the community is an indispensable 
structure (perhaps the only viable one) which could unite and mobilize a 
significant number of individuals behind a single, clearly defined cause.  
The other camp, however, finds in it an ominous and cynical method 
(directed from above) to compel the private individual to commit all energies 
and resources, not to mention readiness to make precious sacrifices. This view 
also has a strategic version which grudgingly accepts its cynical side because, all 
things considered, it is a lesser evil to the alternatives available, especially where 
sectarian, ethnic, and racial divisions are rife. 
As these two camps begin from an inaccurate starting point, the different 
directions they end up taking come full circle because they lead to the same 
problem: that the focal point is the community as such. The argument I want to 
formulate starts with the assertion that the assumption which holds this ethical 
commitment to be rooted in the community ultimately changes the field within 
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which this set of ideas operate; it ends with the assertion that this ethical 
commitment beginnings and endings lie at the level of the national subject who 
misrecognizes the orientations of those abstract identities which are themselves 
actualized through a process of misrecognition. 
Taking this misrecognition for a valid connection between individual and 
community forms the impetus for Fredric Jameson’s controversial argument in 
his “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism.” In this 
essay, Jameson tries to articulate an interpretive paradigm for a body of literature 
that he insists is bound to be misread if one were to approach it using 
interpretive paradigms developed for Western literature. Jameson does so, he 
claims, to remedy serious mistakes made by critics who either follow “the 
strategy of trying to prove that these texts are as ‘great’ as those of the canon 
itself,” or do more damage by arguing that they “remind us of outmoded stages 
of our own first-world cultural development” (65). Because of their belated 
development, the second view maintains, these literary forms are constantly 
trying to catch up with their Western counterparts.12  
There is no doubt that the basis for Jameson’s clear-cut dichotomy 
between Western and third-world literatures is to come up with credible critical 
tools to deal with habitually misread texts, in addition to countering a type of 
literary history whose foundation is the denial of coevalness of different literary 
                                                
12 See Roger Allen’s The Arabic Novel: An Historical and Critical Introduction. Allen’s 
literary history of the Arabic novel is very much informed by this view.   
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traditions.13 After making his much criticized dichotomy, Jameson proceeds to 
his central assertion: 
Let me now, by way of a sweeping hypothesis, try to say what all 
third-world cultural productions seem to have in common and 
what distinguishes them radically from analogous cultural forms in 
the first world. All third-world texts are necessarily, I want to 
argue, allegorical, and in a very specific way: they are to be read as 
what I will call national allegories, even when, or perhaps I should 
say, particularly when their forms develop out of predominantly 
western machineries of representation, such as the novel. (69) 
 
What is striking about this “hypothesis,” first of all, is its absolutist nature and 
the virtual absence of any qualifications. Putting that aside,14 however, one finds 
in this claim an expression of the error mentioned above, namely the tendency to 
conceive of the subject’s national affiliation either as a metaphorical embodiment 
of the nation or as a realization of its alleged characteristics, principles, or ethical 
values. “Third-world texts,” Jameson adds, “even those which are seemingly 
private…necessarily project a political dimension in the form of national 
allegory: the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the 
embattled situation of the public third-world culture and society”15 (69).  
                                                
13 In Time and the Other, Johannes Fabian critiques the discipline of anthropology for 
defining its subject, the Other, as existing within a different timeframe. In doing so, 
anthropology “gave to politics and economics—both concerned with human Time—a 
firm belief in ‘natural,’ i.e., evolutionary Time. It promoted a scheme in terms of which 
not only past cultures, but all living societies were irrevocably placed on a temporal 
slop, a stream of Time—some up stream, others down stream” (17). 
14 These two problems are not insignificant, of course, but they have been discussed at 
length elsewhere: see Aijaz Ahmad’s “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness and the 
‘National Allegory” in his In Theory, 95-122. 
15 Emphasis in original.  
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The palpable consequence of this type of reading is the miniaturization of 
the individual’s attributes and actions by taking them to be merely mimetic. 
Although giving these attributes and actions a grander stature might seem to 
endow them with surplus significance, what it actually does is cripple them 
because fixing them to events outside their scope and beyond their influence is 
equivalent to stripping them of the openness and the spontaneity that we expect 
from modern narrative. Therefore, the overriding characteristic of the subject 
whose attributes are fixed to an external force is dependency and powerlessness: 
such subject is entirely dependent on the nation for its private identity as well as 
the ethical orientation underpinning it and powerless to initiate an action, ethical 
or otherwise, to mitigate the “embattled situation of the public third-world culture and 
society.”  
It is well known that censorship under authoritarian regimes makes it 
necessary for some writers to mask their works’ social and political criticism 
through the use of literary devices such as allegory—a practice that could have 
been the genesis of Jameson’s national allegory itself. But even if a fictional 
narrative uses allegory to squeeze through censorship, masked criticism in this 
case hardly qualifies to be a national allegory since such criticism’s chances of 
being anti-national, of countering the logic of the nationalism within which it is 
conceived, are far greater than those of its rendering the individual as a mere 
shadow of the nation in question—a counterproductive strategy at best! 
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The paradigm of the national allegory,16 though, does generate some by-
products, a number of which, it has to be conceded, are positive. This approach 
to reading17 puts the burden of historicizing on the reader, something very much 
in keeping with Jameson’s famous motto in The Political Unconscious—”always 
historicize!” A reading of a given text against the national allegory necessitates a 
certain level of knowledge of the historical, political, and literary background of 
that text, a requirement that makes casual “literary tourism”18 either an unethical 
attitude or a virtual impossibility. In addition, there is in this approach a tacit 
awareness, on the whole, that postcolonial fiction, to take one example, tends not 
to be as apolitical as comparable fiction written in the West. This puts those 
works of fiction that engage politics either directly or indirectly in perspective 
and prevents their accomplished qualities from being obscured by that 
engagement, an engagement that is often judged to be either unaesthetic or in 
bad taste. Finally, a reading of this kind at least attempts not take fiction written 
in the West to be the fundamental reference point (even when the form is itself a 
                                                
16 Ian Buchanan defines the national allegory as “a type of narrative whose essential 
subject is the nation state. Because of the life of a nation, large or small, exceeds the 
capacity of what any novel can actually accommodate, narrative fiction of this type 
uses allegory as a means of expressing a dimension of existence greater than that of 
the lives of its individual characters. National allegories tend to be focused on the lives 
of ordinary people, however, rather than heads of state or aristocracy, using the 
mundane daily struggles as a means of illustrating the state of the nation” (333). 
17 Jameson makes it clear that the national allegory is an approach to reading rather than 
a theory (68). 
18 Literary tourism can be defined as an attitude to reading, whereby the literary text is 
read on the assumption that it provides an entry point to an unfamiliar country, 
culture, or people. See Haunani-Kay Trask’s “Decolonizing Hawaiian Literature” in 
Inside Out: Literature, Cultural Politics, and Identity in the New Pacific. 
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Western one) for the critical assessment of works that have become indigenous to 
their environments through developing their own artistic trajectories. 
I started my discussion of Jameson’s argument by suggesting that its 
impetus is the mistaken supposition that the ethical commitment is rooted in the 
national community. The question is, then, how does Jameson’s national allegory 
differ from the notion of the double narrative, in its two varieties, the 
superimposition and binding models? The “allegory” in the national allegory 
suggests that there is hidden meaning, that there are at least two levels of 
meaning, one can be located easily while locating the other requires a 
hermeneutic exercise. In both double narrative models, however, what is at play 
are two manifest narratives, neither of which needs to be uncovered or derived 
from other elements in the narrative. Rather, what is at stake in the double 
narrative is the structural principle according to which the two narratives 
interact. This is an important distinction as both segments of the double narrative 
have a surface which implies that there is no need for “uncovering” something 
that the reader does not experience directly. Thus, a consideration of the double 
narrative as opposed to the national allegory leads to a reading that does not 
seek to uncover, but to trace the contact points of the text’s multiple surfaces 
and/or structures. 
In addition, Jameson’s introduction of allegory in this context might seem 
to liberate the text from strict materiality. However, what should be noted is his 
radical use of allegory. While we tend to associate allegory with its fluidity and 
resistance to the fixity of meaning, the version of allegory we encounter here 
actually undermines these associations. Through a sleight of hand, another, 
 51 
arguably stronger, form of fixity or materiality—history and politics—is brought 
right back in. Conceiving of allegory in this strict one to one manner, where the 
latter endows the former with fixity instead of fluidity, makes for a decidedly 
rigid reading so as to strip the allegory of its power. Jameson, we might say, 
materializes allegory through subtracting its fluidity and adding material 
history. 
 Finally, the most serious flaw in the national allegory interpretative 
paradigm is its essentially regressive and, to some degree, elementary nature, 
regressive because it justifies the ideological operation of national narratives, 
elementary because it fails to account for the complex temporal structures of 
identity in national narratives. As an interpretative paradigm the national 
allegory is bound to produce either a misreading of the text or a legitimization of 
its ideology. If it imposes the national element onto a text that does not contain it, 
it inhibits all its other potentialities, and if it indeed produces credible results, it 
would be because it conforms to the ideological structure that already animates 
the text. The mere act of such interpretation concedes that the individual’s 
attributes and actions cannot be anything but a derivative of the national 
community. How could the individual be anything other than an expression of 
the ethical commitment to the national community? How could the individual be 
anything other than a perennial national subject with the full weight of ethical 
responsibility and none of the freedom to initiate genuinely creative action? By 
virtue of having these assumptions as part of the methodology itself, the national 
allegory is inherently incapable of bringing about a critical assessment of the 
ideological structure of those narratives that are genuinely national.  
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1.4 Narrative and Time: Which Time Is It? 
Not only does the national allegory rely on the old (but apparently very 
persistent!) metaphor of the nation as a human subject, it effectively entraps that 
subject’s present and future trajectory within the parameter of the nation. Placing 
that inhibited trajectory in conjunction with orientation principle discussed 
above helps illustrate this point, namely how turning the national subject into a 
surrogate of the nation inhibits the development of a more thorough 
understanding of the temporality of narrative.  
To begin with, the connotations of the word orientation suggest both an 
existence in the present and, most importantly, a particular viewpoint which in 
turn determines possible becomings. Orientation, then, encapsulates both an 
actualized and manifest present as well as what one might call a possible and 
latent futurity. Even if that future is yet to be actualized, even if it is beyond what 
is visible from the vantage point of the present, the subject’s identity is 
nonetheless reliant on the desire for a “future to ‘redeem’ the past, to make it part 
of a life story which has sense of purpose, to take it up in a meaningful unity” 
(Taylor 50-51). The notion of orientation embodies an extension of the actualized 
present, an extension which always points to an open-ended future possibility 
that, though virtually nonexistent, is still formative of the present since it 
dominates it in a very tangible way. This open-ended futurity, an essential 
component of the present, has to be completely overlooked in a reading based on 
the national allegory since such reading cannot avoid being limited by its 
historicist outlook.  
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Furthermore, the national allegory must also relegate the subject, at whose 
level the orientation necessarily originates, into a reflection or a likeness of the 
nation. The subject, in essence, is made dependent on historical and political 
circumstances external to it, circumstances part of a passive archive which lacks 
the potential of creating a direction on its own. This emphasis on historicity and 
retrospection as well as the failure to scrutinize the role anticipation and futurity 
play in narrative, Currie argues in About Time, is a symptom of a larger problem 
that narrative theory suffers from.  
Narrative theory’s excessive preoccupation with memory and the passive 
archive meant that it failed to develop a more sophisticated understanding of 
both futurity in narrative and narrative as mode of being. Currie insists that this 
deficiency in narrative theory can only be remedied through a philosophical 
intervention, as philosophy’s capacity to deal with time, he explains, is greater 
than that of narrative theory. “One of the things that narrative theory can learn 
from philosophy,” Currie writes, “is a proper sense of the importance of the 
future” (51). Thus, “with philosophy as its teacher, narrative theory can turn its 
attention to narrative not only in its function as archive but to the question of 
narrative as a mode of being” (Currie 51). As a first step of overcoming this 
deficiency, we must be aware that  
a fictional narrative encourages us to think of the past as present no 
more than it encourages us to think of the present as a future past. 
But whereas narrative theory has explored the first implication, of 
what Ricœur calls the presentifying of the past, exhaustively, 
through the themes of memory, the reliability of the narrator and 
other aspects of retrospect, it has paid far less attention to the 
correlative issue in which the present is experienced in a mode of 
anticipation. (Currie 5) 
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If we reflect on this neglected aspect of narrative in relation to my general 
argument which holds national affiliation to be a deeply personal business rather 
than a function of the national community, we are bound to discover something 
about the logic of nationalism itself which tends to favour a preoccupation with 
the present’s connection to the passive archive and pays little attention for the 
present’s connection to anticipation. “Nationalism,” we must keep in mind, “has 
to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political 
ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which—as 
well as against which—it came into being” (Anderson 12). The logic of 
nationalism has tremendous power over the passive archive, through which it 
can delineate the solidification of the national affiliation and the historical 
circumstances that legitimized it, made it possible or necessary, in addition to 
how these circumstances continue to do so in the present. Its weakness, however, 
lies in its inability to supply a script of the future as it can neither form a picture 
of the dissolution of the national affiliation nor of its further development. The 
present form of national affiliation might have a long, maybe even endless, 
history of maturation behind it but cannot have a radically different or virtual 
future form because the mere contemplation of such future implies the 
inadequacy of its present form or trajectory. 
 This inability to imagine the future of national affiliation or allow for 
virtual possibilities has bearing on our discussion not only insofar as the 
deficiency in narrative theory is concerned, but also in the particular conception 
of time that is essential to the logic of nationalism. The underpinning of this 
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conception is time’s continuous flow, a flow made transparent through a 
delineation of progress. In order to differentiate between religious communities 
and national ones, Anderson contrasts the two by way of their disparate 
conceptions of simultaneity. Not only does differentiating between these two 
using the category of time makes it clear that nationalism is not simply an 
outgrowth or a secular development of earlier forms of community forging, but 
also that nationalism, more crucially, becomes possible only with a conception of 
time that is not based on what he terms the medieval simultaneity-along-time, or 
on an understanding of time in which past and present can be conceived as 
having the capacity to coexist as in the presumption that makes possible the 
typological interpretation of figures and symbols.  
 This vertical conception of time, of course, is fundamentally different from 
nationalism’s horizontal one, according to which time maintains its constant run 
from past through the present and onto a future fettered by the past, as the 
modern ideology of progress would have us experience it. In contrast, Anderson 
asserts, “the mediaeval Christian mind had no conception of history as an 
endless chain of cause and effect or of radical separations between past and 
present” (23). Drawing on Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 
Anderson stresses that this change from the medieval simultaneity-along-time to 
our modern conception of time as an arrow whereby events transpire and other 
individuals exist simultaneously-across-time “has been a long time in the 
making, and its emergence is certainly connected…with the development of the 
secular sciences” (24). Though Anderson suggestion that this conception of time 
simply “emerged” rather than became dominant is questionable, the point to 
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keep in mind is that simultaneous time is a critical component of nationalism’s 
logic. 
Modern conception of time, then, is “of such fundamental importance 
that, without taking it fully into account, we will find it difficult to probe the 
obscure genesis of nationalism” (Anderson 24). The idea of the nation as a group 
of national subjects who share the same affiliation, who have a palpable and 
contemporaneous presence across time’s horizontal line, therefore, is dependent 
on a measured, divisible, and quantifiable time, a time in which the word 
“meanwhile” comes to have great significance. Borrowing from Benjamin, 
Anderson describes the modern conception of time which “replaced” the 
medieval one as being predicated on “an idea of ‘homogeneous, empty time,’ in 
which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by 
prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock 
and calendar” (24), instruments that makes possible the division of time into 
equal, comparable units. The relationship between the nation and homogeneous, 
empty time, Anderson writes, should not be underestimated as “the idea of a 
sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time 
is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid 
community moving steadily down (or up) history” (26). 
 While clock and calendar provided the instrumental basis for this 
distinctly modern conception of time, other also distinctly modern structures and 
forms profited from these basic instruments and put them into practice: 
Why this transformation should be so important for the birth of the 
imagined community of the nation can best be seen if we consider 
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the basic structure of two forms of imagining which first flowered 
in Europe in the eighteenth century: the novel and the newspaper. 
For these forms provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ 
the kind of imagined community that is the nation. (Anderson 24-5)  
 
This coupling of the newspaper and the novel is reminiscent of Benjamin’s “The 
Storyteller.” It is not inconceivable that Anderson is influenced by Benjamin’s 
judgment, although Benjamin’s judgment is made in a different context. There 
are, however, clear divergences between the newspaper and the novel in their 
treatment of time. To begin with, the conclusion that both are underpinned by a 
single conception of time does not justify the coupling, especially when 
considering that this conception underpins an entire epoch which makes it 
bound to spread widely irrespective of the medium so as not to justify a 
classification based on this single variant. While both forms adopt homogeneous, 
empty time, they do so differently.  
The newspaper adopts homogeneous, empty time quite literally; it does so 
in an overt and static manner through placing great emphasis on precise time 
sequence and unit division. This precision might lead one to see in it an 
alignment with state apparatuses and bureaucracy. The precision, however, does 
little to explain the genesis or flourishing of national affiliation insofar as it 
relates to the national subject’s affective attachment to the nation and deeply held 
convections with respect to a particular ethical stance. Therefore, there needs to 
be two categories in place of the single one which Anderson proposes, not only 
because the creation of a novel involves the transformation of narrative into an 
art form, but also because its treatment of homogeneous, empty time is an 
articulation of the experience itself, not the relay of information about experience. 
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The argument for proposing two categories could be formulated as follows: 
while the newspaper’s structure is suitable to elucidate the way the state utilizes 
homogeneous, empty time as it reflects the time conception according to which 
its bureaucratic machinery functions, the novel is the form par excellence for 
elucidating the unique manner in which the nation adopts the same time 
conception.         
As a point of departure, one could say that the novel’s adoption of 
homogeneous, empty time is comparatively covert and fluid. Unlike the 
newspaper, whose structure as well as the division and precise equivalency of 
units it implies could be evident to the majority of literate national subjects, the 
untangling of the novel’s structure requires at least some training and/or 
experience. This difference, it should be noted, mirrors another key difference 
(related to the one alluded to above) between the state and the nation: while the 
state tends to be visible and definable through its laws and symbols (the map, the 
flag, the parliament, and the constitution), the nation tends to have a built-in 
ambiguity (language, ethnicity, religion, and culture) that functions as an 
inherent component rather than an added complication. It is true that the novel 
does postulate events as occurring as part of a causal chain and characters as 
existing or acting contemporaneously (the two essential conditions of empty 
time), it still introduces problematics such as time manipulation, multiple levels 
of narration, questions of authorship, and formal unpredictability. The novel’s 
capacity to use time and literary devices to create a double narrative as it has 
been outlined thus far makes its postulation of homogeneous, empty time much 
more elaborate as the relationship it creates between the two strands remains an 
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undercurrent. The unmasking of this synchronization, as I explain in the second 
and third chapters, happens through a structural shift. 
In light of the previous discussion of the two time conceptions, it is now 
possible to address more fully Currie’s criticism of narrative theory, a criticism 
that invokes the potential of interpretation which takes anticipation in narrative 
seriously. Benjamin’s “Theses,” in fact, provide a model that incorporates within 
its analysis of history and retrospection a treatment of anticipation and future. In 
the second part of the eighteenth and last thesis, Benjamin writes that “the 
soothsayers who found out from time what it had in store certainly did not 
experience time as either homogeneous or empty” (264). From this standpoint, 
the soothsayer, whose concern is the future as it relates to the present, is the 
opposite of the chronicler whose interest lies in the past and its relationship to 
the present. At the risk of stretching this comparison, one could argue that the 
chronicler’s past events bear a resemblance to the stuff of traditional narrative 
theory, whereas the soothsayer’s mystical pronouncements about the concealed 
and virtual future are what make the Benjaminian historical ruptures thinkable.  
Rather than a future that is realized through incremental, somewhat 
predictable, progress, Benjamin’s messianic future is realized through a 
fundamental break from the steady passage of time. For the soothsayers, 
Benjamin points out in the same thesis, time was not organized around the 
present, or the Gegenwart of homogeneous, empty time; rather, its focal point was 
what we might call the present-moment, or the Jetztzeit of messianic (medieval) 
time. The difference between the two experiences of time is crucial to Benjamin’s 
understanding of history and the future as consisting of particular moments of 
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ruptures within which open-ended possibility is embedded, rather than empty, 
constant, and made up of indistinguishable units whose content, while 
contingent, is somewhat predictable.  
Countering the soothsayers, therefore, meant the necessary institution of a 
prohibition against investigating the future by those who sought a qualitative 
experience of time in place of the quantitative one: the prohibition “stripped the 
future of its magic, to which all those succumb who turn to the soothsayers for 
enlightenment” (Benjamin 264). From the perspective of the current discussion, 
prohibiting the soothsayer’s magic is not merely part of theological dogma, but 
an essential component of nation-building as its potential to imagine a radically 
different future marked by ruptures and discontinuities rather with than 
progress and development makes questionable the idea of the nation as “as a 
solid community moving steadily down (or up) history.” The genre of magic 
realism, as we will see in the third chapter, provides an invaluable space to test 
the limits of this prohibition. 
It is not enough, then, to examine the role of futurity or anticipation in 
narrative by following the same criteria that narrative theory established for its 
investigation of the past as a passive archive. As Taylor rightly puts it, humans 
seek a narrative that gives them an opportunity to conceive of a future that 
would redeem the past in the same way past generations hoped for a future that 
will redeem their own past and present.  
“Our image of happiness,” Benjamin says in the second thesis, “is 
indissolubly bound up with the image of redemption. The same applies to our 
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view of the past, which is the concern of history. The past carries with it a 
temporal index by which it is referred to redemption” (254). It is of the essence, 
however, that the contemplation of the future is coupled with an awareness that 
the operation of such redemption can be undertaken only according to different 
criteria. A given narrative can seem to organize time as to allow for a redemptive 
future, but unless that organization is based on a truly new scheme, such 
redemptive future would amount to nothing but a deception. If such a truly new 
scheme is to be found, it would certainly be an integral part of that easily 
discerned yet difficult to pin down concept—literary style, the subject of the 
second part of this chapter. 
Part Two: Literary Style  
At the outset of her Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity,19 Liah Greenfeld writes 
that nationalism’s specificity, which makes nationality fundamentally different 
from other types of identity, is derived from the way nationalism locates the 
source of individual identity in a collective termed the “people,” a collective that 
is necessarily larger than any concrete community. “This specificity,” she 
continues, “is conceptual. The only foundation of nationalism as such, the only 
condition, that is, without which no nationalism is possible, is an idea; 
nationalism is a particular perspective or a style of thought20“(3-4).  
                                                
19 Greenfeld describes the focus of her book as “a set of ideas…at the core of which lies 
the idea of the ‘nation,’ which I believe forms the constitutive element of modernity. In 
this belief, I reverse the order of precedence…Rather than define nationalism by its 
modernity, I see modernity as defined by nationalism” (18). This thesis will be 
discussed in the fourth chapter whose concern is the fraught relationship between 
nationalism and modernity. 
20 Emphasis added. 
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Though Greenfeld does not follow through on the compelling assertion 
that nationalism is a style of thought in the main text, she expands on it in an 
endnote: 
The concept of “style of thought” was coined by Karl 
Mannheim…and was based on the notion of style developed in art 
history. It encapsulated the idea that broad cultural currents, or 
traditions, similarly to artistic styles, cannot be characterized by 
any of their composing elements, each of which may be found in 
many other traditions…, but only by an organizing idea, or 
principle, which brings these elements together in a distinctive 
configuration that imparts to each element a special significance it 
would lack in any other configuration. (493)  
 
Greenfeld then strangely dismisses the “concept of style” immediately after 
invoking it, arguing that she finds it problematic and thus not applicable because 
nationalism does not have the unity of a tradition such as liberalism. While it is 
true that nationalism lacks clear and distinct tenets of a tradition like liberalism, 
it could indeed be seen as resembling a tradition, even if neither theoretical unity 
nor ideological solidity can be ascribed to it. In fact, nationalism exhibits the most 
important qualities of a tradition: evident durability over a significant period of 
time and an emergence as a viable organizing idea in numerous environments, 
an idea with a number of recognizable features and claims. The formation and 
sustenance of traditions tend to be processes riddled with all kinds of 
contingencies, processes that can hardly be described as coherent.  
Greenfeld’s claim, I want to argue, ought to be adjusted so that it does not 
disqualify the notion of nationalism as a tradition but the notion of nationalism 
as a doctrine. Unity, coherence, and testable plausibility are requirements of 
doctrines, not traditions. A key conclusion is to be drawn from this view: “the 
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precise doctrines” of nationalism and their varying degrees of credibility “are 
hardly worth analysing… [because] we are in the presence of a phenomenon 
which springs directly and inevitably from basic changes in our shared social 
condition, from changes in the overall relation between society, culture and 
polity” (Gellner 124). Thus, it is essential to recognize that nationalism’s 
forcefulness is actually a function of the loose tradition it has formed and 
managed to maintain, not a function of its specific and localized doctrines that 
are not particularly well reasoned. The absence of plausibility coupled with the 
survival of this tradition explains as to why nationalism, though tending not to 
hold up to critical scrutiny, has been and remains massively influential.   
The power of nationalism as such, therefore, lies in the image of tradition 
it projects, a tradition that is in turn underpinned by a “style.” As is the case with 
style, nationalism is a category that lacks clear boundaries. Despite being capable 
of absorbing various elements, of invoking any number of specific doctrines, 
ethical frameworks, historical narratives, and time conceptions, it does not have 
enough solidity so as to be interrogated the way a doctrine might be. If 
nationalism is to be treated as a style, then, the inverse image is just as accurate: 
as we can speak of nationalism being predicated on a particular style of thought 
(which could be termed traditional or classical), it is possible to think of resisting 
it as a procedure that is predicated on another type of style (which could be 
termed for the time being as non-traditional). Such a style is not necessarily anti-
nationalist or diametrically opposed to the classical one, but one which forms a 
challenge to nationalism’s image as a broad cultural current.  
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1.5 The Concept and Condition of Style 
Naturally, for a study concerned with fictional narrative, the style in question is 
literary style in general and narrative style more specifically. First of all, any 
discussion of literary style must begin with conceding that style is perhaps one of 
the most difficult literary notions to pin down; this is so mainly because style has 
a great and indefinite scope as an abstraction yet it can be sensed as being 
remarkably specific when encountered in the singularity of the text. Inquiring 
into style’s textual specificity, however, necessitates a sketch of the traditional 
understanding of what constitutes style as an abstraction.  
Roland Barthes’ compact essay “Style and Its Image” offers a concise 
summation of that traditional understanding and is thus a good entry point to 
the question of style. The basis of what is traditionally called “style,” Barthes tells 
us, is contained in two fundamental oppositions: the first is the opposition of 
Form and Content, or its relatively recent incarnation of Signifier and Signified. 
Style, according to this vision, often invoked in the teaching of literature, is the 
medium through which content finds its expression. The second opposition (the 
more recent of these two) is that of Deviance and Norm, or Message and Code. It 
should be noted that Barthes’ consideration of these basic oppositions is part of a 
bigger question that revolves around the image of style: “how do we see style?” 
(90). Having started with these traditional visions of style, Barthes explains that 
he neither accepts them as they are nor does he intend to undermine their 
principal premises. Rather, he wishes to set them up in order to “complicate” 
them in the course of his essay.  
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The complication which Barthes brings into the first opposition is 
certainly the more conventional of the two; it is, in many ways, reminiscent of 
traditional formalism. It starts as a justified proposition for an analysis that pays 
particular attention to the internal operation of the text but ends up resembling 
the unjustified paradigms of traditional formalism which are now taken more as 
a curiosity rather than as serious principles to be applied in literary analysis. 
Instead of treating “the text as a fruit,” Barthes writes about the first opposition, 
whereby the pit is the content and the flesh is the form, this kind of analysis 
treats form, which is ultimately constituted by style, “as an onion, a 
superimposed construction of skins (of layers, of levels, of systems) whose 
volume contains, finally, no heart, no core, no secret, no irreducible principle, 
nothing but the infinity of its envelops—which envelop nothing other than the 
totality of its surfaces” (99).  
From a utilitarian standpoint, calling attention to the text’s multiple 
surfaces can be especially useful to the notion of double narrative structure as 
described in the first part of this chapter; from a programmatic one, a 
reassessment of Barthes’ structural phase might address the need we have today 
for an analysis that takes form seriously yet avoids the well-known pitfalls of the 
old varieties of formalism; theoretically, however, accepting the extreme claim 
that everything is form containing no core is simply a position which cannot be 
sustained. 
Unlike this somewhat puritan image of style, the second image of Code 
and Message holds more promise as it has the potential to lead to the type of 
analysis I argue for in Part One: an analysis that traces the internal operations of 
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the text without maintaining the puritanical posture made so explicit in the old 
“all is form” claim. Before complicating or refining the opposition of Code and 
Message, Barthes describes its premise as follows: style here is “an aberrant 
message which ‘surprises’ the code…the features of style are undeniably drawn 
from a code, or at least from a systematic space…: style is a distance, a 
difference” (94) from the already existing code which permeates language, 
culture, and aesthetics. The “code,” to put it differently, stands for conventional 
expression and thus the “message” (if it does fulfill the novelty requirement) 
must shake it up. 
The complication Barthes introduces to Code and Message, however, 
remains so minimal that it risks not being noticed at all: the Message, rather than 
a mere aberrance, is a transformation or a reformulation of a convention handed 
down, one that is both accepted and to large degree ubiquitous. We might 
extrapolate, then, that innovation through style upsets and shocks the Norm 
through using it up or consuming it rather than through using it in its ubiquitous 
form or by way of mounting an active and complete rejection of the premises 
which inform it. From this perspective,  
stylistic features [are] transformations, derived either from collective 
formulas (of unrecoverable origin, literary or pre-literary), or by 
metaphoric interplay, from idiolectal forms;…what should govern 
the stylistic task is the search for models, for patterns: sentential 
structures, syntagmatic clichés, divisions and clausulae of 
sentences; and what should animate this task is the conviction that 
style is essentially a citational procedure, a body of formulas, a 
memory…, an inheritance based on culture and not on 
expressivity…stylistic ‘models’ cannot be identified with ‘deep 
structures,’ with universal forms derived from psychological logic; 
these models are only the depositories of culture…; they are 
repetitions, not foundations; citations, not expressions; stereotypes, 
not archetypes. (Barthes 98-9) 
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While the formulas already exist and the creation is not entirely new, Barthes 
seems to argue once more, it is in the specific operation of style where true 
innovation is to be found. This operation can be interpreted as a movement that 
turns a body of culturally dispersed depositories or formulas into new 
reformulation. Put differently, it is a stylistic deviance that does not flaunt its 
deviance but embodies it as formal part of the process that creates an original 
expression.  
 We can infer from this that a fictional narrative which articulates its stance 
through only resorting to the resources of oppositional discourse suffers from a 
sort of deficit—a deficit that puts the work at the risk of losing its distinctive 
literariness and becoming a tired form that can neither become a true “alternative 
history” nor would it maintain its status as an artwork. The deficit at the centre 
of such fictional narrative, moreover, arises from the space it relinquishes to 
second opinions or second confirmations; it is a deficit that arises from stories 
already filtered through different, make-believe discourses, which then 
disincarnate unto becoming information bits rather than genuine stylistic 
transformation. 
The crucial point in stylistics according to Barthes, then, could be summed 
up as follows: rather than the sum, synergy, or dialectic of literary devices and 
motifs one finds in the text, style is essentially a distinctive and individual way of 
deploying the memory or depositories of culture that he speaks of in relation to 
the most basic unit—the sentence. While this summation may involve the 
broadening of style’s field as Barthes outlines it, from the sentence to cultural 
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memory, it does not necessarily mean doing away with style’s smallest units. 
Though style’s linguistic and syntactical elements are very much part of this 
understanding, the point is to define as its most crucial element the particular 
inclination to adjust the position of the inherited material within the totality of 
the text. 
If we apply this understanding of style to the discussion about national 
identity, we can conclude that dealing with the ramifications of the process that 
turns the individual into a national subject neither materializes through avoiding 
the immense and inescapable cultural memory of nationalism nor through 
opposing it rhetorically—and certainly not through a retreat into apolitical 
subjectivity as a response to the alienation from national culture or as an 
expression of general malaise and disillusionment.  
The solution that apolitical subjectivity might represent entails that one 
turns a blind eye to the national subject’s deep, built-in attachment to the nation 
as well as to national ethics and the type of identity it engenders. There is no 
denying that radical subjectivity does provide a respite and sometimes a much-
needed fresh perspective. What it cannot do, however, is grapple in any 
meaningful way with the inescapable depositories that permeate national 
culture. Style as transformation, in contrast, is one that remains fully conscious of 
the cultural memory and its idiolectal forms; it neither interrogates nor opposes 
these forms but takes account of them not through overt objection, refutation, or 
subversion (for that is the territory of the essay) but by way of an operation 
whose function is to absorb and consume them before redeploying them in a 
distinctive manner. 
 69 
Despite getting us closer to a satisfactory outline of style, this operation of 
style remains somewhat blurred as it is articulated by Barthes, both before and 
after his complication. The most conspicuous problem relates to deviance, which 
seems to bear much resemblance to aberrance. They are both, by definition, 
departures from an establish standard. Thus, the deviance or the transformation 
(which adds up to little more than an alternative label) that is supposed to 
complicate what Barthes admits to be one of the two traditional understandings 
of style turns out to be almost a mirror image of the aberrant message. In 
addition to introducing very little complication, Barthes appears to be explicating 
something other than the territory of style itself. Rather than targeting the fluid 
and inconstant territory of style, what his explication actually elucidates is the 
distance between the traditional and the non-traditional, the non-traditional 
being the most explicit manifestation of the consequences of style, not how it 
really operates.  
A proposition about this distance, while incredibly helpful as a starting 
point, does very little to elucidate the category of the non-traditional itself. If we 
take the traditional to be that which “delivers across” (from tradere), then it is not 
sufficient to define the category of the non-traditional as either an aberrance or a 
deviation. The most conspicuous quality of the non-traditional is actually a gap 
that is normally expected to be filled with convention; ultimately, it is not a 
positive value but a lack, an absence of delivering across. Style here is sensed in 
an encounter, one which takes place at the very moment of recognition that there 
is a palpable absence of what one expects to be there. The perpetual shift in the 
definition of style over time can be accounted for in the constant weathering of 
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that moment recognition, in its tendency to be fleeting and to become ephemeral. 
In contrast to the genuinely non-traditional, the action of deviation needs an 
original path, a starting point, a standard from which to deviate. Rather than 
touching upon the space of the non-traditional, style as a deviation delineates the 
space in-between, the space separating the traditional and non-traditional, not to 
mention that the difference embedded in deviation remains dependent on the 
degree of its dissimilarity from the conventional. 
This result, in fact, is to be expected because style as deviation, Carsten 
Meiner argues in “Deleuze and the Question of Style,” “obtains its scientific 
signification from the identity of an a priori form and obtains its functionality as a 
function of the space separating the specific style from the a priori form—whether 
a system of grammatical rules or a psychological model of genius” (157-8). This 
problem not unique to Barthes, says Meiner, but is a feature of all attempts of 
modern stylistics to conceptualize style. What all these attempts do is  
pay the price of scientificity: they explain the individuality of a 
given text as a deviation from something general. The problem thus 
haunting stylistics…could be formulated in the following way: how 
do we create a concept which can identify the specific 
individualities of texts without reducing those to deviations from 
the stable identity of another form? (158)  
 
Getting a satisfactory answer to this question entails a two-step process: a 
liberation from the scheme of the original form and the deviant copy as well as 
an articulation of style through Deleuze’s philosophy of difference (Meiner 159). 
The idea is to approach style by means of the Deleuzian difference: more 
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specifically, as a difference of nature rather than a difference of degree, a 
distinction which Deleuze borrows from Bergson.  
 Theoretically, we are still in the territory of the second opposition as 
Barthes clearly says that “style is a distance, a difference”21 (94). Now, however, 
the interrogation targets the denotation of “difference” rather than distance or 
degree. Following Deleuze’s preposition, then, difference in nature is to be 
conceived as an actualization of the virtual. This movement which turns the 
virtual into actual can be described as “the passage from the virtual [or potential] 
differentiation to the actual differentiation” (Meiner 166), a movement that 
implies a non-resemblance rather than a similitude which is implied by the 
scheme of an initial identity and a different yet derivative copy. The virtual, 
Meiner suggests, resolves the problem of traditional stylistics (whose definition 
of difference remained dependent on that of identity) since a given actualization 
of the virtual will become real principally through its difference from the possible 
or the virtual. The conclusion, then, is that “style animates the virtual structure to 
inhabit the species, classes and orders of representation in an individual way” 
(Meiner 167).  
The novelty of style as a Deleuzian actualization of the virtual lies in the 
way it encompasses both categories of the traditional and the non-traditional in 
equal measure. Both of these categories become actualized through the same 
procedure whose central mechanism is differentiation. It is evident that this 
description of style, unlike that of Barthes, offers a notable complication, 
                                                
21 Emphasis added. 
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especially when compared to the straightforward transformation model. 
Nevertheless, what style as an actualization of the virtual presuppose is that style 
must be conceptualized if one is to understand it adequately.  
What is at stake, however, is not necessarily which concept of style is 
superior or introduces more complications. In general terms, anytime 
conceptualization is applied to style, the result tends to be a concept that is either 
too broad as not to move us closer to precise understanding or too narrow as not 
to account for all existing (actual) and non-exiting potentials (virtual) of style. By 
necessity, to conceptualize is to place a limitation, and it is for this reason that 
any concept of style remains somehow inadequate, regardless of its complexity 
or ingenuity. Style is not to be limited through the concept, but is to be isolated in 
the condition. Rather than deploying an analysis that moves from the general 
concept to the specific condition, the suggestion is to focus on the condition as 
such. If by style we mean the creation of the genuinely original, the non-classical, 
and the non-traditional, then we speak about a singular category that defies all 
types of conceptualization but one which has a remarkably palpable condition 
that deserves special attention. 
How can style as the creator of conditions be a viable alternative to 
conceptualization? What is the overriding manifestation of this image of style, 
especially if it is one which cannot use subjectivity to ignore the cultural 
inheritance (if that is even possible), solidify that inheritance through 
reproduction, or confront it directly since that can only be done through an over-
reliance on rhetoric and information, an over-reliance that is detrimental to the 
artwork as such? And, finally, in what way would Deleuze’s philosophy 
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contribute to the proposition of style as a condition creator? First of all, there 
needs to be a recognition that Deleuze’s philosophy of difference as a unified 
principle (nor any unified philosophical principle for that matter) is unlikely to 
produce the outcome theoreticians of style always sought: an adequate, all-
encompassing concept of style. An attempt to do that can amount only to a 
philosophical intervention based on the principle of application: all that needs to 
be done is applying Deleuze’s “difference” and the problem is solved! 
Instead of deploying any one aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy as a master 
key that opens all locks, what I propose as an alternative is the locating of certain 
elements of his interventions in the debate about style before deploying these 
elements to refine the two principal stylistic conditions I wish to examine in the 
second and third chapters. As Deleuze says in the preface to Essays Critical and 
Clinical, “every work is a voyage, a journey, but one that travels this or that 
external path only by virtue of the internal paths and trajectories that compose it, 
that constitute its landscape or its concert” (Ivi). The multiplicities of paths and 
trajectories governing the artwork consistently resist the unifying violence of the 
concept. A perpetual tension is thus generated as a result of the friction between 
the unifying, exterior concept and the artwork’s disparate, unpredictable paths 
and trajectories. The consistency of this friction is nothing less than a 
predicament which provides the impetus for the perpetual deployment of new 
concepts of style, each intended to cannibalize its predecessor.         
The first of the three elements of the Deleuzian interventions I would like 
to invoke comes from his treatment of Sacher Masoch in his late work, Essays 
Critical and Clinical. In the seventh essay entitled “Re-presentations of Masoch” 
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Deleuze flips on its head the customary paradigm of psychoanalytic 
interpretation which tends to seek the patient in the text. “More a physician than 
a patient,” he argues, “the writer makes a diagnosis, but what he diagnoses is the 
world; he follows the illness step by step, but it is the generic illness of man” (53). 
With that as a guiding principle, “the idea was not to apply psychiatric concepts 
to literature, but on the contrary to extract non-pre-existent clinical concepts from 
the works themselves”22 (187). It is crucial to note that the writer does not only 
rework or reformulate a condition already identifiable in the world. Rather, the 
writer’s procedure is to use literary style to isolate a set of symptoms in order to 
create a condition that becomes identifiable in the world after the fact. If we were 
to accept the Barthes’ reformulation thesis provisionally, then we would have to 
recognize that it is not only a reformulations of things past, but also a 
reformulation of things yet to come—in the vein of Currie’s call for greater 
emphasis on future in narrative and in the spirit of holding the future as the site 
of ruptures. 
The creation of a condition, then, involves straddling the imaginary line 
we call the present so as to incorporate historicity and futurity in equal measure. 
Not only does Deleuze turn the table on the typical psychoanalytic reading 
(which locates in the text what is already known), he also “shows that the clinical 
symptoms of sadism and masochism are themselves inseparable from the literary 
techniques and styles of Sade and Masoch” (Smith 187). Therefore, style as the 
creation of a condition is manifested in the isolation of symptoms which in turn 
                                                
22 Daniel W. Smith, “Critical, clinical.” Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts.  
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gives us an image that includes both history and future, an image that is both 
retrospective and prospective. Using the terminology of the previous discussion, 
one could add that literary style offers a non-rhetorical diagnosis and prognosis 
by isolating the symptoms of the national subject or isolating those of national 
stagnation. One could put it succinctly by saying that style is the capacity to 
create a literary image of this kind.  
1.6 Two Conditions: The Circular and the Directional 
The question as to the number of the different ways of achieving this “creation of 
a condition” is perhaps impossible to answer because the process of actualization 
is characterized by its infinite nature—there are certainly more possible ways 
than can be accounted for. Therefore, rather than providing an exhaustive list or 
imposing a limitation by means of an absolutist claim, I examine only two case 
studies, two distinctive stylistic conditions. My focus on these two conditions is 
informed by their standing for two extremes on a continuum whose poles are 
disconnectedness—as is the case in Elias Khoury’s Little Mountain—and 
enactment—as is the case in Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children. The 
importance of these two conditions, I argue, stems from their occupying two 
ends of what might be termed the spectrum of stylistic innovation. While their 
stylistic approaches are as different as they could be, they end up reaching a 
similar endpoint: the non-rhetorical critique of national identity. Their 
contradictory nature, moreover, is a further proof that there no single way, no 
single concept that can account for stylistic innovation. These two conditions 
could be best described in spatial terms: one is circular and the other is 
directional.  
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 The first stylistic condition (the circular, the topic of the second chapter) is 
one characterized by an explosion of stories incorporated into a single narrative 
frame. This explosion renders the structured binding model infeasible and the 
straightforward superimposition model utterly impossible. The perpetual 
circular revolutions that generate seemingly endless stories point to a kind of 
storytelling that abandons the scheme according to which the movement toward 
progressive development must take center stage. Instead of the unceasing 
building up of tension, one finds in circular storytelling a desire for constant 
dissipation of tension; there is, in other words, a constant striving to do away 
with development for the sake of making prominent the forcefulness of the 
simplest of stories to create and recreate endless points of perspectives before 
contrasting this forcefulness to the spent force that underlies the seemingly 
colossal political and social dogmas.  
The second element I borrow from Deleuze further elucidates this stylistic 
condition. Deleuze’s discussion of representation in Difference and Repetition is 
haunted by representation’s inability to move “beyond the form of identity, in 
relation to both the object seen and the seeing subject” (68). Identity as a 
component of representation or as the centre around which multiple perspectives 
orbit can only be superseded by what Deleuze calls the modern work:   
When the modern work of art develops its permutating series and 
its circular structures, it indicates to philosophy a path leading to 
the abandonment of representation. It is not enough to multiply 
perspectives in order to establish perspectivism. To every 
perspective or point of view there must correspond an autonomous 
work with its own self-sufficient sense: what matters is the 
divergence of series, the decentring of circles, ‘monstrosity’. The 
totality of circles and series is thus a formless ungrounded chaos 
which has no law other than its own repetition, its own 
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reproduction in the development of that which diverges and 
decentres. (68-9)   
 
Unlike the text whose centre is radical subjectivity—narratives relying on stream 
of consciousness come to mind here—but still conforms to the laws of 
representation, the work Deleuze discusses in this quotation forms its centre out 
of a chaos that forgoes the identity of representation. Repetition, discussed in the 
next chapter in conjunction with Elias’s Little Mountain, is undoubtedly the key 
entry point to this stylistic condition.   
 The second condition (the directional, the topic of the third chapter) 
operates by way of an extreme application—to the letter—of the binding and 
superimposition models, an application that takes both of these arrangements to 
their inevitable conclusions. In doing so, the directional movement of storytelling 
places enormous strain on both models so as make their absurdity apparent. The 
cultural depositories of nationalism, as the first part of this chapter shows, turn 
the individual into a national subject through a multilayered linkage to the 
nation—in terms of identity, sense of belonging, and ethics. The directional 
pattern, thus, makes the weakness of that linkage apparent without opposing it 
overtly but by way of rendering all of its underlying assumptions as literal as 
possible, a rendering that parses through these assumptions and exposes their 
breaking point.    
The third Deleuzian element I invoke illustrates this pattern’s incredible 
power. I interpret this extreme application as a way of giving rise to the 
simulacrum, and  
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by simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but 
rather the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged 
position is challenged and overturned. The simulacrum is the 
instance which includes a difference within itself, such as (at least) 
two divergent series on which it plays, all resemblance abolished so 
that one can no longer point to the existence of an original and a 
copy. (DR 60)  
 
Not only does the simulacrum challenge the privileged position of the model as 
well as the ensuing consequences, it also plays a critical role in the creation of the 
non-oppositional, non-rhetorical stylistic condition which at the same time 
manages not to ignore the depositories to which it responds. While I treat 
repetition as the entry point to the first condition, I treat metaphor and hyperbole 
as the entry point to this condition. 
*** 
In Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari state 
that “a minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is rather that 
which a minority constructs within a major language” (16). In Essays Critical and 
Clinical, Deleuze writes “that the masterpieces of literature always form a kind of 
foreign language within the language in which they are written” (71). There is a 
clear overlap between these statements: how do we read this minor/foreign 
language? How do we see the image of style? How do we recognize in it the 
isolation of the condition? The answers to these theoretical questions could only 
be articulated through the works themselves—could only come about within the 
literary works to be discussed in the next two chapters.   
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Chapter 2  
2 Repetition and Consequences in Elias Khoury’s Little 
Mountain 
For storytelling is always the art of repeating stories. 
Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller.” 
When things are repeated, they lose a fraction of their meaning. Or 
more exactly, they lose, drop by drop, the vital strength that gives 
them their illusory meaning. 
Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting  
I wrote about life … about life according to the conditions of war, 
not about the war itself. I wrote about people in war, not a history 
of the Lebanese Civil War. 
Elias Khoury, Tributaries  
Part One: Backgrounds  
I ended the previous chapter with several questions about the process of creating 
stylistic conditions. I would like to begin this chapter by pursuing one of those 
questions, namely the one concerned with the manner in which one can 
recognize those instances when a text does succeed in creating a given stylistic 
condition through isolating a set of symptoms. Such a text, thus, moves beyond 
identifying, validating, or opposing an image already existing in the world onto 
shaping an image which becomes visible or recognizable only after the fact. The 
answer to such question, as the previous chapter’s conclusion also suggests, must 
come about through the literary text itself, which speaks such a condition into 
existence (to use Heideggerian terminology), as this answer cannot be confined 
only to the abstract and the theoretical.  
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By way of approaching this question, I examine Elias Khoury’s novel, 
Little Mountain, as a case study for circular storytelling, doing so through taking 
the stylistic notion of repetition as the textual manifestation of this type of 
storytelling. Little Mountain’s repetitive structure becomes apparent from the 
outset of the narrative where the narrator recalls the neighbourhood in which he 
grew up: 
They called it Little Mountain. And we called it Little Mountain. 
We’d carry pebbles, draw faces and look for a puddle of water to 
wash off the sand, or fill with sand, then cry. We’d run through the 
fields—or something like fields—pick up a tortoise and carry it to 
where green leaves littered the ground. We made up things we’d 
say or wouldn’t say. They called it Little Mountain, we knew it 
wasn’t a mountain and we called it Little Mountain. (3) 
 
The circular movement of narration begins and ends with Little Mountain. 
Between the circle’s beginning and its end, however, lies a discovery of sorts 
about the nature of representation—they called it…we called it…”because the 
mountains were far away” (3)—whose law of discursive correspondence is laid 
bare through repetition. 
In broad terms, the central notion proposed here could be summed up as 
follows: though Little Mountain does not condemn, critique, or even address 
nationalism discursively or rhetorically, through its narrative style, it defies the 
logic which connects nation and narration on the one hand, and nation and 
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individual on the other.23 It does so not to debunk the idea of the nation as such 
but to reverse the process which deploys representation in order to interpellate 
the individual into a national subject. Not only does Khoury’s novel avoid 
creating a structural binding of the national story with the personal one, but it 
also deploys a form of repetition which shakes the foundation of all 
continuities—the necessary component of identity as idem or coherence over the 
course of narrative time. 
2.1 Resilient Misconceptions 
It may be useful, then, to begin the discussion of repetition in Khoury’s novel by 
taking account of two common misconceptions about repetition’s role in literary 
texts in general and in Little Mountain specifically. Repetition, first of all, should 
not be interpreted as either the opposite of order or the antithesis of 
chronological storytelling. I will come back to this crucial point and consider it 
more thoroughly, but, for the time being, it suffices to say that interpreting 
repetition in this manner might seem to illuminate dimensions of chronological 
storytelling (by means of speaking about what appears to be its opposite or 
antithesis) but would ultimately tell us very little about both the way in which 
                                                
23 This is in many ways both independent of and in keeping with Khoury’s own views 
on Arab nationalism in both its versions, the pan-Arab, cultural version and the state-
based, territorial one. Though this chapter does not discuss Khoury’s own views, it is 
perhaps worthwhile to know that his views were ambivalent. In her essay “On the 
Necessity of Writing the Present,” Sonja Mejcher-Atassi write that “for a time Khoury 
frequented the ‘Arab National Club’ founded by the Palestinian intellectual George 
Habash. He sympathized with the ideas of Arab nationalism but was not part of any 
political group in particular. This changed with the Arab defeat in the June War of 
1967. Shocked by the political events, he joined the fidayyin, the Palestinian resistance 
group in Jordan. While pursuing his studies in Beirut, he repeatedly took part in 
military action in Jordan and southern Lebanon” (88).   
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repetition can serve as the scheme of narrative and about the consequences of 
such a stylistic choice.  
Therefore, rather than assuming that repetition in narrative signifies a 
simple escape from or avoidance of chronology, repetition will be treated here as 
pointing to a burdensome weight that the narrative we encounter in Little 
Mountain tries to shake off. This weight is ultimately made up of depositories 
that influence not only the way we think about identity but also the way identity 
is fashioned aesthetically. This weight or burden, as we shall see later, is more 
related to fundamental questions about the nature and power of representation 
rather than to chronology as such.  
What the reader encounters in Khoury’s novel is in many ways a desire to 
counter conventional notions of representation and in doing so weaken the 
symbolic order governing identity and ethics which existed prior to the crisis for 
which the civil war stands. In “The Mature Arabic Novel outside Egypt,” Roger 
Allen states that Khoury’s novels tend “to provide a challenge for the reader 
which greatly enriches the process of discovery” (219). From this perspective, the 
term “weight” could be applied to both reader and narrative: the dominance of 
the mode of repetition makes it seem as though the narrative and its reader are 
destined to start at the beginning, must perpetually repeat that beginning, rather 
than simply march forward while pretending that representation could 
somehow dissipate the traumatic consequences of the civil war. Repetition, in 
short, is the mark of hesitancy to accept progress and the illusion of continuity, 
two key ingredients of nationalism as ideology. 
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Expressing this weight of “the eternal beginning” through repetition (and 
now I come to the second misreading) reveals that we are not simply dealing 
with a trauma-induced crisis of mimesis. According to Mona Takieddine 
Amyuni, for instance, it is the incoherence of the situation depicted which 
motivates Khoury to use this anti-realist style. In her essay entitled “Literary 
Creativity and Social Change,” she elaborates on the effect of the social 
upheavals of the sixties on the Arabic novel. Amyuni describes Khoury’s 
inability or unwillingness to write coherently about the Lebanese Civil War 
saying that  
a fractured reality, indeed, haunts Khoury’s personae24 and is 
rendered through a similarly broken down style. The only 
reality…is made of endless stories one creates…the rest totally 
escapes one’s grip. These chopped-up stories are like a ‘mirror of a 
broken reality,’ and a basic question is posed in all of Khoury’s 
fiction: how can literature weave the language of our troubled 
epoch out of the mirrors of a broken reality?’ (108) 
 
The metaphor of narrative serving as a mirror of reality (broken or otherwise) 
Amyuni deploys points to a persistent theoretical approach to make sense of 
literary experimentation.25 The intimation is that narrative cannot (or at least 
ought not to) weave a coherent language out of a reality characterized by chaos. 
                                                
24 The narrator is often compared to Khoury himself as a result of the biographical 
overlap with the main narrator’s experiences. 
25 This is a simplified characterization of this theoretical approach which is often posited 
in more complex terms. In Modern Arabic Literature, Paul Starkey puts it as follows: “a 
prominent characteristic of Ilyas Khuri’s work is its ‘self-referential’, or ‘metafictional 
nature, a strategy that attempts to involve the reader as a creative partner in the 
making of the text, which both marks the author out as a ‘post-modernist’ in the full 
sense of the term but which also reflects the fragmentation of the society to which he 
belongs” (150).   
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While Amyuni’s discussion of Khoury’s style is descriptively accurate, it is 
analytically questionable. Amyuni assumes that the inability to represent a 
broken reality through a coherent narrative is a shortcoming of mimesis. How is 
it possible to represent chaos through formal orderliness, the reasoning goes? 
This reasoning proves insufficient when considering the abundance of realist (or 
even documentary) narratives which seem to be capable of depicting chaos 
through well-ordered, chronological narratives. Since it would be questionable to 
claim that such depictions are in essence unsuccessful or unethical, we are left 
with no choice but to concede the possibility that aesthetic order could indeed 
successfully capture chaos. 
 Rather than a crisis of conventional mimeses, then, the fragmentary, 
repetitive narrative of Little Mountain points to an attempt to strip the story bare 
and leave it with as few symbolic traces as possible. Since the concept of mimesis 
is imbued with the connotations of recreating the world with a certain degree of 
fidelity, of imitation, and realist representation, thinking of repetition as a crisis 
of mimesis would suggest that the work suffers from an inability, at worst, or a 
refusal, at best: an inability to recreate what really took place or a refusal to invest 
the necessary effort to render it satisfactorily. Dealing with what took place 
through stripping the story of symbolic traces, however, suggests both the ability 
to create an alternative to conventional mimesis and the acceptance of the 
challenges this entails. The symbolic traces I have in mind, it must be reiterated, 
are the building blocks of the process that inextricably links the individual and 
the nation at the crucial levels of identity and ethics. The point behind stripping 
the story of such symbolic traces in Little Mountain is not simply to dispute or to 
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respond to the questionable premises that initially contributed to the crisis but to 
use the fragmented parts of those premises as the primary material for creating 
an alternative style of articulation. In other words, it is a style of articulation that 
uses up the symbolic traces rather than deploys them. By using them up, it 
renders them ineffective. 
2.2 The Civil War and the State of State and Cultural 
Nationalisms  
Little Mountain renders the symbolic traces ineffective as it narrates episodes 
taking place during a devastating civil war, a war which epitomizes the utter 
failure of nationalism’s program or at least the decimation of its unifying spirit. 
“What’s the difference between war and civil war?” (24), asks one of the fighters 
who appears in Little Mountain’s second chapter entitled, “The Church.”26 
Despite the fact that the question is posed and then repeated later on, it remains 
unanswered; it is never addressed by the seemingly indifferent fighters who 
show little interest in endowing the war they are engaged in with any 
philosophical, ideological, or ethical meaning. Little Mountain, after all, is “free of 
any moral positioning or partisanship for one militia group over another” 
(Mejcher-Atassi 88).  
 This is just a small part of Little Mountain’s overall tendency to deflate the 
imperial drive of discourse, not necessarily by countering its propositions but by 
                                                
26 This chapter tells the story of a group of fighters who take position in a church 
because of its strategic location overlooking the surrounding neighbourhoods. The 
chapter resembles a self-contained play more than a part of coherent or holistic 
narrative. 
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not allowing it to have a voice of its own. If the fighter’s question about the 
difference between war and civil war strikes many as being complicated or as 
needing serious philosophical or ethical contemplation, it would be because the 
logic of nationalism is simply the reigning logic of our era. “Whether we know it, 
or like it, or not, most of us are Hegelians and quite orthodox ones at that” (92) 
writes Paul de Man in his essay “Sign and Symbol in Hegel’s Aesthetics.” 
Something similar is at play here. The answer to the fighter’s question might 
seem complex because, whether we know it, or like it, or not, most of us have 
internalized the logic of nationalism. A civil war is inimical to that logic. 
Though set during the early phase of the Lebanese Civil War, a war that 
lasted from 1975 to 1990, Khoury’s novel focuses on the disjointed voices of 
narrators who are dragged into the bloody conflict more than on giving any 
documentary account, whether full or partial, of the war itself or of its historical 
roots. The novel 
consists of fragmentary narratives that relate to different spatial 
and temporal situations and have, at least in part, an 
autobiographical nature. They recall a Beirut childhood in the 
Christian neighborhood of Ashrafiyya, also called “the little 
mountain”; a childhood that is increasingly overshadowed by the 
events of the civil war. Tensions escalate until roadblocks are set 
up: then fighting—in which the narrator takes an active part—
breaks out between the Palestinian and Christian militias, 
spreading throughout the streets of Beirut and dominating 
everyday life. (Mejcher-Atassi 87)  
   
Aside from the fourth chapter narrated by an emasculated, middle-aged civil 
servant, the novel focuses on the stories (or to put it more accurately, the 
ramblings and conversations) of men fighting with the Joint Forces, a group 
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comprised of a number of allied groups who were, to varying degrees, 
sympathetic to the cause of pan-Arab nationalism. The Joint Forces fought 
against the Lebanese nationalist, umbrella group known as the Phalanges, one 
known for its commitment to Lebanese, state-based nationalism.  
 My focus has been on the way Little Mountain’s narrative treats the 
Lebanese Civil War and, by extension, nationalism, invoking this term in a 
relatively uncomplicated fashion. The focus on nationalism as such is meant to 
establish a foundation for the thesis proposed in this chapter before introducing 
the more complicated and complicating variables that any discussion concerned 
with nationalism in the Arab world ought to include. Knowing that nationalism 
in the Arab world could mean several things, the term “nationalism” ought not 
to be mistaken for a signifier pointing to a homogeneous ideology or for a 
unified and uncomplicated worldview.  
The variables I refer to above are the result of the unconventional way in 
which the idea of the nation played out in the Arab world. Broadly speaking, the 
additional variables pertain to the two almost mutually-exclusive senses of the 
term “nationalism.” My starting point is Adeed Dawisha’s Arab Nationalism in the 
Twentieth Century, a book containing useful distillations of these two divergent 
understandings of nationalism. As a preface to what follows, I should mention 
that, as a book on nationalism, Dawisha’s suffers from some flaws, the most 
apparent of which is the author’s beginning by defining the theoretical 
underpinnings of pan-Arab nationalism before proceeding to critique it (or 
scathingly condemn it) based on demonstrating how nationalism was exploited 
by the authoritarian rulers of Arab countries. Consequently, he ends up 
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expressing a vehemently critical and overtly cynical viewpoint of political 
intrigue, but he ultimately fails to produce a satisfactory critique of the concept 
on theoretical grounds.  
That being the case, Dawisha correctly states that nationalism in the Arab 
world has always had     
two ideological paths: al-qawmiya ([or pan-] Arab nationalism) and 
al-wataniya (nationalism based on state sovereignty). In a sense, 
here was a re-enactment of the nineteenth century philosophical 
debate between the German and the Anglo-French schools. The 
German school would stress al-qawmiya, with its emphasis on the 
oneness of the people (the Volk) under a unifying language and a 
continuous historical experience. Political and geographic divisions 
that might have separated members of the nation were artificial 
and therefore irrelevant to the definition of al-qawmiya. The Anglo-
French school, however, would embrace al-wataniya, the 
nationalism built (or at a minimum, nurtured) through state 
institutions within a geographically limited space, even if the 
citizens were to speak different languages and/or profess different 
ethnicities. (219) 
 
It should be said that each of these categories of nationalism has multiple forms. 
Al-wataniya, for instance, does not always denote the type of rhetoric advocated 
by an already established nation-state, as it is clear in the case of regional 
nationalism (Greater Syrian nationalism comes to mind here) which neither 
sought a unified Arab state based on the hypothetical oneness of Arab culture 
and language nor had it ever had a civic nation-state of its own. Because this 
chapter is concerned with national identity and Khoury’s Little Mountain rather 
than with nationalism in the Arab world, what is pertinent from our perspective 
are the fundamental characteristics of these two principal categories, not their 
historical trajectories or the splinter ideologies each produced.  
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The difference between these two strands of nationalist ideologies is first 
and foremost political, meaning that it is more the outcome of disparate political 
orientations than the result of contrasting interpretations of the constituents of 
Arab national identity (language, common history, culture, etc.), which is the 
case with the different forms of pan-Arab nationalism such as those described as 
Ba’athist or Nasserist. Al-wataniya (in many cases, though not in all27) emphasizes 
certain characteristics that pertain to a smaller group, more often with the 
intention of making a stronger case for the political sovereignty of the concerned 
group than to question their Arabness.  
What must be stressed, however, is that, for programmatic reasons, many 
who believed in and advocated for al-qawmiya were willing to embrace al-
wataniya hesitantly because they saw the latter as a transitory period that could 
or should at some future time lead to the former. This pragmatic solution meant 
that the two distinct political orientations of al-qawmiya and al-wataniya were able 
to survive and flourish simultaneously, leading to a situation in which it was 
relatively easy for those with enough political influence to win followers from 
both ideological camps by supporting the state-based wataniya actively while 
making sure to pay lip-service to the more idealistic notion of a united Arab 
national state.28  
                                                
27 See Taha Hussein’s The Future of Culture in Egypt. 
28 This is precisely why Dawisha provides a scathing history of Arab nationalism. It is 
for the same reason his account, in reality, is a history of political opportunism and/or 
mismanagement rather than an account of pan-Arab nationalism as such. 
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Therefore, while al-wataniya proved more successful in practical terms, al-
qawmiya remained the nobler, least expedient of the two alternatives. This is so 
mainly because its narrative proposes an Arab identity that has an impressive 
historical continuity, in addition to highlighting the artificiality of political 
borders separating Arab states, borders which were envisioned on maps by 
competing empires but were in many cases meaningless at the ground level. Not 
only did its narrative take account of and proposed to correct this basic historical 
reality, it also proposed an inclusive Arab national identity that (at least in 
theory) transcended the numerous religious and sectarian divisions.  
These elements among others made al-qawmiya an especially appealing 
strand of nationalism, so much so that even the overtly critical Dawisha admits 
that “if there was one period where this sectarian divide was at its lowest, it was 
during the 1950s, and particularly in this 1955–1958 period” (174). This is of 
course the same period he labels as the heyday of pan-Arab nationalism. Add to 
this admission his rare praise of this strand, writing that  
Arab nationalism, in its heyday, bestowed many gifts on its 
children: independence from the outsider; purposeful strides onto 
the road to social and economic modernity; a sense of dignity after 
the long years of colonization; a set of words and phrases that 
allowed the Arabs to narrate their own history; an abiding belief in 
their own ability to sweep aside all doubters and naysayers who 
blocked the way to progress. (312-3) 
 
Dawisha, nonetheless, considers all of these gifts insufficient as a result of the 
absence of democracy, an absence, according to him, which was responsible for 
the failure of the entire project of pan-Arab nationalism, if not wholly then at 
least partially (298). Of course, blaming its failure on the lack of democracy 
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requires one to forget that cultural nationalism is much more difficult to institute 
than civic nationalism as it involves bringing together a larger number peoples, 
usually in the absence of the required institutions but with the existence of a 
noble, liberatory idea. This difficulty, one might add, is evident even in the 
absence of foreign intervention represented by colonialism and imperialism as 
has been the case with the rise of nationalism in the Arab world. 
While al-wataniya is a nationalism that requires either the existence or the 
feasibility of a state with all its necessary institutions which are then entrusted 
with sustaining and nurturing it, al-qawmiyai is a nationalism that is more akin to 
a nationalism as a style of thought, one that is reliant more on the adoption of a 
particular worldview than on being a subject of a set of concrete and enforceable 
laws.  
Without a doubt, cultural nationalism is a type of nationalism that could 
benefit from the existence of a state with all its powerful institutions, but it is 
crucial to note that while it might seek a political nation-state actively, it does not 
require one as an absolute criterion.29 The thinkers of pan-Arab nationalism, such 
as the influential Sati’ al-Husri and the less so Zaki al-Arsuzi, did not see the 
                                                
29 I should indicate here that the case of Lebanon is unique in that the state preceded the 
Lebanese nation. Though this constitutes a unique example which might call for a 
greater scrutiny of the state in this particular case, what should be stressed is what 
transpires once the idea of the nation has been solidified: the nation becomes the more 
affective of the two. In other words, even in those cases where the nation is actually 
the product of the state machinery, the nation remains the entity with the power to 
embed itself in narrative in line with how this process is described in the first chapter. 
While the state does deserve special attention, achieving the objectives of this study 
requires that my attention be devoted to the nation, the generator of the deep-seated 
bond between the one and the many.  
 92 
non-existence of a united Arab state or the difficulties involved in establishing 
one as being detrimental to Arab national/cultural identity, whose inspiration 
and basic principles come, according to Dawisha, not from the region we now 
call the Arab world, but from the German idea of nationalism developed by the 
romantics. Writing about the type of nationalism promoted by al-Husri, Dawisha 
says the following: 
In his definition of the nation, Husri opted categorically for the 
German idea of cultural nationalism promoted by Herder, Fichte, 
and Ernest Moritz Arendt. In this formulation, as we have seen, a 
nation cannot depend on such ephemeral bases as the “will of the 
people”; rather, a nation is objectively based through the unity of 
its linguistic community and the coherence of its history. It is the 
individual’s language and history, regardless of his own 
preferences, that determine his national identity. Echoing the 
German romantics’ definition of what constitutes a “German,” 
Husri would contend that people who speak Arabic as their mother 
tongue are Arabs, the very people who recognize the common 
thread of their long and distinguished history. The Arab nation is 
therefore predetermined and eternal. (64) 
 
This preference meant two things simultaneously: the German cultural model 
constituted a positive influence in that it was the one judged as being more 
suitable in the Arab context, while the French civic model constituted a negative 
influence in that al-Husri’s definition of Arab national identity was formulated 
against Renan’s definition of national identity as voluntary, participatory, and as 
derived from a group of individuals being or becoming the subjects of laws and 
institutions. Its appeal could also be explained by the fact that, unlike Britain and 
France, Germany was not engaged in a direct occupation and colonization of 
Arab lands.  
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By opting for the German model, however, al-Husri did not necessarily 
import it as he found it. He had to subject it to what might be termed as a process 
of “cultural translation.” Thus, there are key differences to note between the 
original German romantic model of nationalism and the one al-Husri chose to 
adopt and promote. These differences can be interpreted as proof that al-Husri 
was keen on ridding cultural nationalism of its racial and racist overtones. They 
can also be interpreted as an indication that what took place ought not to be seen 
as a simple act of borrowing but is rather the result of a striking similarity in the 
way two geographically distant groups of people related to themselves prior to 
the age of nationalism.  
Since discussing this in detail would make for a rather long digression, it 
is enough to provide a brief outline of the adjustments al-Husri introduces to the 
German idea of nationalism. In The Arabic Language and National Identity, Yasir 
Suleiman highlights some of these differences, writing that  
although al-Husri shares with Herder, Fichte, and Arendt the view 
that language is the main ingredient of nationhood, he differs from 
the last two in his refusal to ascribe to Arabic and the Arabs the 
status of “original” language and “original” people [unlike al-
Arsuzi who did exactly that]… In addition, al-Husri adamantly 
refuses [to accept] ideas [according to which] race and language are 
said to coincide. (131) 
 
By emphasizing the role of language while downplaying the role of race or 
descent, Suleiman points out, the cultural pan-Arab nationalism achieves two 
important aims: it proved that it is indeed  
anchored (1) to those elements in the history of the Arabic-speaking 
peoples…, and (2) to the ideas of the German Romantics. Viewed 
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from the perspective of these two formative impulses, the Arab 
nation emerges as a construct that is sanctioned by the past and 
supported by evidence drawn from the course of nationalism in 
modern European history. (162)  
 
 These divergent forms of nationalism, though, are not spelled out 
explicitly in Khoury’s novel. They do, however, appear in the separation 
between the groups of fighters: while those belonging to the coalition 
sympathetic to al-qawmiya are given the opportunity to narrate their disjointed 
stories, those belonging to the one subscribing to an extreme form of al-wataniya 
are not.  
 Despite this, Little Mountain is first and foremost a novel of and about 
storytelling and not one of or about historical, sociological, or political 
information. The encounter with the narrative produces little effect (if any) on 
the reader’s historical, sociological, and political information concerning the 
Lebanese Civil War or nationalism in the Arab world for that matter. Rather than 
coalescing to make a holistic image or an arc of the civil war itself, the narrative’s 
disjointed stories remain isolated images, separated from each other by 
unbridgeable textual gaps.  
More importantly, the civil war, as it is depicted in Little Mountain, never 
forms a solid background to these decidedly personalized and distinctly 
individualized incidents. It should be added that the mere constructing of 
isolated, unbridgeable images through fragmentation on its own would not be 
sufficient to eliminate a dominating background. It would be possible to 
organize fragments in such a way that they become fathomable through a 
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uniform background which would pull them together in spite of their apparent 
heterogeneity. In contrast, the isolated images remain disconnected from a 
temporal, unifying background which is then made to serve as their organizing 
principle. 
With the absence of a uniform, narrative background, these individualized 
incidents become the only way one could make sense of the precarious positions 
of the fighters and their various social and sectarian origins. This knowledge is 
not gained from accessible, explanatory, and information-based narration but 
from the choices they make, from the scattered signifiers of different ideologies, 
as well as from the images they create out of their fears, insecurities, and hopes. 
Their decisions to fight alongside this diverse and socially heterogeneous group 
known as the Joint Forces despite their varied social and sectarian origins is a 
significant part of the story that remains below the narrative’s discursive surface. 
These decisions are never explained explicitly, neither through an ethical stance 
nor by way of ideological discourse. In “The End of Illusions,” Andreas Pflitsch 
correctly states that in his novels, Khoury “dispensed with anything 
unequivocal” (30). In line with this approach, the fighters’ decisions remain part 
of an underlying scheme rather than part of a manifesto-like, rhetorical 
explanation. The end result is a narrative whose focus is the war experiences of 
fighters, told through voices that are confused, repetitive, rambling, and 
disjointed. 
2.3 Little Mountain and the Arabic Novel 
Before getting to the consequences of these repetitive, disjointed voices, some 
preliminary comments are due—about the Lebanese novel, the civil war, as well 
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as about the position of Little Mountain within the tradition of the Arabic novel. It 
would not be an overstatement to say that the Lebanese Civil War has had a 
tremendous impact on the novel in Lebanon. The civil war was influential in that 
an unprecedented number of experimental works were written in response to it 
as a result of its effect which was such that “dreams were shattered and language 
lost its innocence” (Pflitsch 30). Nouri Gana characterizes this immense influence 
saying that the war was the “midwife” of the Lebanese novel (157).30 Khoury 
himself “has emphasized the crucial importance of the civil war to Lebanese 
literature, claiming that it simply did not exist prior to the conflict. Before the 
war, only ‘Egyptian novels’ had been written in Lebanon” (Pflitsch 30).  
 “How many novels will be written about us…?” (26), one of the fighters in 
Little Mountain wonders. To him, it is as if the yet to be written novels could 
provide a justification for the war or ascribe it with a rationale31 in the form of a 
future redemption in the vein of Taylor’s reasoning that humans always seek a 
future that would redeem their past (50-51). The fighter’s question could also be 
read as an expression of hope that these novels might one day form an archive 
which would be the war’s saviour and redeemer—this is precisely what Little 
Mountain does not do for it is a novel that channels highly subjective stories and 
memories, doing so while resisting the urge to build an archival structure into 
                                                
30 This metaphor, though appropriate because it calls attention to the civil war’s 
significant influence, can be somewhat misleading as it suggests that the Lebanese 
novel was “born” during this national trauma. In fact, the earliest Arab novelists came 
from Lebanon which was at the time part of the Ottoman administrative province of 
Greater Syria. 
31 This is particularly important since the fighting soon “obey[ed] its own logic, 
decoupled from the ideological goals the parties had formulated at the outset” 
(Mejcher-Atassi 89))  
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which these stories and memories can fit. As Norman Saadi Nikro describes Little 
Mountain’s narrative movement in his The Fragmenting Force of Memory, the 
movement, far from following a historical pattern, is a “downward vertigo 
(dizziness, light-headedness)…beginning with the little mountain, Ashrafieh, 
sinking into surrounding Beirut, and ending in the subterranean hollows of the 
Paris Metro” (104).  
The appearance of these war novels, which were written from the 
perspectives of those who fought the war as well as of those who were 
devastated by it, has come on the heels of fully fledged experimentation in the 
Arabic novel. To put it in generic terms, these novels intensified what is 
described in main-stream literary history of the Arabic novel as the transition 
from the dominance of the realist mode to the supremacy of the experimental 
one. Angelika Neuwirth points out that “what distinguishes the Lebanese novel 
from the rest of contemporary Arab literature is not only its introspection and 
rigorous destruction of political grand narratives but its experimental character, 
unique in its daringness” (61). Hyperbole aside, Neuwirth locates the beginnings 
of the transition from realism to experimentalism (which she calls “a critique of 
representation”) in the works of “the authors of the ‘new sensibility,’ a literary 
trend [in Egypt] that emerged in the early 1960s as an attempt to overcome the 
dominant realism” (45). Examples of experimentation in form and themes, then, 
can be traced back a decade earlier (Ghassan Kanafani’s All That’s Left to You also 
comes to mind here). But it is with the publication of these civil war novels that 
this mode of narrative experimentation became normalized, or at least more 
widespread and accepted.  
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From the literary historian’s perspective, Little Mountain, taken as an 
emblem of the civil war novel, has since come to occupy a special position on the 
trajectory of the Arabic novel’s development32 as it is taken to represents the 
accomplished narrative experimentation. Therefore, given that the Arabic novel 
is a relatively new form (within the Arabic literary tradition which spans a 
millennia and a half), the movement from the more or less traditional realist 
mode of storytelling to the experimental one is often described as both a 
significant milestone and a welcomed development, a period marking what 
Allen terms as the “period of maturity” (46) in his survey, The Arabic novel. 
The significance of Khoury’s novel also becomes especially evident when 
considering the emphasis some critics place on connecting the history of the 
Arabic novel and its evolution with the political history of the state. As a result of 
taking the Lebanese Civil War as its setting, Little Mountain is frequently seen as 
a remarkable and faithful document of the civil war’s early phase. Though one 
can disagree with this approach (especially the assumption that the novel’s most 
pressing task is the delineation of history), it remains difficult to dismiss it out of 
hand for the simple fact that it has proven to be quite a resilient approach in 
critical writings about the Arabic novel.  
In The Politics of Nostalgia in the Arabic Novel, Wen-chin Ouyan indicates 
that  
                                                
32 Tayeb Salih’s The Season of Migration to the North competes with Little Mountain for this 
position. In the case of Salih’s novel, it not so much narrative experimentation but the 
novel’s fresh approach to the question of colonialism. 
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the past and tradition in contemporary Arabic discourses…are 
more often than not defined according to ideologies attendant to 
Arab nationalism and modernisation, and above all, the reality of 
the nation-state. The Arabic novel writes its own (hi)story in 
tandem with narrating the emergence, modernisation and failure of 
the Arab nation at large and Arab nation-states in particular. (66)   
 
For instance, literary critic Faisal Darraj contends that the literary history of the 
Arabic novel has a precise correspondence to the political and social history of 
the region as whole and that the Arabic novel should not only be read as a 
historical document but also as an archive. Not only is the correspondence 
between the novel and the region’s tumultuous history evident, Darraj suggests, 
it is one which can only be ignored on pain of misinterpretation. In his book The 
National Memory in the Arabic Novel, Darraj writes that the Arabic novel 
represents, in essence, “a qualitative archive of an entire century, or ‘a novelistic 
history’ of the different phases of modern Arabic history, which spans from one 
defeat to another, or from a potential victory to an assured defeat” (17, my 
translation). Darraj also maintains that  
the novel, which mixes reality with the product of imagination is 
nothing less than the primary Arabic document which gave us and 
still does objective knowledge, for this novel has gone through an 
entire century while proving once and again, throughout its 
different phases, the objectivity of what it recorded and the validity 
of what it predicted. (21, my translation)  
 
The terms archive, document, objective, and record are no doubt in conflict with 
the concept of the autonomy of the artwork. Having said that, it is essential to be 
reminded of one crucial point, more for the sake of explanation than for the sake 
of justification. This approach, which turns the novel into a historical document, 
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is undertaken with the intention of elevating the status of the novel—perceived 
as the bearer of a brand of truth that never found its way to the political 
discourse throughout an entire century dotted with crushed hopes, failures, and 
perpetual setbacks. From this perspective, Darraj’s reading unequivocally assigns 
the novel a privileged position: first, as an unquestionably authentic form and, 
second, as the bearer of modernity which managed take root in novel’s aesthetic 
form but failed to become established at the social and political levels.    
As one of the influential literary critics writing in Arabic, Darraj33 
formulates an argument that highlights the type of expectations awaited from the 
novel in a highly charged political context. In the previous chapter, I made the 
point that the critic ought not to ignore the accomplished qualities of some works 
classified under the label of “postcolonial fiction” because of their tendency to be 
politically engaged, an engagement that tends to be judged unfavourably. What 
we find in Darraj’s approach, however, is something rather different: it is not 
only an appeal to accept the political engagement of some novels or not to allow 
such an engagement to undercut their other facets, but it is also a critical 
expectation to which the novel is supposed to conform. If the Arabic novel indeed 
forms an archive of the twentieth century, then it follows that each individual 
novel would necessarily form only a part of that archive, if it is to fulfill its social 
and ethical duty. As part of an enormous textual reference book, an individual 
novel must always be read (at least tacitly) as being complementary and never as 
being self-sufficient.  
                                                
33 Darraj admires Khoury’s novels. See The National Memory in the Arabic Novel, 248-54. 
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Little Mountain, in short, defies those expectations. It defies them by being 
structured as an anti-archive and by making its commitment to the individual, 
not to the national subject whose identity is governed by the political or 
historical background. This commitment could be sensed in how the novel 
makes it impossible for the reader to assemble its fragments into a satisfactory, 
conventional, or coherent whole. The novel, after all, create fragmented fictional 
worlds that teem with stories and memories which are endowed with anything 
but certainty or reliability—the essential ingredients of a document that might be 
judged as containing objective knowledge or historical truth. If it seems to be 
archival, it is perhaps the result of its setting or the multiplicities of its stories. 
Edward Said’s short essay, “After Mahfouz,” contains another view on 
Little Mountain’s position within the tradition of the Arabic novel. Said does not 
go as far as treating the novel as an archival document but still subscribes to the 
paradigm of narrative as a mirror of reality. The main premise of Said’s essay is 
encapsulated in his argument that Khoury’s novels are “in stark contrast to 
[those of Naguib] Mahfouz, whose Flaubertian dedication to letters has followed 
a more or less Modernist trajectory. Khoury’s ideas about literature and society 
are of a piece with the often bewilderingly fragmented realities of Lebanon” 
(323).34 In contrast to the modernist Mahfouz, “Khoury has forged (in the Joycean 
                                                
34 This is in line with the claim Pflitsch makes in his essay on the Lebanese-American 
author Rabih Alameddine, “So We are Called Lebanese”: “mistrusting history and 
historical writing is unsurprising for Lebanon in particular, where up to the present 
day a ‘national history’ accepted by all the country’s confessional and ethnic 
communities has yet to gain a foothold” (322).  
 102 
sense) a national and novel, unconventional, Post-Modern literary career” (Said 
323).  
Said develops this argument by presenting a comparison between 
Mahfouz and Khoury, a comparison based on a delineation of the different 
circumstances within which the Egyptian and Lebanese novels have first come 
into existence and later thrived. The outline he sketches “so schematically” (320) 
connects those circumstances directly with the texts’ stylistic qualities in a way 
that allows him to move briskly from describing the political and historical 
realities of the two countries to the narrative techniques which he sees as both 
influenced by and reflective of the circumstances of each country.35 Speaking 
about a break which he locates between the Egyptian Nobel Laureate, Mahfouz, 
and Khoury, Said writes that unlike Mahfouz, whose works express the compact, 
unique, and resilient Egyptian culture, “Khoury…is an artist who gives voice to 
rooted exiles and the plight of the trapped refugees, to dissolving boundaries 
and changing identities, to radical demands and new languages. From this 
perspective Khoury’s work bids Mahfouz an inevitable and yet profoundly 
respectful farewell” (325).  
The feature one notices in this comparison is that it is derived from the 
belief that narrative is ultimately mimetic and representational, even when it 
does not appear to be so, as is the case with Little Mountain. Mahfouz’s novels 
                                                
35 Said also makes the connection between to Khoury’s own life experiences and his 
novel: “Little Mountain replicates in its own special brand of formlessness some of 
Khoury’s life [experiences] (323)). “Khoury’s work embodies the actuality of 
Lebanon’s predicament,” which is, he adds, “so unlike Egypt’s majestic stability as 
delivered in Mahfouz’s fiction” (322). 
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(Said has The Cairo Trilogy and Midaq Alley in mind) are representational of the 
stability of Egyptian national culture, whereas Khoury’s novel reproduce the 
unstable, fragmentary, and precarious nature of Lebanese national culture. From 
this we could deduce that the novels of both authors are “realist,” whether or not 
they follow the conventions of realism. 
Said’s sketch is carried out with two presuppositions. First, the assessment 
of individual works involves viewing them as part of a tradition whose guiding 
principle is a necessary and unceasing process of development. Second, assessing 
the contributions of a given Arabic novel in relation to that constant process of 
development is best carried out with the yardstick that the novel that has already 
established in the West.36 Said also emphasizes that we should “keep in mind 
                                                
36 Notice, for instance, that the comparisons with Flaubert and Joyce are meant to 
illuminate the approximate positions of Mahfouz and Khoury within their own 
tradition. The source of this comparison can be located in the perpetual “anxiety of 
comparison,” an anxiety to which corporatists are prone. How should one establish 
satisfactory grounds for comparison? This is a complicated issue which cannot receive 
proper treatment here, other than making a reference to the intelligent discussion of 
this question in Abdelfattah Kilito’s Thou Shalt Not Speak My Language where he 
amusingly tells a story of delivering a lecture to a French-speaking audience on al-
maqamah, a classical Arabic narrative genre. How should Kilito establish the maqamah’s 
historical and cultural contexts? Should he use the Islamic calendar or the Western 
one? If he uses the Western calendar, is he misleading his audience by pointing them 
to a timeframe that is meaningless in the context of this genre? If he tells them the 
author of these maqamat (al-Hamadani) lived in the fourth century according to the 
Islamic calendar, is he bound to confuse them by using a timeframe they are not 
familiar with? “What I would like to note here,” Kilito writes, “is that when I hear of 
al-Tahtawi and al-Shidyaq [nineteenth-century Arab writers], my mind does not turn 
to the thirteenth [century according to the Islamic calendar], but to the nineteenth 
century” (8). Whereas, “when thinking of classical Arabic literature,” he adds, “I 
always refer to the Islamic calendar” (8). Here, Kilito points to the Arab intellectual’s 
literary memory which, he argues, is divided between the classical period and the 
modern one. The classical Arabic literary tradition, which developed more or less 
independently from that of Europe, has now become the heritage of a modern Arabic 
literary tradition that is greatly influenced by European literature. Hence, any 
discussion of modern Arabic literature (especially the novel) spontaneously refers one 
“to Europe as a chronology and a frame of reference” (8). 
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that the Arabic novel is an engaged form, involved through its readers and 
authors in the great social and historical upheavals of our century, sharing in its 
triumphs as well as its failures” (318). The question we are left with is the 
following: while it could be possible to concede that the Arabic novel is an 
“engaged form” (or an “embattled” (318) one, as Said writes in the next 
paragraph), is it a form destined to be read only as a manifestation of its political, 
social, or historical engagement? Could the aesthetic form be appreciated and 
assessed on the individual level without using history or political commitment as 
the only keys with the potential of unlocking it? 
From this progress-oriented view, then, the appearance of a certain, truly 
new text, which surely belongs to a heritage that no one can entirely ignore, 
constitutes an Event that alters the history of the entire tradition that stretches 
both before and after it. The issue with this view, which could ultimately be 
traced to T. S. Eliot’s famous formulation in “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent,” is that while it seeks to elevate the stature of the new text without 
causing injury to its precedents, it ends up doing violence to both texts, or bodies 
of texts, being compared. Neither text could, the supposition goes, make visible 
its own difference independent of the particular tradition to which it belongs. It 
is for this reason that one should take with a grain of salt this teleological 
understanding of literary history. 
Part Two: What’s the Deal with Repetition?  
The decision to use Little Mountain as a case study implies that it exhibits special 
characteristics, or that it is at least a noteworthy text which deserves a special 
consideration. If the previous overview of Little Mountain’s critical reception 
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suggests that we ought to be hesitant in accepting the pronouncements of main-
stream literary history, which, as we have seen, does accord Khoury’s novel a 
special status, then how are we to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory 
claims, the one implied and the one suggested? To reconcile the two claims, a 
distinction should first be made between repetition as a device deployed in 
narrative and repetition serving as the narrative’s scheme.  
The effect of repetition as a narrative device could be explained in many 
ways. To mention only two cursory explanations, one could say that the effect is 
the highlighting of a significant site within the text or the creation of a mantra-
like utterance that emphasizes a critical (though often ambivalent) point that the 
text is at pains to make. In this case, repetition is concerned with what we might 
provisionally term as the “production of meaning,” regardless of whether the 
meaning produced is explicit, insinuated, or has the potential to support multiple 
interpretations. Of course, this can take shape in many different ways, from the 
simplistic (and insufferable) didactic to the cryptically coded enunciation which 
can quickly debunk any deciphering attempt that is thrown at it. Since this type 
of repetition is not the main concern here, we can simply say that, in general 
terms, the deployment of repetition as a narrative device could be explained by 
either a desire or an impulse to place emphasis or to draw attention and thus to 
generate meaning rather than dissipate it.  
2.4 When Repetition is the Narrative’s Scheme 
Using repetition as the narrative’s scheme, on the other hand, has a very different 
relationship to the production of meaning. By way of beginning to clarify this 
crucial difference, I want to turn to one of this chapter’s three epigraphs. In Part 
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Seven of Milan Kundera’s The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, the protagonist, Jan, 
tries to explain to himself the peculiar effect of the image of borders which 
repeatedly occurs to him. “When things are repeated,” he reasons, “they lose a 
fraction of their meaning. Or more exactly, they lose, drop by drop, the vital 
strength that gives them their illusory meaning” (296). In this instance, the 
reoccurring or repeated image fails to generate meaning because it neither 
highlights a point at which interpretation could begin, nor does it illuminate 
those other parts which are not subject to perpetual reoccurrence. If anything, 
this repeated image makes things even more obscure, makes the context within 
which it appears even more uncertain than it would have been without that 
repeated image. This repeated image, in essence, takes on the role of a 
structuring principle for everything else rather than the role of an isolated 
occurrence that has the potential to serve as the context’s key or its solution. For 
Jan, memory (by constantly repeating a single image) does not merely point to a 
specific site through which an explanation could be constructed. Rather, the 
repetition of the image acquires a logic of its own in that the effect is not one of 
illumination. The consequence of this type of repetition, then, is to weaken what 
would otherwise be the critical site of meaning—making it lose, drop by drop, its 
vital strength which gives it its illusory meaning.    
Repetition in Little Mountain follows this scheme as its effect is neither the 
rhetorical illumination of the image repeated nor of its context. Repetition in 
Khoury’s novel appears not as a function for the generation of meaning but as 
the modus operandi of the narrative, as its logic. When compared to the rhetorical 
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tendencies common in many celebrated Arabic novels,37 this repetition as a 
scheme, as the structuring principle of Little Mountain, produces consequences 
which make the novel stand out for its stylistic difference, a difference that is 
neither historical nor necessarily progressive. Not only does this explanation of 
the novel’s contribution differ from the one given by main-stream literary history 
in that it targets the work itself rather than the larger trend to which it might 
belong, it is also one that does not require a progress-oriented conception of the 
development of literary forms.  
The special qualities of the novel are not necessarily related to its being 
modernist, postmodernist, experimental, or because it supersedes Mahfouz’s 
brand of realism (all explanations based on the literary history of the Western 
novel, not the Arabic one), but are related to its avoidance of generating meaning 
on the back of rhetorical devices. This would allow the reformulation of Said’s 
turn of phrase: rather than bidding Mahfouz’s works a profoundly respectful 
farewell, Little Mountain actually offers a refreshing alternative to the Arabic 
roman à thèse.  
Having already discussed the framework within which Said places Little 
Mountain, it is now time to move into another part of the essay, namely the one 
concerned with explicating the function of repetition. The explication Said offers 
with regard to order and repetition can be summarized as follows: it is an 
                                                
37 It is difficult and perhaps unnecessary to provide an exhaustive list here but one could 
mention a few well-known examples of this tendency where rhetorical exposition as 
well as intellectual concepts and debates take precedence over aesthetic elements such 
as forms, plots, character development, and settings, as in Taha Hussein’s A Man of 
Letter and Jabra Ibrahim Jabra’s The Ship. 
 108 
attempt to offer a reading that reconciles these two divergent concepts. Toward 
the end of his essay, Said argues that “style in The Little Mountain” 
is, first of all, repetition, as if the narrator needed this in order to 
prove to himself that improbable things actually did take place. 
Repetition is also, as the narrator says, the search for order—to go 
over matters sufficiently to find, if possible, the underlying pattern, 
the rules and protocols according to which a civil war, the most 
dreadful of all calamities, was being fought. Repetition permits 
lyricism, those metaphorical flights by which the sheer horror of 
what takes place—’Ever since the Mongols … we’ve been dying 
like flies. Dying without thinking, of bilharzia, of the plague … 
Without any consciousness, without dignity, without anything’ 
(Khoury)—is swiftly seen and recorded, and then falls back into 
anonymity. (324) 
 
For Said, repetition, far from being the inverse of order, is a mechanism that 
compensates for the absence of its supposed opposite. Though this can be 
characterized as a textbook example of deconstructing a binary, it represents a 
productive beginning. Repetition, though appearing as a disorderly form, is still 
seen as a search for order in a situation in which all order is obliterated by a 
chaos that is no longer an anomaly but has become part of mundane experience. 
Said draws attention as to how even in the chaotic form that Khoury creates, 
there is an underlying, fundamental desire to seek an order that could possibly 
mitigate the traumatic experience of the individual. From this standpoint, the 
traumatized individual constantly seeks a fleeting order even when such an 
individual appears hopelessly lost in an all-consuming chaos. 
There is, however, another crucial point to be made with regard to this 
reading whose aim is to underline the improbable connection between order, 
chaos, and repetition. While going in the right direction, Said’s reading remains 
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inadequate because it does not go far enough. While he rightly criticizes the 
misleading binary of order/repetition and (by extension) its aesthetic 
counterpart linear/fragmentary, he does so by accepting that the search for order 
implies understanding the chaos of the war through the same illusory logic of the 
past. After the crisis, one cannot seek an equivalent or at least comparable logic 
to the one that existed prior to it. What emerges through repetition, I want to 
argue, is something rather different because the traumatized individual, the 
fractured society, or the fragmentary narrative, cannot simply have recourse to 
same logic that reigned before the catastrophe as critical threshold has already 
been crossed.  
In “Postcolonial Literature in a Neocolonial World,” Saree Makdisi 
indicates that what remained after the start of the Lebanese Civil War, 
was necessarily fragmented, and any engagement (fictional or 
nonfictional) with these realities was compelled to adopt new 
forms, different from the ones typical of prewar cultural 
production…for both the fictional and the nonfictional narratives of 
the war are laid out in confusing and incoherent—schizophrenic—
disorder…As the narrator of Little Mountain says, sardonically, 
“Even surprises occurred in an orderly fashion before the war. My 
dreams were comprehensible. As for now, everything’s changed…” 
Thus, Lebanese writers, who have been forced to confront not only 
the war itself but its retroactive schizophrenic dissolution of what 
turns out to have been merely the illusion of prewar stability, have 
been engaging in the creation of new literary styles and forms…in 
which both the war and what went before it have been radically 
reimagined, reconfigured, and understood in new ways. (277-8) 
  
Stylistic repetition in Little Mountain, then, does not seek to reorder the past but 
creates a form meant to imagine that which has yet to be articulated—it is a 
movement eying a concealed future rather than a revealed or disclosed past. 
 110 
Repetition, in other words, does not simply recreate something along the lines of 
the order which existed before—the type of mediation between individuality and 
affiliation proposed by a nationalized and nationalizing style of thinking, or the 
collective formula, or idiolectal form (if we are to use Barthes’s phrase). 
Repetition as a narrative style seeks a new conception of the mediation, one that 
does not follow the assumptions of the old one. Though the starting point of this 
movement could be traced back to the old one, its overall effect (or consequences, 
as it is described in this chapter’s title) works to cast a shadow of uncertainty on 
the law which governs the established order of things, not only to mount a 
challenge to it or subvert its assumptions but also to uncover them or to render 
them bare.  
Unlike the proposition according to which repetition seeks to search for or 
recreate order (in other words, seeks to create a new law as an alternative to the 
defunct one), the proposition I put forward indicates that the true novelty of 
repetition is to uncover the already existing law because simply creating a new 
one would take us back to square one, to the more common and much too 
general exercise of replacing one law with another, an action which Benjamin 
describes as “law-making.” At the present moment, it is useful to formulate this 
idea by applying to it the terms of this study: instead of a quest to create what is 
sometimes termed as post-national, international, or global identity (new law), 
narrative repetition in Little Mountain seeks to push the limits of the law of 
national identity itself (existing law). The creation of a post-national identity, 
after all, would be an extension of the premise of national identity.  
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This is in accordance with the previous chapter’s overarching thesis, 
which argues that narrative is the ultimate grounds for undoing the national 
affiliation based on the equivalency between the national subject and the nation 
as narrative constituted the grounds on which this affiliation was initially 
imagined. From this perspective, the significant differences between pan-Arab, 
cultural nationalism and state, civic nationalism become less important because 
they both remain copies of the same existing law that regulates the relationship 
between the national subject and the nation. This is not to equate the political 
and historical consequences of these different versions of nationalism. Rather, it 
is to suggest that insofar as identity formation is concerned, the differences 
between the two are technical rather than fundamental. Therefore, the 
replacement of the national affiliation (in its two main versions, the civic and the 
cultural) with another type of law-making, post-national affiliation (which is not 
as convincing or as functional as the national one), would be anything but a 
novelty. 
While it is feasible to delineate the functioning of the law-making process, 
be it the national or the allegedly post-national one, it is impossible to provide a 
workable methodology of the law-uncovering process as this process proceeds 
on the assumption of the absence of methodology. Though we cannot pinpoint a 
single method associated with it, it is certainly possible to locate its effect. As a 
result of the law-making process being replicable, insofar as it is never truly new 
but is always another, modified copy of a law that already existed, it is in essence 
a methodological process based on a given symbolic arrangement, which is 
capable of withstanding a great deal of rearrangement. In contrast, the mere 
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suggestion of methodology in the context of the law-uncovering process would 
be in stark contradiction to this process’s most important constituting element 
which is its individual style. It is for this reason that this study targets case-
studies rather than sets up a universal or widely applicable theory about 
postcolonial or third-world fiction. Therefore, what could and should be done 
instead is provide a description of the specific manner in which this uncovering 
of the law takes place in Khoury’s text, in addition to expanding on its overall 
consequences and effect on the logic of national affiliation.  
2.5 Representation and Its Law of Correspondence 
To start with, then, let us consider a passage that appears in the opening pages of 
Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. Discussing the nature of the subtle interaction 
between repetition and the law (which is the structuring principle governing 
order or generality), Deleuze says the following: 
If repetition can be found, even in nature, it is in the name of a 
power which affirms itself against the law, which works 
underneath laws, perhaps superior to laws. If repetition exists, it 
expresses at once a singularity opposed to the general, a 
universality opposed to the particular, a distinctive opposed to the 
ordinary, an instantaneity opposed to variation and an eternity 
opposed to permanence. In every respect, repetition is a 
transgression. It puts law into question, it denounces its nominal or 
general character in favour of a more profound and more artistic 
reality. (3) 
 
As a first step of approaching Deleuze’s description of what repetition says, let 
us examine the several polarities he underscores: singularity/the general, 
universality/the particular, distinctive/the ordinary, instantaneity/variation, 
and eternity/permanence. At first glance, these polarities can be somewhat 
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puzzling, especially when considering the first two sets according to which 
“singularity” corresponds to “universality” whereas “the general” is put on the 
same plane as “the particular.” An educated guess that could be proposed to 
deal with this apparent mismatch might be formulated as follows: Deleuze’s use 
of these binaries is meant to exploit their descriptive power while simultaneously 
deconstructing them. This could pass as an adequate explanation, that is, until 
one reads what he writes two pages later: repetition “is by nature transgression 
or exception, always revealing a singularity opposed to the particulars subsumed 
under laws, a universal opposed to the generalities which give rise to laws” (5). It 
turns out that the terms Deleuze uses are neither a mismatch (intended or 
otherwise) nor a poststructuralist exercise in deconstruction; they are, in fact, 
terms which he deploys specifically in relation to the function of the law whose 
premises are not only questioned by repetition but whose origins are also 
exposed by it. What he calls “the particular,” therefore, is not “the unique” but is 
rather an isolated yet ordinary occurrence that still follows the laws of “the 
general.”   
In order to get to the point that concerns us most here, namely Little 
Mountain’s narrative repetition, its circular storytelling, and the impact on the 
national affiliation’s narrative structure, it is essential to put what Deleuze says 
about the law as it is described in the quotation above into conversation with 
what he says about the repetitive and circular structure of the modern work of 
art, a work for which, I argue, Little Mountain stands. We should be reminded 
that such a work, according to Deleuze’s suggestion, develops both “permutating 
series” and “circular structures” (68), all in an attempt to create an escape route 
 114 
out of the prison of representation. Broadly speaking, storytelling, 
representation, and national identity are closely connected. (Mis)Representation, 
by definition, has to submit to the logic of the identical which gives it the 
capacity to construct all the different forms of identity, whether they are 
aesthetic, social, or political; representation is actually the closest instance one 
could find to the structuring principle of the law; it is, in this sense, the law’s 
primary and most visible manifestation, one which is not confined to the 
aesthetic but also to the political. Not only does it provide the necessary 
sustenance to the law, allowing for its unceasing expansion into new domains of 
applicability, representation is also the mechanism through which the initiation 
of the law-making procedure becomes possible.    
By way of thinking through what repetition in Little Mountain does to 
representation, the mainstay of political imaginative constructions such as 
national identity, let us turn to an instance of what Deleuze describes as “circles 
and series” that stand on “a formless ungrounded chaos which has no law other 
than its own repetition” (69). This instance will also serve as an illustration of 
some aspects of the novel’s narrative style which introduces this repetitive, 
circular, and permutating storytelling to the context of the travails of the 
Lebanese Civil War and, by extension, of nationalism.  
It might, then, be useful to start at the beginning, that is, to start with a 
passage that appears in the first few pages of Khoury’s novel before being 
repeated two more times in the course of the first chapter. The choice of this 
specific passage is related to its status as a microcosm of the novel as a whole—a 
microcosm that exhibits the novel’s other characteristics. Each time the passage is 
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repeated, several small differences are introduced. These differences pertain to a 
change in tense (a switch between the present and past) but also to a change in 
the content being conveyed. Thus, these changes are stylistic in all cases, but they 
are also conflicting insofar as meaning is concerned. Spoken by the main 
narrator, not only does this passage give us crucial clues about the repetitive 
style in which the novel is written, it also includes an indirect suggestion, a trace 
or a signifier of the main narrator’s political allegiances. The narrator says: 
Five men came, jumping out of a military-like jeep. Carrying 
automatic rifles, they surround the house. The neighbors come out 
to watch. One of them smiles, she makes the victory sign. They 
come up to the house, knock on the door. My mother opens the 
door, surprised. Their leader asks about me. 
—He’s gone out. 
—Where did he go? 
—I don’t know. Come in, have a cup of coffee. 
They enter. They search for me in the house. I wasn’t there. 
They found a book with Abdel-Nasser on the back cover. I wasn’t 
there. They scattered the papers and overturned the furniture. They 
cursed the Palestinians. They ripped my bed. They insulted my 
mother and this corrupt generation. I wasn’t there. I wasn’t there. 
My mother was there, trembling with distress and resentment, 
pacing up and down the house angrily. She stopped answering 
their questions and left them. She sat on a chair in the entrance, 
guarding her house, as they, inside, looked for the Palestinians and 
Abdel-Nasser and international communism. She sat on a chair in 
the entrance and they made the sign of the cross, in hatred or in joy. 
They went out into the street, their hands held high in 
gestures of victory. Some people watched and made the victory 
sign. (4-5) 
  
There are several things that need to be elaborated with regard to this passage, 
among them is the slight variations introduced in the next two repetitions. These 
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variations are indicative that this type of repetition amounts to more than an 
experimental maneuver or a meaning-generating device. We will get to this 
crucial aspect after establishing some principal observations.  
From the repetition of the sentence, “I wasn’t there,” we come to 
understand that the speaking subject in Khoury’s novel is constituted by absence 
(this also applies to other narrators and storytellers who appear in the following 
four chapters.) This absence is not complete, but rather an absence from the 
designated or expected place. The character, the passage, as well as the 
individual plot are not in their designated place—not tied down to an anchoring 
or illuminating background. In addition to the physical absence from the scene 
itself, there is another, more extreme absence indicated by the fact that the main 
narrator is never given either a name or a set of clear and distinctive 
characteristics which might allow the reader to identify him with any certainty as 
he reappears in the course of the narrative—the ultimate absence, perhaps, is the 
absence from one’s own narrative.  
This textual self-elision of Little Mountain’s principal narrator is in line 
with the novel’s reticence on the question of national affiliation, despite its 
setting being a civil war fought in the name of competing ideas with regard to 
that type of affiliation. The narrator’s self-elision points to a crucial choice, a 
choice to form out of an absence a disfigured but a newly imagined presence, one 
based on the individuality, uniqueness, and fleeting nature of character identity 
rather than on the illusory fixity of the affiliation identity, be it a broad, national 
affiliation or an exclusive, sectarian one. Notice that the same cannot be said 
about the militia men who storm the house. They are indeed present, but their 
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presence is determined by symbols which are in turn determined by the fixity of 
affiliation and of group. Thus, the only thing we know of this narrator with any 
certainty is his storytelling which is couched in a chaotic and disfigured narrative 
about an incomplete, incoherent life: episodes from a sheltered, confused 
childhood in the neighbourhood known as “Little Mountain,” episodes of street 
fighting between various nationalist and sectarian groups, and finally a short 
episode of the narrator’s time in Paris where he goes to be treated of his wounds. 
In Signifying Loss, Gana calls this absence “belated.” Gana’s central 
argument in the chapter treating Khoury’s work could be summed up as follows: 
the after-the-fact absence from the crucial scene quoted above represents a device 
intended to make sense of the trauma discursively, that is, through the utterance 
and re-utterance of what took place between his mother and the militia men. 
“The ability of the first person narrator to tell us he ‘wasn’t there,’” Gana writes, 
becomes possible only belatedly, when he reinserts himself into the 
narrative gap, and reproduces the absence (the ‘not being there’) to 
which he was subject, but not yet a retrospective witness. Laying 
claim to an absence from the scene of the traumatic event at the 
moment of its unfolding becomes belatedly the inaugurational 
moment of the discursive reconstruction of what happened. For the 
first person narrator of Little Mountain to go on repeating again and 
again (in a chiastic vacillation of sameness and difference) the 
circumstantial sequence of this arch event throughout the narrative 
is indicative of the ways in which repetition here a narrative device 
or an organizing principle of narration: not only does it sustain the 
rhythmic unfolding of the story, but it also frames the very 
painstaking and gradual transformation of the traumatic event into 
a belated experience. (162) 
 
Having already addressed the difference between repetition as a narrative device 
and as an organizing principle, I want to focus here only on the other aspects of 
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Gana’s reading, namely the gap produced by the narrator who, not bearing 
witness to the event firsthand, attempts to fill it with yet another gap which he 
creates through repeating that he “wasn’t there.” From Gana’s perspective, then, 
to lay claim to an absence from a key segment of one’s narrative also marks the 
moment of beginning to reconstruct that very segment discursively, an action 
which appears to Gana as having clear therapeutic connotations.  
Despite approaching the question of repetition from a different 
perspective, Gana seems to agree with Said that narration is always a way of 
ordering or reordering the events either to make them more comprehensible or 
to deal with their traumatic residues, two aims that can be interpreted as at least 
closely connected or as part of a single, more general method of narration. In 
Khoury’s novel, the two critics agree, the principle of chaos or chiasmus becomes 
the device through which the traumatized subject makes sense of the 
combination which brings together the perceived coherence of the subject’s own, 
national identity as well as the incoherence of the context in the midst of which 
that subject finds itself. This “formless form,” as Gana describes it, or the 
“patchwork novel,” as Stefan Meyer puts it in The Experimental Arabic Novel (129), 
does not simply stand for the incoherence of the civil war itself, but rather for the 
difficulty of grasping the mutual erasure of the seeming coherence of national 
identity and the utter incoherence of civil war. According to the specific 
mechanism Gana proposes, either the subject experiences the traumatic event 
firsthand or engages in trying to fill the gap that absence creates through the 
production of a repeated sequence of discursive absences, in a perpetual “chiastic 
vacillation of sameness and difference,” as Gana poetically puts it.  
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 The claim that a specific type of narration could fill the gap of absence 
takes us back to the problematic of representation. What is at stake in Gana’s 
reading (also in those of Said and Darraj) is the question of how does narrative 
represent its context accurately and how does it do so faithfully and ethically? The 
point I want to emphasize, however, is that rather than posing the question of 
how does one represent that context accurately, Little Mountain’s repetitive 
scheme proposes the more difficult question of how one does not represent it in 
the sense of reproducing its law with all the premises that make that law 
functional. Put in general terms, the repetitive scheme proposes the question as 
to how one could make a clean escape from what I call the prison of 
representation. Therefore, the “chiastic vacillation of sameness and difference” or 
the “permutating series and circular structures,” as Deleuze phrases it, instigate 
the severance of what I call in the previous chapter “the dual plot’s matching 
points,” points that are the prerequisites of the law of representation which seek 
to reproduce the nation’s story in the background—the civil war—in the guise of 
the character’s story in the foreground—the scene of absence.  
 Although it might seem improbable or counterintuitive, the fighters who 
barge into the narrator’s home—in one version they are allowed in, in the other 
they force their way in—constitute a part of the national story. They are, both 
literally and metaphorically, intruders. They are such because they serve as 
caricatures which repeatedly appear as signifiers of the civil war itself, of its 
brutality as well as its destructive, sectarian nature. The absence of the narrator, 
rather than simply standing for psychological trauma, actually stands for the 
attempt to institute a non-correspondence between himself and the war as a 
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national event. His acts are those of an independent character, unlike the militia 
men who enter the house as automatons, adorned with symbols, repeatedly 
appearing before disappearing forever into the non-distinct background.  
The severance of the dual plot’s matching points is also a function of the 
time conception which governs the narrative in Khoury’s novel. This can be seen 
in the variations between the multiple versions of this event. It is true, first of all, 
that this repetition with variation casts a shadow of doubt on straightforward 
narrative knowledge (usually established by means of chronological and/or 
realist narration) through proposing alternative, unconventional ways to deal 
with what had occurred—this, though, might be one of the least interesting 
aspects of repetition in Little Mountain.  
The other important aspect of repetition with variation is that in addition 
to making this pivotal episode formally separate from the nation’s story, it also 
makes it utterly timeless in that the episode is narrated in a way that makes it 
impossible to be located within homogeneous, empty time. There is in the overall 
narrative an absence of the principle of “meanwhile” or, as Anderson puts it, the 
principle of coincidence: not only is narrative time in Little Mountain inconstant, 
in the sense that individuals do not move “calendrically through homogeneous, 
empty time” (Anderson 26), it also lacks the temporal markers that are necessary, 
first, to put individual incidents and national ones on a single time-plane and, 
second, to put different individuals in a hypothetical “temporal dialogue” with 
one another. In other words, there is no temporal dialogue capable of making 
parallel the movement of different characters within the narrative’s time, with 
moments that have the potential of becoming nodes of temporal coincidence or 
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correspondence, so much so that the variations in the repeated event ensure the 
negation of this principle of correspondence. 
Once we reach the third repetition of this event, it becomes clear that the 
cyclical repetition which reappears without discursive justification does not 
simply shed more light on what exactly happens. If anything, it makes the 
question regarding what “exactly happens” an unanswerable and perhaps even 
an irrelevant one. Rather than “what occurred?” the question becomes “why it 
reoccurs?” The first iteration of the scene serves to synchronize the national story 
and the personal one. Repetition, then, tears apart that initial biding by turning 
that moment of contact between the two strands into a discontinuous line 
whereby the progress of that parallel is stunted with both strands petering out—
a technique in line with Khoury’s work in general where “much remains 
inconclusive; narrative strands come to nothing and peter out” (Pflitsch 30). 
From this viewpoint, repetition puts representational truth itself in question: 
according to the law of representation, the third and final repetition of the scene 
would indeed hold the answer to the previous two as it is the one most 
illuminated, the one most reflective of the incident that the narrative retells by 
virtue of its building its momentum by way of the previous two.    
It is now time to turn to the third version in order to explain further the 
challenges it poses to the law of representation. It is not necessary, I think, to 
focus on the second variation because its importance lies in its function as part of 
the series of repetition rather than on what it specifically accomplishes. It is 
perhaps enough to mention in passing that the main difference between the first 
and second versions is the addition of the threat the militia men make to the 
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mother once they realize the narrator is nowhere to be found: “—He’d better not 
come back here” (13). 
In the third version, however, the differences are amplified: 
They came. 
Five men, jumping from a military-like jeep, carrying 
automatic rifles. Five men wearing big black hats with big black 
crosses dangling from their necks. They surround the house. They 
ring the church bells and bang on the door. 
Five long black crosses dangling before my mother as she 
opens the door. She mutters unintelligible phrases. She slams the 
door in their faces and cries. 
Five men break down the door and ask for me. I wasn’t 
there. They find a book with a picture of Abdel-Nasser on the back 
cover. I wasn’t there. My mother was there, trembling with distress, 
resentment, and fear. My mother was there. She sat on a chair in 
the entrance, guarding her house as they, inside, looked for the 
Palestinians and Abdel-Nasser and international communism. She 
sat on a chair in the entrance, guarding her house as they, inside, 
tore up papers and memories.  
My mother was there. 
I wasn’t there. 
I was in the East, searching with short, almost barefoot men 
in rubber shoes that didn’t keep the cold out. I was in the East, 
looking for Little Mountain stretched across the frames of men, the 
sea surging out of their beautiful eyes. (17-8) 
 
The return of this event is not the reappearance of the same under a different 
guise. The moment we start to apply what we take to be the normal workings of 
memory to its “reappearance with difference” is also the moment we begin to go 
astray. Memory, initiates the past into the present by the repetition of bygone 
events. With each repetition, the imperfections of memory begin to show 
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themselves through differences which start to surface as small discrepancies 
before such discrepancies become ever larger. This might be true insofar as it is 
taken as a descriptive observation about the way individuals remember events. It 
is also a difference which Deleuze argues is posited as being subordinated to 
similarity.  
 It is inaccurate, however, to extend this descriptive observation so as to 
explain the function of a past event as a representation in the economy of a given 
narrative. Far from only highlighting the unreliability or imperfections of 
memory, these variations weaken discursive meaning by recycling symbolic 
markers—Abdel-Nasser, the automaton-like militia men entering the house, the 
crosses, and victory signs—which usually gain their power through being 
explained and sometimes through being critiqued. It is crucial to notice that the 
two sets of symbols—representing the two forms of national attachment—are 
organized by the militia men themselves. The narrator never tries to claim the 
symbols of pan-Arab nationalism assigned to him by the intruders, despite the 
fact that his choice to fight alongside the Palestinians and their supporters gives 
us clues as to where his sympathies lie. His sympathies, however, are defined by 
his individualized choice (one taken against the grain), not through any specific 
symbolic arrangement. His attachment to the national idea is individualized as 
an attachment to a cause, governed by a sense of injustice rather than by a sense 
of false togetherness. In the first version, these markers appear to regulate the 
symbolic relationship between the narrator and the militia men: they come 
wearing big crosses; he has a book with Abdel-Nasser’s picture on it. In the third 
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one, these symbols become nothing more than dead signifiers devoid of any 
discursive content. 
It is, therefore, urgent to recognize that by narrating the third version the 
way he does, the narrator does not simply remember the event imperfectly, 
whether intentionally as a way of sorting out his trauma or unintentionally as a 
result of his faulty memory. Rather than repeatedly bringing a recollection to the 
surface, he relates the event in its guise as a formative experience, so that its 
content and symbols (Abdel-Nasser, the crosses, the weapons, the reactions of 
the neighbours and that of his mother) are recycled through the imperfect, 
repetitive permutation from powerful discursive icons into bits of muted 
reference points that lack the symbolic network necessary for endowing them 
with potency.  
To narrate here means to put forward an inharmonious jumble of 
formative experiences and to create through repetition a collection of moments 
that decidedly bring to the fore the individual’s narrative, one guided by actions 
and choices, at the expense of the homogenizing tendencies of affiliation 
narratives, which absolutely need a discursive, symbolic network of meaning in 
order to operate effectively. In this way the narrative becomes first and foremost 
the property of the individual story, regardless of how incoherent it happens to 
be, rather than a mere replication of the real-world event or of its background, 
which is often treated as the model against which the copy or the individual’s 
narrative is judged. This type of fidelity-judgment is evident in the readings 
discussed above, readings based on the following formula: fractured reality => 
fractured narrative = faithful rendering. Repetition, thus, is not the eternal return 
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of the same, nor is it the eternal return of the almost-the-same. It is rather the 
creation of a set of events that can stand as individual stories, neither expected to 
resemble something other than themselves nor rejuvenate the symbols of the 
law.  
A critical question should be posed at this point: in what way is the 
preceding reading of repetition significant with regard to the problematic of 
national identity? It is significant because at the basis of national identity is the 
presumption that such identity is a copy whose model or a priori form can be 
found out there, in the world of politics, in history, in the world of social 
relations, or in a given system that regulates ethical responsibility. As is the case 
with the event narrated in Little Mountain, the narrator’s national identity is not a 
representation which re-enacts a larger model, one which is then judged based 
on its degree of fidelity, but an individuation whose most important constituent 
is its difference, not its degree of resemblance. From this perspective, then, it is 
no longer an identity but an imperfect repetition echoed by a single individual. 
If we make the mistake of taking the third version as simply the one that is 
most faithful to the event as it takes place in “reality,” we are bound to remain 
stuck with the question of why should it be repeated and why should it be 
preceded with two versions?—questions that will almost certainly take us from 
the crucial problematic of representation to the secondary problematic of trauma 
and memory. We should be reminded here that the appearance of the first 
version, inserted as a textual fragment that is out of place, generates an 
expectation that the stories to come will smooth out its rough edges by giving 
voice to the ideological signifiers it contains. The appearance of the third and 
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final version shatters such expectation by first amplifying the ideological 
signifiers before showing that these signifiers do not in fact have a content, do 
not point directly to signifieds as they are expected to do. With this in mind, we 
can begin to see how the repetition of the formative event holds at once a 
“distinctiveness” and a “universality,” distinctiveness by virtue of being an 
individual experience of one man, a “universality” by virtue of being an instance 
of what it means to choose the ethics of individual action at the expense of 
national and/or communal affiliation.  
2.6 The Last Word 
Repetition with variation starts by creating a temporal non-correspondence and 
ends by showing the way of imagining other types of political, national, and 
communal non-correspondence that are not part of passive disengagement. 
These variations also show that repetition in Little Mountain is a textual 
procedure which flips over the concept of identity on its head in that the 
reoccurring event produced in the text achieves two forms of independence: first, 
from the necessity of constructing a representation of the reality existing out 
there within which there is a coordination of the movement of characters and the 
occurrence of events, second, from parasitical dependency based on the primacy 
of that which comes first, an independence from respecting the primacy of what 
Deleuze calls the a priori form.  
 The first form of independence could be described in more mundane 
terms as follows: the difference which the textual reoccurrence envelopes steers 
away from the perennial question of representation/misrepresentation, that 
dichotomy which governs aesthetic judgment in the world of identities. The 
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fictional world of Little Mountain is one teeming with radically independent 
individuals/characters that do not appear as mere subjects of their narrative’s 
background. “All identities are only simulated,” Deleuze says in the preface to 
Difference and Repetition, “produced as an optical ‘effect’ by the more profound 
game of difference and repetition” (xix). It is perhaps the absence of this 
comforting optical effect which makes storytelling in Little Mountain disorienting 
but liberating. As Pflitsch  contends in his discussion of Rabih Alameddine’s 
novels, “identity can turn out to be a prison, a heavy burden, and the effort to 
cast it off can become the task of a lifetime, an obsession pursued passionately 
and full of suffering” (324). 
It is rather appropriate to end this chapter by coming full circle, by going 
back to the question proposed in the chapter’s opening: what exactly is the 
stylistic condition that Khoury’s novel creates and what kind of image do we 
arrive at? The answer to this question is also a sort of summation: the novel takes 
the civil war as an opportunity, as an event that allows for the isolation of the 
symptoms of national identity, more specifically the conjunction of two 
nationalist ideas (the cultural and the civic) as they vie for “the legitimate use of 
violence,” the prize and goal of law-making processes.  
As to the image the novel creates, it is one that takes form through a 
rendition of the idea of the nation that does not rely on a representation of that 
idea’s tenets or on its method; it is, instead, one that conjures that idea’s spectres. 
Rather than two competing nationalist ideas, complete with their respective 
discourses, what one finds is the palpable presence of shapeless spectres, which, 
though not resembling the nationalism as it operates in time and space, in the 
 128 
world of history and politics, it still points to it with spectacular clarity. Little 
Mountain, then, gives space to individual action; it neither pits ideologies against 
each other nor puts them in dialogue. Instead, it robs them of the discursive 
narrative properties they very much need to thrive. This image, combining 
newness and potency, is the image of the muted idea of the nation.     
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Chapter 3  
3 The Magic World of Metaphor, Metonymy, and the 
Simulacrum: Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children 
Magical realism reorients not only our habits of time and space, but 
our sense of identity as well: with over five hundred children of 
midnight talking through his head, is Saleem himself anymore? 
Wendy Faris, “Scheherazade’s Children”  
I even made the boy and the country identical twins. 
Salman Rushdie, Introduction to Midnight’s Children  
Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it 
as false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of 
representation as itself a simulacrum.  
Jean Baudrillard, Simulations 
With the discussion of novelistic narrative and national identity moving from 
Khoury’s Little Mountain to Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children, it is 
worthwhile to start this chapter with a reminder of the stark differences between 
the two novels: the subject matter, the narrative style, the tone, and the contexts 
of the two novels are quite distinct. The context, for instance, ranges from a 
devastating civil war to the history and aftermath of a long-awaited national 
independence. The tone ranges from the tragic to the absurd. The narrative genre 
ranges from fragmentary storytelling to magic realism. The subject matter ranges 
from the memories of street fighters in war-torn Beirut to the Bildungsroman of an 
Indian boy growing up in bustling Bombay and coming of age in Pakistan. Last 
but not least is their radically different handling of the relationship between 
subject and national affiliation.  
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3.1 Grounds for Comparison: Different Aesthetics, 
Convergent Tendencies  
Beginning with placing emphasis on these stark differences, however, also serves 
as an opportunity for calling attention to the convergence of the two novels, a 
convergence that forms the central part of this study’s “grounds for 
comparison.” Though this convergence is far from being immediately evident, it 
is, I argue, well worth pursuing, if not simply for the sake of the “comparative 
challenge” of putting in conversation two very different novels as a way of 
getting at the shared literariness that informs comparative literature as a 
discipline, then for the sake of drawing attention as to how two sets of very 
distinctly divergent literary techniques could end up creating a comparable 
effect—could wind up with stylistic images whose effect produces a convergence 
which cannot but be underlined.  
 To reiterate this idea in more specific terms, one could say that the 
narrative styles of these two novels create comparable images that push the 
representational law of national identity to its limit. In doing so, they expose its 
breaking point, all while forgoing both straightforward discursive criticism and 
the institution of a new law. They forgo these alternatives and instead speak into 
existence a language through which a current is created, a current that creatively 
resists the presuppositions forming the thrust of the conventional understanding 
of national identity. The narrative structuring schemes these novels employ—
repetition and fragmentation in Khoury’s Little Mountain, hyperboles and 
digression in Midnight’s Children—I argue, offer a unique structural way of 
interrogating the assumptions upon which national identity was constructed, not 
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only in relation to nationalism in the postcolonial societies in which the events of 
these novels take place but also in relation to nationalism as such. In short, the 
fictional worlds they bring about are ones in which national identity has lost its 
hypothetical yet comforting coherence.  
 The creation of such fictional worlds is first and foremost an attempt to 
imagine truly new and distinct ways of dealing with the question of national 
affiliation. (And this is yet another indication that what is at work in these novels 
is an operation with no single identifiable methodology.) From this study’s 
viewpoint, then, one could say that while their processes of “isolating of 
symptoms” of national affiliation are highly individualized, i.e. materialize in 
two aesthetically distinct manners, the resulting stylistic images share the 
characteristic of being imbued with a single desire and animated by a 
comparable energy: the desire to address the issue of national identity and the 
energy required to imagine new ways of assessing it, away from the typical 
dichotomy of either rejection or acceptance.  
 If it were not for running the risk of proposing a dichotomizing and 
dichotomized reading, one would go as far as claiming that the two novels are 
opposites—as far as their narrative movements are concerned—which are 
animated by underlying energies that come so close to being identical. While 
Khoury’s novel uses repetition and fragmentation to propose an image of a 
muted national identity, Midnight Children uses hyperbole and digression to 
propose a world in which the metaphor of national identity is fully adopted: “I 
had been mysteriously hand-cuffed to history” Saleem Sinai says amusingly in 
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the novel’s first paragraph, “my destinies indissolubly chained to those of my 
country” (9).  
 In Metaphor, David Punter proposes an “over-adventurous” way of 
thinking of metaphor “as ectoplasm: as the fruit of an attempt to give material 
form to, to incarnate, that which otherwise remains latent, ghostly” (68). With 
Rushdie’s novel in mind, Punter suggests that metaphor is “the bodying-forth of 
sets of correspondences” of which we have all been “aware in a liminal38 way, 
hovering somewhere around the threshold of articulation” (68). In Midnight’s 
Children, however, the crossing of the articulation’s threshold represents a 
narrative movement which goes further than giving the ghost a material form. It 
is, in other words, a narrative movement which begins by deploying the 
metaphor’s body—extracted from the depositories of national culture—and ends 
by obliterating that body into pieces out of which neither the ghost nor the body 
could be resurrected. The approach of fully embodying the central metaphor 
connecting subject and nation, I argue, is one which turns out to mount one of 
the strongest forms of interrogating the solemnity of national identity, doing so 
through a narrative movement that renders its usually potent and affective ethos 
as absurd rather than as seriously cogent or ethically binding.   
 “Above all things,” Saleem tells the reader shortly after, “I fear absurdity” 
(9). What he seeks above all, therefore, is “to end up meaning—yes, meaning—
something” (9). Saleem’s preoccupation with “meaning,” it must emphasized, 
does not emerge out of the writing process which he undertakes later in life as he 
                                                
38 Emphasis in the original. 
 133 
approaches his thirty-first birthday. The creation of meaning retrospectively, as 
we saw in the first chapter, is inescapable. Given that it is so, if Saleem’s desire to 
create meaning were to emerge at the time he begins to write his 
“autobiography,” then such desire would be nothing out of the ordinary. Saleem, 
however, is aware early on that his personal life carries a great deal of meaning, 
that he is at the centre of history, if not the cosmos.  
 How is this meaning to be created? And better still, how is it to be 
optimized to such an extent as to satisfy the exceedingly narcissistic Saleem? It is 
created by way of asserting a visceral bond between a select number of subjects 
and their nascent nation, with Saleem being the most remarkable member of this 
group. Describing the moment of his birth, Saleem writes the following: 
Understand what I’m saying: during the first hour of August 15th, 
1947—between midnight and one a.m.—no less than one thousand 
and one children were born within the frontiers of the infant 
sovereign state of India. In itself, that is not an unusual fact 
(although the resonances of the number are strangely literary)—at 
the time, births in our part of the world exceeded deaths by 
approximately six hundred and eighty-seven an hour. What made 
the event noteworthy (noteworthy! There’s a dispassionate word, if 
you like!) was the nature of these children, every one of whom was, 
through some freak of biology, or perhaps owing to some 
preternatural power of the moment, or just conceivably by sheer 
coincidence (although synchronicity on such a scale would stagger 
even C. G. Jung), endowed with features, talents or faculties which 
can only be described as miraculous. It was as though—if you will 
permit me one moment of fancy in what will otherwise be, I 
promise, the most sober account I can manage—as though history, 
arriving at a point of the highest significance and promise, had 
chosen to sow, in that instant, the seeds of a future which would 
genuinely differ from anything the world had seen up to that time. 
(195)  
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It is, first of all, rather remarkable that Saleem uses a mere understatement when 
he refers to the number of children born during this magical hour of concrete and 
metaphoric births. Despite receiving no more than a casual reference, this 
evocative number is an acknowledgement of the undeniable literary and 
imaginative component of the subject-nation bond.  
 Though implying the power of magic, the imaginative correspondence 
taking place at the moment of birth has consequences that Saleem and the other 
midnight’s children are not yet able to grasp: 
At the most literal level, we might say that Rushdie is pointing to 
the way in which to have been born at a certain “magical” moment 
forever robs us of our private life; more broadly, we might say that 
this very idea of privacy itself is a myth, a metaphor, because as we 
try to explain or understand another life we become automatically 
involved in a process of metaphorisation whereby we try to see the 
individual life as a metaphor for wider historical forces. (Punter 68-
9)   
 
The moment Saleem makes central to the subject-nation bond (and the meaning 
that ensues from it) is actually the moment the state is born. Would it still be 
legitimate to interpret it as the bonding moment between subject and nation 
rather than subject and state? Without a doubt, reading the description of the 
children’s birth with this distinction in mind could compel one to object to 
speaking about this miraculous incident via the nation as it is clear that the 
moment being described here is the moment of the birth of the state of India 
rather than the nation of India. Is it the nation or the state which “forever robs us 
of our private life”? One ought to keep in mind that, from nationalism’s 
viewpoint, the birth of a state—far from being the mere emergence of a 
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bureaucratic machinery—is a moment of great significance as it stands for the 
fulfillment of the nation. The nation’s political sovereignty is the single, most 
crucial notion that animates nationalism as a style of thought.39 In fact, the desire 
to establish political sovereignty is often seen as an essential requirement for a 
given nationalism to be defined as such. Since the birth of a nation can never be 
located at a precise historical moment that could be invoked on a regular 
intervals, the moment the state is born comes to stand as an interchangeable 
symbol representing at once the birth of the nation and that of the state. Just as 
political sovereignty animates nationalism, such a one-to-one symbolic 
representation animates its primary legitimization principle.  
 Elsewhere in his narrative, Saleem ironically reflects on this very point, 
namely how the birth moment of the Indian state becomes a symbolic 
representation for that of the nation. As Saleem explains, India’s independence 
meant that 
there was an extra festival on the calendar, a new myth to celebrate, 
because a nation which had never previously existed was about to 
win its freedom, catapulting us into a world which, although it had 
five thousand years of history, although it had invented the game 
of chess and traded with Middle Kingdom Egypt, was nevertheless 
quite imaginary; into a mythical land, a country which would never 
exist except by the efforts of a phenomenal collective will. (112) 
 
                                                
39 In the Umma and the Dawla, Tamim al-Barghouti indicates that “if the nation is an 
objective reality consisting of a group of people, having in common a number of 
traits…which result…in a sense of togetherness, then these elements are associated 
with a quest to express them politically by forming a [non-existing] nation-state…If, 
on the other hand, the nation was an abstraction invented and propagated through 
government discourse, its function is still to legitimize [an existing] state…In both 
cases, the state is the purpose, end and aim of the nation” (34).  
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For the time being, the final comment to be made about the visceral bond 
between subject and nation as it is rendered in Midnight’s Children is that what 
makes the event noteworthy—read: meaningful—is not only the political 
independence of the nation/state, but also the children’s features, talents, and 
faculties which they acquire via their deep-rooted bond with the nation. We will 
discuss the notable promise Saleem makes—namely, to narrate this miracle 
within an otherwise sober account—in the section addressing national identity 
and the genre of magic realism, but, for now, it would be sufficient to keep in 
mind both the centrality of the generation of meaning to Midnight’s Children and 
the magical phenomenon invoked in order to give that meaning its peculiar 
shape and pattern.   
 The final point to be made with regard to the grounds for comparison is as 
follows: while the discussion of repetition in Little Mountain is driven by the 
effort to show how the novel is at pains to counter the conventional narrative 
prerogative of meaning production, the discussion of hyperbole and digression 
here is driven by the effort to explain the peculiar consequences of Midnight’s 
Children’s extreme urge to produce meaning—its extreme but ultimately playful 
urge to seam subject and nation ever so neatly so as to call the bluff of national 
identity. The discussion of both novels, nevertheless, underscores the crucial role 
difference plays in the treatment of national identity in both novels. 
3.2 Comedy and Absurdity, Discourse and Structure 
In what way does Midnight’s Children’s playfulness come about? To the novel’s 
reader, who cannot but be fully aware of Saleem’s wit and sense of humour, the 
answer might seem too evident as to make the question itself superfluous. Put 
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shortly, the playfulness comes about through the narrative’s irreverence and its 
unabated comic effect. While this would certainly be true on the descriptive 
level, it is crucial to recognize the distinction between the narrative’s deployment 
of the comic and the absurd, especially if we want to address the issue of the 
novel’s treatment of well-established conventions such as those governing the 
functioning of national affiliation.  
 While the comic facet is crucial, as it is evident from Saleem incessant 
penchant for jokes, this discussion focuses more on the novel’s absurdist facet. 
The explanation for this choice is quite straightforward in light of this study’s 
aim: it is because the comic takes form as part of a purely discursive 
arrangement, as part of the particular language that Midnight’s Children puts 
forth. Examples of this comedy are to be found in the discursive jabs at the often 
hollowed and passively accepted “national characteristics”—characteristics 
which in turn form the discursive bedrock of national identity. This comic effect 
is the product of statements such as the one describing Saleem’s grandfather’s 
(Aadam Aziz) identity transformation from the local (Kashmiri) to the national 
(Indian): “Aadam Aziz has simply paid the price of being Indianized, and suffers 
terribly from constipation” (MC 52). Unlike the discursive nature of this comic 
effect, the absurd in Midnight’s Children comes across as part of a formal 
arrangement. It is one which materializes by way of putting Saleem’s personal 
story in a highly improbable conjunction with that of the nation. Rather than 
targeting the discourse within which national identity operates, absurdity targets 
its very structure.    
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 From the above mentioned quotation about absurdity and meaning, one 
which appears as early in the narrative as the second paragraph, we are 
presented with two central notions that govern Saleem’s narrative. The first of 
these notions relates to the narrative’s use of hyperboles as a way of setting into 
motion the exaggerated production of meaning. Of course, this is manifested 
most clearly in the metaphor that the narrative deploys, namely the concern for 
making every personal detail gain in importance through connecting it to an 
event or to a date of national significance—a technique which arguably 
constitutes the driving engine of this ever-expanding, exceptionally digressive 
narrative. Examples of this abound. For the time being, however, it is sufficient to 
consider only one of these examples so to highlight the importance of this 
metaphor before it is discussed in more detail later on. For instance, when 
Saleem’s grandparents, Aadam and Naseem, are finally about to see each other 
face to face for the first time after having fallen in love “in segments,” through a 
“perforated sheet,” Saleem tells us that this long-awaited meeting, the significant 
harbinger of his own consequential birth, happened “on the day the World War 
ended … Such historical coincidences have littered, and perhaps befouled, my 
family’s existence in the world” (27).  
 It might appear that what Saleem calls “historical coincidences,” which 
are essentially an overdetermined specimen of what I term in the first chapter as 
the “binding points” of the national affiliation’s narrative, are meant to create the 
novel’s characteristic comic effect. There is certainly some truth to this view. 
More importantly, however, the primary purpose of these historical coincidences 
is to amplify or to put into overdrive the representational law of national 
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identity—a law that gives such identity both meaning and cogency—to such a 
degree so as to erode the relative invisibility of this law’s principal device and, in 
the process, make its operation utterly conspicuous, thus virtually impossible to 
miss.    
 This amplification of meaning is very much connected to the novel’s 
second aspect which is related to setting up Saleem for failure in his quest to give 
his life the kind of meaning he so desires: while he finds nothing more terrifying 
than absurdity, his predetermined fate leads him to what he fears the most—to be 
absurd. In short, absurdity is the nemesis of meaning. What starts as a movement 
between the poles of meaning and absurdity ends up becoming a process meant 
to deconstruct the dichotomy itself, so that the narrative does not simply 
delineate the “rise and fall” of meaning but brings to the fore the traces of 
absurdity that always stain the structure of meaning. Comedy is incapable of 
highlighting this critical relationship between meaning and absurdity because its 
attack on meaning remains a separate force that might weaken such meaning but 
cannot undo its internal structure. While comedy does seem to undermine the 
potential of ideas to appear meaningful, powerful ideas can nonetheless survive 
the onslaught of comedy whose effect is mostly temporary and fleeting. It is for 
this reason that Saleem shows absolutely no fear of the comedy he directs at his 
nation, his family, and above all at himself. If anything, he exerts himself to be 
comic, to tell jokes, and to relate even the most serious of events in the most 
facetious manner possible.  
 Contrary to common belief, then, which holds comedy to be a potent 
weapon against ideology and/or power relations, comedy is actually more likely 
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to serve as a tool in the service of powerful ideas than to serve as their true 
adversary. If comedy does seem to be a formidable adversary in some cases, this 
would be proof that the ideology or the set of power relations it opposes are 
already too feeble to confront real challenges, rather than proof of comedy’s own 
forcefulness. In those cases where comedy appears to be exceptionally powerful, 
that power is in reality nothing more than an optical illusion produced by the 
weakness of the idea it pokes fun at. In the presence of a truly potent force—such 
as the idea of the nation and its “binding” mechanism—comedy functions 
merely as a safety valve that ultimately preserves established power relations 
when there is a credible risk that things might be about to go out of hand. This is 
an uncomfortable truth attested to by Methwold when he asks Ahmad Sinai not 
to take offence at the clown’s out-of-line joke, telling Ahmad that the joke is 
merely part of “the tradition of the fool… Licensed to provoke and tease. 
Important social safety-valve” (102). 
 With so many compelling studies and cogent arguments illustrating the 
inescapable power of discourse, is it not perplexing to attribute comedy’s 
weakness to its discursive nature? When I contend that comedy is weak, my 
contention is made in relative terms, not absolute ones. In other words, I claim 
that comedy’s weakness is thrown into sharp relief when it is compared to 
absurdity’s compelling strength. When I claim that the relative weakness of 
comedy is related to its operating within the discursive field, I do so to draw 
attention to as to how comedy operates within a field which it shares with the 
same ideologies and power relations it seeks to attack and weaken. Discourse is a 
flexible field whose resiliency lies in its capacity to accommodate polarities 
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without suffering a great deal for it. What this means is that comedy could—and 
indeed often becomes—only a single side of one of these multiple polarities. As a 
result of sharing the same field with what it attacks, its damaging potential 
remains more limited than one would hope, more limited than we are often led 
to believe.  
 Absurdity, on the other hand, tends to come about as part of a structural 
maneuver that chips away at the very structure of ideas rather than being 
necessarily constrained within or bounded by the limits of what one could call 
the “discursive superstructure.” Saleem, then, is absolutely correct in indicating 
that it is absurdity which ought to be feared—not comedy—precisely because it 
is a structural maneuver which has the capacity to uncover the unreasonable 
nature of a dominant idea and expose its implausibility, consequently, inflicting 
irreparable damage, rather than simply pretending that it is sufficient to laugh 
away questionable yet influential ideas. 
 If absurdity in Midnight’s Children is a structural maneuver brought about 
by the extreme and improbable alignment between the personal and the national, 
what is, then, the genre of magic realism’s role in this alignment? Does not this 
reading make the novel’s most evident characteristic, i.e. the combining of the 
fantastical and the realist, superfluous? There is, in fact, a close connection 
between absurdity and magic realism as magic realist narration is precisely what 
allows for the “structural absurdity” to form and develop organically rather than 
emerge either as a contrived textual extra.  
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3.3 Magic Realism: Digression and Leakages 
To illustrate this connection between absurdity and magic realism, we must first 
take stock of the role digression plays in the narrative. Midnight’s Children is 
above all an encyclopedic narrative that mixes the serious and solemn with the 
humorous and irreverent. As is the case with Little Mountain, Midnight’s Children 
is a narrative bent on the generation of stories, though, in Rushdie’s novel, this is 
done through the mode of digression rather than through circular storytelling. 
While circularity emphasizes the disconnectedness between stories or different 
versions of a single story, digression puts at the forefront the importance of 
connecting the various stories it helps generate. As a consequence, the former 
results in a narrative imbued with a melancholic worldview that dwells on the 
unbridgeable gaps within the community, while the latter results in one whose 
worldview takes the community’s connectedness, at least initially, as a given.  
 There is no doubt that digression in Midnight’s Children is closely related 
to oral storytelling.40 What I want to focus on, however, is another facet of this 
digression—a facet that is of more relevance to this study: digression as the 
natural and organic growth insofar as both narrative and character are 
concerned. This point is made clear in Saleem’s comparison between himself as a 
fetus growing inside his mother’s womb and the narrative itself: “What had been 
(at the beginning) no bigger than a full stop had expanded into a comma, a word, 
                                                
40 In Salman Rushdie, Catherine Cundy writes that “Midnight’s Children draws on the 
models of the seemingly endless and digressive Indian epics the Mahabharata and 
Ramayana…With its thirty chapters or ‘jars’ of pickled personal and national history, 
its meandering digressions and metronomic swings through time and space, 
Midnight’s Children illustrates a link between Rushdie’s chosen style of communication 
in the text and the oral narrative that he seeks to reproduce” (27-8). 
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a sentence, a paragraph, a chapter; now it was bursting into more complex 
developments, becoming, one might say, a book—perhaps an encyclopedia—
even a whole language” (100). Not only does Midnight’s Children conceive of the 
character—in both its conception and development—as being comparable to 
narrative, it endorses the view that the narrative element at the heart of personal 
identity necessarily leads to a form of connectedness between the self and the 
other, a connectedness from which there is no escape.  
 In Saleem’s own words, “things—even people—have a way of leaking 
into each other” (38). Saleem insists on this idea as he attempts to provide a 
justification for the digressive nature of his narrative. His justification for 
deploying digression as a critical component of narration is addressed quite 
explicitly in the novel’s first book. As he writes the story of the midnight’s 
children, Saleem faces constant harassment by his often impatient companion, 
Padma, who is at times a patient listener but is often unwilling to tolerate the 
style of Saleem’s storytelling. Her criticism is based on what she perceives as his 
shortcomings as a storyteller: she neither understand why it takes him far too 
long to narrate sub-plots (as a result of his tendency to avoid resolving narrative 
threads promptly) nor does she appreciate his dwelling on certain events at the 
expense of others. On one such occasion, Saleem loses patience with her 
pestering him and decides to explain his position and, in a way, spell out his 
manifesto as a narrator:  
But here is Padma at my elbow, bullying me back into the world of 
linear narrative, the universe of what-happened-next: “At this 
rate,” Padma complains, “you’ll be two hundred years old before 
you manage to tell about your birth.” She is affecting nonchalance, 
jutting a careless hip in my general direction, but doesn’t fool me. I 
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know now that she is, despite all her protestations, hooked. No 
doubt about it: my story has her by the throat, so that all at once 
she’s stopped nagging me to go home, to take more baths, to 
change my vinegar-stained clothes, to abandon even for a moment 
this darkling pickle-factory where the smells of spices are forever 
frothing in the air. Now my dung goddess simply makes up a cot in 
the corner of this office and prepares my food on two blackened 
gas-rings, only interrupting my Anglepoise-lit writing to 
expostulate, “You better get a move on or you’ll die before you get 
yourself born.” Fighting down the proper pride of the successful 
storyteller, I attempt to educate her. “Things—even people—have a 
way of leaking into each other,” I explain, “like flavors when you 
cook.”… “To me it’s a crazy way of telling your life-story,” she 
cries, “if you can’t even get to where your father met your mother.” 
(38)41 
 
As an encyclopedic and deliberately digressive narrative, then, Midnight’s 
Children follows the different strands—plots and subplots—all the way to their 
inevitable end. In doing so, it ensures that each connection is exploited and each 
plot or subplot is completely exhausted, mirroring through this narrative 
procedure the novel’s propensity for avoiding going against convention 
explicitly and instead showing how tenuous conventions become when they are 
stretched to their logical endpoints.  
 By employing digression as a way of handling the multiplicity of its 
stories, Midnight’s Children simultaneously illustrates Saleem’s worldview as well 
                                                
41 There is in this quote a clear example of the key role Padma plays in the novel. If I do 
not elaborate on Padma’s role in the narrative or on that of the other women in this 
text, it is not because I play down their roles in shaping the narrative and its 
movement. From this perspective, my focus on Saleem (as a male protagonist) ought 
not to be interpreted from a gender perspective. Rather, I see Saleem as playing the 
most crucial role because of the particular connection he establishes between himself 
and the nation. Had the protagonist of Midnight’s Children been a female character, my 
reading would obviously be adjusted in some places but its outline would remain 
unchanged.   
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as the spirit of its magic realist narrative: the metaphoric “leakage” of people, 
stories, things, and concepts into each other is the essence of magic realism, 
which is, according to the generic definition, a composite genre that seeks to 
reconcile various modes of storytelling into an unexpected unity. In order to 
refine this critical point, I want to draw attention to two quotations, the first 
deals with the treatment of convention while the second is concerned with 
uniqueness.  
 The first of these quotations is in fact the novel’s very first sentence. 
Saleem initiates his idiosyncratic autobiography with his birth: “I was born in the 
city of Bombay … once upon a time” (9). From the narrative’s first sentence, then, 
we come to learn its first crucial feature: while this sentence contains highly 
conventional elements—beginning with the protagonist’s birth and deploying 
the proverbial “once upon a time”—it also contains a maneuver which 
announces that the ground beneath these conventional elements is a shifting one; 
this sentence, by way of its playful arrangement, signals that far from being 
anchored to a secured ground, the conventions are incorporated into the 
narrative with the stipulation that they continuously teeter on a floating, shifting 
surface. There is, in other words, a particular attitude at work, one that is neither 
guided by a disregard for or an abandonment of the questionable but influential 
traditions nor by an unquestionable embracing of it: I was born ... oh wait … 
once upon a time!  
 The second quotation appears later in the narrative. In it, Saleem 
comments on an issue close to his heart: uniqueness. Here, he suggests that “if 
one wishes to remain an individual in the midst of the teeming multitudes, one 
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must make oneself grotesque” (109). In Self, Nation, Text in Salman Rushdie’s 
Midnight’s Children, Neil Ten Kortenaar points out that “if India were a person it 
would be a grotesque such as Saleem, its paternity would be in dispute, and its 
ability to tell its story would be in question” (35). While one could make the case 
for this analogy, one would have to do so with the view that grotesqueness in 
Rushdie’s novel has only negative connotations implying inadequacy, when, in 
fact, the connotations of grotesqueness are uniqueness and power. A reading 
more in line with the values of this fictional world would consider this 
grotesqueness in conjunction with the principle of connectedness. On the one 
hand, we are presented with the proposition that people “leak” into each other 
which suggests the inevitable connectedness of the stories out of which 
individual identities take shape. This principle, of course, is one that transpires 
out of a belief in a certain unity between the things that leak into each other. On 
the other hand, there is a genuine a desire to seek uniqueness, even if it has to 
come at the cost of embodying the grotesque.  
 Using the grotesque as an individuation mechanism could even be 
extended to the novel as a whole; it could be taken as a rough description of 
Midnight’s Children as a narrative that grapples with ways to depict the 
grotesqueness and distortedness of its context. There is in this context a coming 
together of a fledgling national identity and a state which takes on the mission of 
becoming that identity’s incubator. The distorted nature of the novel is a function 
of the style of narration which takes digression and hyperbole as its principal 
tools to generate meaning. Later on, we will see how the narrative tools of 
digression and hyperbole are responsible for the construction and deconstruction 
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of the two devices—metaphor and metonymy—upon which the representational 
law of national identity relies. For now, though, we should be reminded that 
hyperbole also means power, a point that becomes evident if we compare the 
“distortion” of the narrative with its distortion of Saleem’s body as his 
disproportionate physical appearance is closely tied to the magical powers he 
possesses.  
 Saleem’s legs “were irretrievably bowed” and his “baby-snaps reveal that 
my large moon-face was too large; too perfectly round. Something lacking in the 
region of the chin. Fair skin curved across my features—but birthmarks 
disfigured it; dark stains spread down my western hairline, a dark patch 
coloured my eastern eye. And my temples: too prominent: bulbous Byzantine 
domes” (Rushdie 124). His distorted anatomy, however, also mean that his ever 
clogged up sinuses become the instrument through which he discovers his ability 
to communicate with his fellow midnight’s children. In short, he “was a radio 
receiver” even better “than All-India Radio” (164). As John McLeod puts it in 
“Nation and Nationalisms,” this allows the children to “form an imagined 
community in Saleem’s mind when, owing to a bizarre accident, he discovers 
that he can telepathically communicate with all of them” (116). 
 These lopsided physical characteristics, therefore, make Saleem one of the 
exceptional children whose qualities and powers must, by definition, be 
exaggerated through hyperbole. The immediate associations which the adjective 
“hyperbolic” evokes are exaggeration and amplification. This is to say that the 
novel’s “grotesqueness” is a characteristic meant to guarantee its uniqueness as a 
narrative about the nature of national affiliation. The desire to seek uniqueness, 
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however, is in constant tension with the initial concession to the principle of 
leakage, a principle according to which it is inevitable for the teeming multitudes 
to leak into the self. This tension serves as a symbolic reference to the 
contradictory principles of national affiliation which requires both the 
uniqueness of the subject and the oneness that is necessary to bring together an 
anonymous group of subjects.  
 With the above distillation of the novel’s key characteristics—first, the 
shifting ground of tradition, second, the distorted and disproportional use of the 
representational law of identity, as well as the two forces of connectedness and 
uniqueness which inform both—we are now better able to answer the previously 
proposed question about the role of magic realism in Rushdie’s novel. Given the 
existence of these varied constitutive forces—embracing tradition, but 
interrogating it, embodying the representational law, but stretching it thin, 
accepting the inevitability of social connectedness, but actively seeking 
uniqueness—how are they to be reconciled into a single narrative that claims to 
pursue the production of meaning rather than relative, fragmentary truths—a 
narrative which seeks anything but to be incoherent?  
 The answer lies precisely in the “toolbox” afforded by the genre of magic 
realism. Magic realism is what allows all of these varied, constitutive forces to 
“leak” into each other, thus forming an ad hoc unity and allowing the multiple 
forces not only to develop organically, but naturalizes them to such an extent 
that they come to seem as if they were meant to commingle in the first place. Put 
in different words, not only does the principal, generic leakage between magic 
and realism make all the other tributary leakages possible, it also makes them 
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seem natural within Midnight’s Children’s fictional world. This is precisely why 
the novel’s structural absurdity, which is generated by another leakage between 
the personal and the national, is neither a textual extra nor a supplement 
developed through narrative discourse. It emerges and develops as part and 
parcel of the novel’s internal operation. 
3.4 Magic Realism: History, Fiction, Myth 
Continuing with the principle of “leakages,” one of Midnight’s Children’s most 
notable “leakages” is the one between the two key facets of nationalism: history 
and myth. In her study of the genre of magic realism, Ordinary Enchantments, 
Wendy Faris describes the genre’s distinctive capacity to bring together history 
and myth42 as “idiosyncratic recreations of historical events” (15). It is worth 
noting that, even in the case of some nationalisms where mythology or religion 
serve as an essential foundation, nationalism tends to be an outwardly secular 
and profane movement whose most compelling feature is the ardent drive 
toward modernity and modernization. In outwardly professing this, however, 
nationalism unwittingly underscores its “split personality” condition. 
 “Nationalism is Janus-like,” Suleiman rightly observes: “it looks towards 
the past, for valorization and authentication. And it looks towards the future for 
modernization on all fronts: social, economic, political, cultural and linguistic” 
                                                
42 In the introduction to his novel, Rushdie writes that “in the West people tended to 
read Midnight’s Children as a fantasy, while in India people thought of it as pretty 
realistic, almost a history book. In “‘Errata’: or, Unreliable Narration in Midnight’s 
Children,” an essay collected in Imaginary Homelands, he hopes “that Saleem Sinai is an 
unreliable narrator, and that Midnight’s Children is far from being an authoritative 
guide to the history of post-independence India” (22-3). 
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(226). The content of such past, it should be added, is not derived only from 
material history but also from the rich chest of mythology. If it were not for 
nationalism’s conscious suppression of any association which risks putting on 
par with the products of the imagination, one could argue (facetiously, as it 
were) that proponents of nationalism should widely acknowledge that magic 
realism is perhaps the most ideal genre for nationalism, namely because of the 
genre’s capacity to accommodate nationalism’s both forward and backward 
outlooks, all without the jarring contradictions for which nationalism’s discourse 
is infamous.   
 This combination of history and myth that magic realism is able to bring 
to bear “implies that historical events and myths are both essential aspects of our 
collective memory” (Faris 16). This implication, Christopher Warnes writes in 
Magical Realism and the Postcolonial Novel, counters the argument that the fantastic 
stands for an evasion of history: “where the fantastic has been thought of as an 
escape from history, Rushdie reclaims it by showing how it is already present in 
the language of history in Midnight’s Children” (122). In the case of nationalism, 
the formation of “collective memory,” whose sources are history and myth, is 
comparable to the one which, according to Ricœur, plays out at the level of 
individual identity: the arrival at self-knowledge. Self-knowledge, of course, is 
crucial to the formation of any identity. I point out in the first chapter that 
Ricœur holds that the arrival at self-knowledge results from a chain of assertions. 
It is worthwhile at this point to reconsider this chain of assertions in light of both 
nationalism’s use of mythology as well as magic realism’s facilitation of the 
meshing of history and mythology. This chain of assertions, then, evolves in the 
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following manner: “self-knowledge is an interpretation; self-interpretation, in its 
turn, finds in narrative, among other signs and symbols, a privileged mediation; 
this mediation draws on history as much as it does on fiction” (Ricœur 188).  
 I revisit Ricœur’s argument not to suggest that the role of fiction in the 
case of individual self-knowledge is equivalent to that of mythology in the case 
of national self-knowledge. Rather, I do so in order to reflect on how, unlike the 
mechanism at work at the individual level, one which strives to efface or blur the 
distinction between history and fiction, magic realism in Midnight’s Children 
meshes together history and mythology organically: it does not do so by effacing 
the distinction between the two categories, but through altering the rules of the 
world in which history and mythology arise side by side without inflicting 
damage upon each other. Instead of changing the definitions of the categories 
themselves, i.e. making the differences between them more difficult to ascertain, 
the novel changes the properties of their context: an entire new world—complete 
with its novel physical laws—must be invented for nationalism’s two 
contradictory facets to cease being incongruous.  
 For the present moment, let us keep in mind this new world Midnight’s 
Children speaks into existence as we examine magic realism’s primary 
characteristics according to the outline Faris proposes in the introduction to her 
study:  
As a basis for investigating the nature and cultural work of magical 
realism, I suggest five primary characteristics of the mode. First, the 
text contains an “irreducible element” of magic; second, the 
descriptions in magical realism detail a strong presence of the 
phenomenal world; third, the reader may experience some 
unsettling doubts in the effort to reconcile two contradictory 
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understandings of events; fourth, the narrative merges different 
realms; and, finally, magical realism disturbs received ideas about 
time, space, and identity. (7) 
 
Before undertaken any detailed discussion of the primary characteristics Faris 
proposes, I should mention that three of these characteristics are really part of a 
single but more general characteristic of magic realism. The first, second, and 
fourth characteristics could all be considered as different aspects of a single 
characteristic produced by the coming together of magic and realism. All three, 
therefore, could be condensed as follows: they describe the procedure and effect 
of bringing together the magical and the realist into the same textual space. As 
these three characteristics are relatively straightforward so as not to need 
extended commentary, I will concentrate only on the third and fifth 
characteristics, which could be seen as closely interrelated when tested against 
Midnight’s Children and the new world it brings about. 
 According to the third characteristic, the reading experience of magic 
realism produces unsettling doubts as a result of the contradiction inherent in the 
two starkly different portrayals of events. On the one hand, we witness miracles 
that could neither be fully or partially explained through reference to the 
properties of the phenomenal world. On the other hand, though they transcend 
the properties of the phenomenal world, these miracles are portrayed by way of 
“a sober account” (as Saleem explicitly states), namely by way of a portrayal that 
speaks the language of the phenomenal world.  
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 If having “unsettling doubts” about the magic43 or the strange mixture is 
indeed an essential feature of magic realism, then it would surely become 
difficult to accept the argument that Midnight’s Children magic realist world is 
one which comfortably accommodates the polarities represented by secular 
history and fantastical myth. Given the centrality of this argument to my 
overarching reading of the novel, two explanations must be provided in order to 
deal with this counterargument. From this perspective, these explanations are 
not necessarily meant to debunk the centrality of Faris’s third characteristic. 
Rather, they are meant to deal with this issue because of its importance to the 
argument proposed in this chapter. While the first explanation deals with the 
reason my argument seems to be at odds with Faris’s third characteristic (which, 
after all, seems to be intuitive), the second one explains what is at stake, namely, 
how the difference between Midnight’s Children being in line with this 
requirement or at odds with it actually means the difference between endorsing 
or accepting nationalism’s logic and resisting or countering it.   
 First, Faris’s criterion of “unsettling doubt” applies more to the fantastical 
than it does to magic realism. It is, without a doubt, the same criterion that 
Tzvetan Todorov applies to the fantastical, though he describes it as 
                                                
43 There is a clarification to be made about the use of the terms “magic” and “myth.” I 
use the term “magic” not as a synonym for “myth,” but as a term referring to the text 
that is capable of speaking myth into existence, in the same way that the term 
“realism” is used to describe texts that strive (whether they succeed or not) to generate 
a concrete and detailed depiction of the world.     
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“uncertainty.”44 It is true that this might seem as too fine a distinction to make, 
especially given the influence of the fantastical on magic realism. However, this 
is actually a crucial point to make as this unsettling doubt (which necessarily 
transpires out of the magical element as it is the one transcending the world we 
know) suggests that the magical and realist are indeed arranged hierarchically 
(with realism occupying the privileged position). This is, however, an argument 
that Faris herself does not agree with as she accepts the premise that magic 
realism constructs no such hierarchy (48).  
 Considering this criterion further, one also finds out that this characteristic 
appears to be designed for the purpose of being applicable to the decidedly 
varying novels that Faris considers as belonging to the same category rather than 
for the purpose of being rigorously applied to each one of them. A case in point 
is the precise applicability of this characteristic to a novel such as Milan Kundera 
The Book of Laughter and Forgetting—one of the novels Faris addresses in her 
study— despite Faris stating on several occasions that Kundera’s novel does not 
fit incredibly well within her grouping. For instance, she writes that there are 
“very small intrusions of magical events in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting” 
                                                
44 In The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, Todorov explains “the heart 
of the fantastic” in this way: “In a world which is indeed our world, the one we know, 
a world without devils, sylphides, or vampires, there occurs an event which cannot be 
explained by the laws of this familiar world. The person who experiences the event 
must opt for one of two possible solutions: either he is the victim of an illusion of the 
senses, of a product of the imagination—and laws of the world then remain what they 
are; or else the event has indeed taken place, it is an integral part of reality—but this 
reality is controlled by laws unknown to us. Either the devil is an illusion, an 
imaginary being; or else he really exists, precisely like other living beings—with this 
reservation, that we encounter him infrequently. The fantastic occupies the duration of 
this uncertainty” (25). 
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(27), and that the novel actually “exists on the fringe of magical realism” (62). 
The question we are left with is how could this novel be on the fringe of this 
genre yet fit Faris’s core characteristics with incredible precision? The answer, of 
course, is that the characteristics are meant to cast too-wide a net rather than 
serve as meticulous criteria.   
 Second, if Midnight’s Children indeed reproduces nationalism’s 
ambivalence vis-à-vis its double outlook toward history and myth, it would only 
be reproducing the discourse of nationalism as that discourse operates in the 
political sphere: a reproduction (even a comic one) is necessarily dependent on 
the initial copy. Ironically, the novel pushes the limits of nationalism because it 
deploys magic realism to resolve this persistent contradictory stance of 
nationalism. By doing so, it erases this discursive ambivalence. As a result of 
delivering this resolution, the novel leaves its reader without any unsettling 
doubts about the magical gifts of the midnight’s children and about the fact that 
“the children of midnight were also the children of the time: fathered…by 
history.” “It can happen,” Saleem insists, “especially in a country which is itself a 
sort of dream” (118).    
 Faris’s fifth and most pertinent characteristic supports this conclusion. The 
magic realism of Midnight’s Children disturbs received ideas about time, space, 
and identity by creating a new world that does not suffer the limitations of the 
phenomenal world. Having unsettling doubts about such world means that it 
would no longer have bearing on these categories—time, space, identity—as they 
manifest themselves in the phenomenal world as doubt creates is a clear-cut 
separation between the magic realist world and our own. As a result, the magic 
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realist world would remain as a fanciful construction and, consequently, an 
impossibility that should not be taken seriously. The experience of being 
presented with a magic realist world that allows for the suspension of disbelief, 
one which generates no doubt, is precisely the experience that makes possible the 
shift in the categories of time, space, and identity as they manifest themselves in 
the phenomenal world.         
 With this crucial point in mind, one begins to see the consequences of 
conjuring into existence a world in which nationalism’s discursive contradictions 
are resolved. The importance behind this move lies in the paradoxical way it puts 
nationalism at odds with itself as well as with the world it allegedly seeks to 
bring about. If nationalism makes good use of a serviceable past—made up of 
myth, questionable ancient history, fiction, or a mixture of the three—to buttress 
the sense of collective identity while projecting a future-oriented outlook based 
on the precepts of modernity, then the apt response ought not to be to draw 
attention the jarring inconsistency in its discourse but to deploy the tools of 
narrative fiction to create the very world that could support such discourse. To 
do so is to adopt fully nationalism’s logic, thus underscoring its imaginary and 
fictional character rather than to mount one argument against another.      
 Rather than proposing “idiosyncratic recreation of historical events,” 
Midnight’s Children paradoxically proposes to recreate historical events “as they 
really were.” From this perspective, one could flip the equation Faris creates as 
she argues that “history [remains] the weight that tethers the balloon of magic … 
as if to warn against too great a lightness of mythic or magical being” (16). 
Though Faris makes an excellent point in suggesting that history checks the 
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uninhibited nature of magic, fantasy, or myth, what it is even more remarkable 
about Midnight’s Children’s magic is that it also tethers the “balloon of history.” It 
does so in order to produce an image of that history that is not strictly 
materialist. Its magic also checks the excesses of historical representations, 
excesses that could, counterintuitively, exceed those of magic itself. This is 
especially true in the case of a novel such as Midnight’s Children, one of whose 
principal objects is to create a fictional world in which the portrayal of 
nationalism in its multiple faces, the historical and the mythological, becomes a 
true possibility.   
3.5 “Re”presenting the Representation: National Identity 
and the Simulacrum 
Is it not problematic to argue that Rushdie’s novel creates a world in which it 
becomes possible to portray nationalism in its multiple faces or, in more 
mundane terms, to recreate historical events “as they really were”? Putting it in 
these terms could be perceived as problematic because it seems as if the 
argument takes us back to the question of representational fidelity. This, in turn, 
invalidates, or at least goes against, this study’s broader argument that strives to 
mount a critique of both mimetic representation and interpretations whose point 
of departure is a tacit acceptance of the “re” in representation. In addition to this 
is the tendency of the phrase—”as they really were”—to produce formulations 
according to which truth arises as a result of a process involving uncovering or 
disclosure: truth as aletheia.  
 I want to emphasize, therefore, that the phrase “as they really were” 
means something very specific. I certainly do not insinuate that the novel 
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exposes the weaknesses of national identity simply by uncovering the truth that 
things were never as coherent or as consistent as they seemed to be. Rather, 
Midnight’s Children recreates historical events “as they really were” in the sense 
of recreating their representation as such; in other words, it creates what could be 
called a representation of the representation. This recreation, however, does not 
involve a loss in line with Jean Baudrillard’s fourth phase of the image as he 
characterizes it in Simulations—a phase part of a scheme whose end point is pure 
simulation (6). Rather, it is a vital gain because Midnight’s Children’s 
representation of the representation is a form of aesthetic resistance made 
possible by way of a remetaphorization which has close connections to the 
notion of reterritorialization: “the notion of resistance through 
remetaphorisation, through what the French thinkers Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari called a ‘reterritorialisation’ of conquered realms…, becomes a substrate 
of literary resistance itself” (Punter 54). The resistance entailed by the 
redeploying of representation, therefore, reveals that what is at work is an 
aesthetic procedure akin to the function of the Deleuzian simulacrum. 
 It is now necessary to make reference to the brief section which appears at 
the end of this study’s first chapter, namely the one introducing the “directional 
stylistic condition.” This reference is meant to highlight two basic premises about 
the Deleuzian simulacrum. The first premise dictates that the simulacrum ought 
not to be understood according to Plato’s formulation of Forms and Appearances 
with the simulacrum serving as their poor cousin: not as “a simple imitation” 
(DR 60), as a degraded copy, as twice removed from the model, and, 
consequently, as inferior to both model (Form) and copy (Appearance). The 
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second premise dictates that the simulacrum ought to be viewed as “the act by 
which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and 
overturned” (DR 60). The starting point, therefore, is to indicate that rather than 
being a simulacrum in the sense of recreating an imitation of the classical 
national identity narrative (parodic, subversive, or otherwise), Midnight’s 
Children puts forth a simulacrum constituted first and foremost by its difference 
from the classical narrative, not by its similitude to it.  
 To say “constituted by its difference,” however, is not to state some 
rhetorical verbiage. There is within this statement an assertion touching the very 
core of the way in which the discursive and formal elements of Saleem’s 
narrative interact. While the narrative’s representational similitude is directly 
tied to its discursive element, something that is evident, as we have seen, in 
Saleem’s incessant attempt to embody the nation-subject bond while maintaining 
his self-professed status as an agent of events, central to their unfolding rather 
than subject of their wrath. This is a position he strongly maintains until it starts 
to become clear that the representational discourse of nationalism he skillfully 
puts in motion is at odds with the novel’s formal underpinning, an underpinning 
that should ideally function as a support mechanism of the novel’s discursive 
surface. The strain placed on the discourse of nationalism begins to intensify as it 
becomes more and more apparent that Saleem’s project of meaning production45 
is destined to disintegrate under the weight of the simulacrum46 which takes 
                                                
45 A project made possible by the mirroring effect, a similitude. 
46 A simulacrum made possible by a magical world that has no original model, a 
difference.  
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shape slowly but surely. Saleem hints at the unstoppable disintegration as early 
as the third chapter, which he begins by saying 
Please believe that I am falling apart. I am not speaking 
metaphorically; nor is this the opening gambit of some 
melodramatic, riddling, grubby appeal for pity. I mean quite 
simply that I have begun to crack all over like an old jug—that my 
poor body, singular, unlovely, buffeted by too much history, 
subjected to drainage above and drainage below, mutilated by 
doors, brained by spittoons, has started coming apart at the seams. 
In short, I am literally disintegrating, slowly for the moment, 
although there are signs of acceleration. (37) 
 
Because this hint comes too early in the narrative, it could be read as an effect of 
Saleem’s penchant for hyperbole. As he approaches midway into his narrative, 
however, Saleem is no longer simply hinting. Rather, he unmistakably gives vital 
confirmation of the conundrum he faces in his attempt to reconcile the 
representational discourse at the surface with the anti-representational 
simulacrum lurking beneath it. Notice how his tone here is different—a tone that 
is distinctively solemn and serious rather than typically facetious. “Am I so far 
gone,” Saleem writes,  
in my desperate need for meaning, that I’m prepared to distort 
everything—to re-write the whole history of my times purely in 
order to place myself in a central role? Today, in my confusion, I 
can’t judge. I’ll have to leave it to others. For me, there can be no 
going back; I must finish what I started, even if, inevitably, what I 
finish turns out to be not what I began. (166)  
 
If there is a single keyword capable of unlocking the tension that progressively 
builds up—the tension between the discursive meaning and its formal 
undermining—it would be the adverb “inevitably.” It is worthwhile to pause 
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here for a moment and reflect on how this inevitability is very much in line with 
the term I give to Midnight’s Children’s stylistic condition: directional. Though the 
enterprise of meaning production shows signs of collapsing under its own 
weight, this stylistic condition’s imperative is to keep pushing forward 
nonetheless. There is, in other words, no possibility of changing the narrative 
movement’s direction in the midst of writing—even on the pain of destroying the 
initial purpose postulated by the narrative’s discourse.  
 Saleem, therefore, is not going to be the judge of what transpires at this 
point, at least not rhetorically. Saleem’s narrative, one could argue, is a test case 
underlining how even when the narrative does voice its motive discursively, the 
ultimate result is the formal undermining of that voiced motive. Instead of being 
the judge of the imminent collapse, Saleem allows for the inevitable judgment—
in the form of the simulacrum—to transpire silently by way of the narrative’s 
formal procedure. The narrative’s fundamental turning point, then, could be 
described as follows: while one finds within the narrative’s discourse a doomed 
endeavour to deploy the representational logic of nationalism through 
embracing national identity fully, one finds within its structure the overturning 
of that endeavour. 
 It is now possible to outline a more detailed explanation as to how the 
simulacrum overturns the discourse of national identity. I want to undertake this 
explanation as part of an answer to the following question: how does this tension 
between discourse and the simulacrum relate to the distinction made in the first 
chapter between the background-foreground and the binding models? In the 
discussion on Althusser and subjecthood, I indicate that while the background-
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foreground narrative imagines the individual as an always-already national 
subject, the binding narrative begins with postulating an individual before 
deploying literary mechanisms to turn that individual into a national subject. 
What makes Midnight’s Children a particularly complex narrative when measured 
against this distinction is its manifestation of characteristics belonging to both of 
the above models. However, if the novel indeed stands as an example of both 
models, then what is the purpose for making the distinction in the first place?  
 To answer this question, I begin with the more straightforward part, 
namely the one concerning the background-foreground which Saleem creates 
through discursively pushing the connection between himself and the nation. 
Midnight’s Children, I think, unquestionably exhibits the essential features of this 
model, so much so that Saleem admits from the start that he has been 
“handcuffed to history,” that his personal narrative is always cast as the 
foreground of the grander narrative in the background. Accordingly, within the 
foreground-background framework, his inflated self-importance and self-
presumed agency notwithstanding, Saleem is always-already a national subject, 
ever since the moment of his birth. It is possible to go even further and say that 
Saleem is a radical re-enactment of the Althusserian subject: not only does he 
enter subjecthood at the precise moment of his birth (before entering the 
social/linguistic symbolic regime), he is a national subject even prior to that, an 
unusual feat made possible by the prophesy his mother solicits before giving 
birth: “a son, Sahiba,” she is told, “who will never be older than his 
motherland—neither older nor younger…there will be two heads—but you shall 
see only one” (Rushdie 87).  
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 The second part concerns the formal arrangement that emerges out of the 
extreme application of the binding model, or, in other words, the simulacrum 
which, within the narrative’s logic, is presented as both being inevitable as well 
as created by chance. While Saleem uses the conventional discourse of 
nationalism to give himself a central role in the law-making procedure for which 
India’s independence stands, he ends up pushing the binding model beyond its 
limits. Instead of producing a representation, one based on the principle of 
model/copy, nation and subject, he ultimately creates a simulacrum that causes 
his whole project to come crashing down. It is precisely for this reason that 
Saleem realizes midway through the narrative that it might well be the case that 
what he finishes will turn “out to be not what [he] began” (Rushdie 166). While 
the motivation behind Saleem’s pushing forward nonetheless is determined by 
the stylistic condition described as “directional”—he “must simply continue 
(having once begun) until the end” (422)—one could also read it more 
generously and say that his pushing forward is additionally a function of his 
dedication to the notion of the storyteller’s honesty, even if that honesty comes at 
the expense of localized, information-based instances of dishonesty such as his 
narrating the murder of Shiva which does not really take place.   
 The ultimate manifestation of the directional approach and/or storyteller 
honesty is the acceptance and recognition that the simulacrum which takes over 
the narrative progressively also makes the model/copy formulation—national 
identity’s enabler—utterly unsustainable. What begins as a conventional 
representational bond formulated in accordance with the model/copy 
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conception is transformed into a sort of representation of the representation, 
though not as a copy of the copy.  
 In “Plato and the Simulacrum,” Deleuze points out that understanding the 
simulacrum as a copy of the copy is to miss the point:  
If we say of the simulacrum that it is a copy of the copy, an 
endlessly degraded icon, an infinitely slackened resemblance, we 
miss the essential point: the difference in nature between 
simulacrum and copy, the aspect through which they form two 
halves of a division. The copy is an image endowed with 
resemblance, the simulacrum is an image without resemblance … 
Doubtlessly [the simulacrum] still produces an effect47 of 
resemblance; but that is a general effect, wholly external, and 
produced by entirely different means from those at work in the 
model. The simulacrum is constructed around a disparity, a 
difference; it interiorizes a dissimilitude. That is why we can no 
longer define it with regard to the model at work in the copies—the 
model of the Same from which the resemblance of the copy derives. 
If the simulacrum still has a model, it is another one, a model of the 
Other from which follows an interiorized dissimilarity. (48-9) 
 
The first critical realization that comes to light from thinking of Midnight’s 
Children’s formal structure48 as a simulacrum is that there is a procedure at work 
within the novel that surpasses the writing strategy described as “metafiction.” 
Metafiction is a type of writing whose primary guiding principle is a postulation 
of the truth as aletheia: the disclosure of the truth behind history, fiction, and 
myth involves the uncovering of the way they are constructed which highlights 
the commonalities between these categories.  
                                                
47 Emphasis in original. 
48 Toward the end of the novel, Saleem says the following: “Sometimes I feel a thousand 
years old: or (because I cannot, even now, abandon form), to be exact, a thousand and 
one” (440). 
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 In Magical Realism and Deleuze, Eva Aldea describes reading Midnight’s 
Children via the notion of metafiction, writing that 
The argument generally follows this pattern: Rushdie’s use of 
magical realism shows us in practice how the imagination offers us 
ways of making sense of the world. Referring to Linda Hutcheon’s 
concept of “historiographic metafiction,” which she uses to 
describe writing with a “theoretical self-awareness of history and 
fiction as human constructs,” critics assert that the novel’s magical 
realism, by foregrounding the commonality of the process of 
making history and making fiction, allows us to understand how 
all identity is created by the process of the imagination. (57) 
 
There are surely many indications in Saleem’s narrative which vindicate reading 
the novel via metafiction. The most apparent of these indications is the 
narrative’s equal concern with the telling of Saleem’s autobiography and with 
the writing decisions he has to make, his torments, hesitancies, and the dilemmas 
he faces as he writes it all down. Despite the value to be found in exposing the 
mechanisms of writing and identity-making, it is crucial not to stop at this 
feature. Doing so ultimately amounts to focusing on the mechanisms of writing 
at the expense of its outcomes, which leads to accepting that the novel culminates 
in postulating the conclusion that national identity is an imaginative construct. 
 As opposed to critiquing national identity in this manner, the simulacrum 
offers a more original and cogent critique, away from the dichotomy of the true 
and the false. A case in point is the distinction Baudrillard makes in Simulations 
between feigning and simulating an illness (3).49 This distinction leads to a critical 
                                                
49 Though I disagree with Baudrillard’s analytical judgment of the simulacrum, I still 
appreciate the clarity of his description of it. 
 166 
question: if the simulator holds the potential of producing the “true” symptoms, 
should one consider the simulator sick or not? Baudrillard’s answer indicates 
that “objectively one cannot treat him as being either ill or not ill” because “the 
simulation threatens the difference between the ‘true’ and the ‘false,’ the ‘real’ 
and the ‘imaginary’” (3).  
 This is precisely why critiquing national identity as a manifestation of the 
simulacrum holds more potential than explaining its function through 
metafiction. Metafiction belongs to the first category in that its principal result is 
to uncover that what is posited as concrete through the mechanisms of 
representation is in reality a product of the imagination. The simulacrum, 
however, threatens the difference between these categories and thus 
demonstrates that national identity cannot be explained as emerging and 
developing by way of false consciousness. Given that national identity cannot be 
satisfactorily measured against either the category of the concrete or the 
imaginary, the simulacrum allows for the forming of a more sober 
understanding of national identity as neither based on falsehood nor on the 
truth—the most remarkable accomplishments of Midnight’s Children’s structuring 
mechanisms. 
 Focusing on the novel’s metafictionality, therefore, makes it possible to 
skirt these crucial questions, thus shelving it under the heading of the “search for 
identity” rather than under the “critique of identity.” As Aldea argues while 
making the case for putting Deleuze’s philosophical contribution in dialogue 
with Rushdie’s novel,  
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Deleuze’s theoretical framework indicates that the central conflict 
in Midnight’s Children is not so much between the plurality of the 
masses and the idea of a unified India, as is commonly held, as 
between the possibility of identity, be it hybrid and multiple, and 
the breakdown of an order that upholds that possibility. That is, an 
order that makes possible the distinctions, categories and divisions 
— the segments—necessary for identity. (59) 
 
Given the novel’s context and subject-matter, Deleuze’s framework of difference 
and the simulacrum indirectly debunks two commonly held presupposition: 
first, that “the search for identity” is limited to certain cultural and geo-political 
spaces and, second, that such a search remains mystifyingly elusive in those 
spaces where a truly modern conception of identity is yet to take root. Proposing 
to focus on the simulacrum Midnight’s Children brings to bear an implicit 
recognition that the narrative’s contribution is not limited to its cultural or geo-
political space, but has something to offer that is applicable anywhere national 
identity is to be found: that is, everywhere.  
 I argue, therefore, that reading Midnight’s Children via the simulacrum 
allows for a richer conclusion than the one offered by metafictionality. Rather 
than the deployment of postmodernist narrative devices which make the reader 
privy to the process of constructing history, fiction, or identity (or, in more 
simplified terms, to undertake a dissection of identity in the third- or 
postcolonial world), Midnight’s Children isolates the symptoms of national 
identity by way of a configuration of the fabula and the sjuzet whereby the first 
demonstrates Saleem-the-midnight’s-child’s embracing of national identity in its 
representational variant whereas the latter demonstrates Saleem-the-storyteller’s 
inevitable embracing of it as a simulacrum. This is the ultimate reason behind the 
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reader being privy to the writing process because without an access to the 
mechanisms of writing, its outcomes cannot be felt: the access to the construction 
of historicity or fictionality is meant to allow for the separation of the discursive 
and structural strands.   
 The narrative’s turning point, then, is Saleem’s discovery (intended or 
haphazard) of the infeasibility of meaning creation in accordance with the 
parameters of representational national identity—the parameters meditating the 
experiences of Saleem the-midnight’s-child. The sjuzet, in other words, cannot 
proceed on the same assumptions posited by the fabula. Proceeding according to 
the fabula’s assumptions entails remaining within the realm of model/copy. 
 Ultimately, critiquing national identity through the simulacrum leads to 
the following conclusion: given that national identity will continue to mediate 
relationships between individuals/subjects and communities in the foreseeable 
future, the redefinition of this identity’s core in terms of difference rather 
similarity constitutes a genuine and viable breakthrough. As the world remains 
distant from being without nations—the one Renan saw over a century ago as a 
clear possibility and in some ways an inevitable conclusion—the simulacrum 
holds for the time being the possibility of a liberating difference that can mitigate 
the violence of similitude. Rather than being a pragmatic or a utilitarian 
viewpoint, this is a possibility that goes beyond the false choice between a more 
entrenched nationalism and an illusion of globalization. These two alternatives, 
though seemingly oppositional, take similitude as their ultimate orientation. 
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3.6 The Play of Metaphor and Metonymy 
An essential point must be underscored with regard to what I call the “violence 
of similitude.” The conjunction of the words “violence” and “similitude” within 
a lager discussion examining nationalism might conjure images of a totalitarian 
emphasis on achieving the goals of establishing conformity and stamping out 
singularity. This is not what I have in mind. Rather, the violence I am alluding to 
is far more subtle and, arguably, more menacing precisely because it comes 
about by way of a similitude which has the capacity to lurk under surface of 
things, thus determining an instinctual understanding of national identity and, 
consequently, relations between the self and the other. 
 Describing similitude as instinctual is not an arbitrary move; it is, rather, a 
move meant to place emphasis on the tendency of representation to conceal or to 
naturalize the prefix “re.” To illustrate how Midnight’s Children deals with this 
operation, I want to start by referring to Jorge Luis Borges’ “On Exactitude in 
Science”—the story which Baudrillard uses as an entry point to his discussion on 
simulacra and simulations.  
 “In that Empire,” the story begins, 
the Art of Cartography attained such perfection that the map of a 
single province occupied the entirety of a city, and the map of the 
empire, the entirety of a province. In time, those unconscionable 
maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guild struck a 
map of the empire whose size was that of the empire, and which 
coincided point for point with it. The following generations, who 
were not so fond of the study of cartography, as their forbears had 
been, saw that the vast map was useless, and not without 
pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the inclemencies of 
sun and winters. In the deserts of the west, still today, there are 
tattered ruins of that map, inhabited by animals and beggars; in all 
the land there is no other relic of the disciplines of geography. (325) 
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There are, undoubtedly, many possible readings of this specimen of Borgesian 
brevity. For our purposes, though, it is sufficient to bring into focus only two 
suggestions this story makes. In their quest for perfection and scientific 
exactitude, first of all, the cartographers fully materialize the (hypothetical) 
representational nature of maps. To put it another way, they have forgotten 
about or simply chose to eliminate the prefix “re” in “representation.”  
 This “literal map,” the second suggestion goes, seizes to be a map 
altogether because it no longer has the basic justification of its existence as an 
object whose relationship to the territory is first and foremost metaphorical. 
While it is true that this extreme application kills the metaphor, what is of more 
significance is that the hypothetical bond which the metaphor maintains between 
map and territory dies with it as well. The cartographers’ exactitude is 
comparable to Saleem’s inclination to exploit the hypothetical bond, which, while 
giving him the illusion of meaning, ends up obliterating any chance of it. This 
tendency of his, Saleem concedes, is part of a scientific worldview: “setting my 
face against all indications to the contrary, I shall now amplify, in the manner 
and with proper solemnity of a man of science, my place at the centre of things” 
(237-8). In addition to stressing the decisive role of the fantastical in this 
operation, Borges’ story confirms the conclusion that while this operation’s first 
step is undertaken for the purpose of achieving optimal accuracy and is thus in 
line with the endeavour to apply the maximum conformity possible to the logic 
of mimetic representation, its inevitable consequence is the radical undermining 
of that very logic.  
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 In Baudrillard’s description of this operation, which takes form as part of 
the cartographers’ fundamentalist scientific project, the initial representational 
motivation is characterized by its specular and discursive nature, whereas the 
consequence (simulation) is characterized by its nuclear and genetic nature: 
“This representational imaginary, which simultaneously culminates in and is 
engulfed by the cartographer’s mad project of the ideal coextensivity between 
the map and the territory, disappears in the simulation whose operation is 
nuclear and genetic, no longer at all specular or discursive (2).  
 These characteristics—specular-discursive/nuclear-genetic—throw into 
sharp relief not only the operation of metaphor and metonymy in Midnight’s 
Children, but also that of hyperbole which functions as their enabler. As Warnes 
points out, “hyperbole, the splitting, fusing and blurring of the literal and 
metaphorical, and an emphasis on the constitutive and performative over the 
merely descriptive capacities of language, are all central to Rushdie’s modes of 
narration and strategies of representation” (101). As is the case with the 
cartographers, then, Saleem’s operation of ideal coextensivity is fuelled by a 
penchant for hyperbole, which in turn saves itself from the assault of reason and 
logic by being couched in the fantastical where such rules are suspended. 
Bearing in mind the essential qualities Baudrillard posits in relation to the 
representational imaginary, on the one hand, and the simulation, on the other, it 
becomes possible—as a pivotal first step in taking stock of the operations of 
metaphor and metonymy—to avoid the pitfall of reading hyperbole in Rushdie’s 
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novel as a discursive device rather than a genetic or structural one which 
regulates the different aspects of the narrative.50  
 In his monograph on Rushdie’s oeuvre, for instance, Stephen Morton 
interprets the use of hyperbole in Midnight’s Children as enabling Rushdie to 
make concrete the horrors of history that the arc of the story encompasses. He 
writes that “in Midnight’s Children Rushdie uses hyperbole to register how the 
excessive forces of history and the power of the postcolonial state terrorise 
Saleem’s body. For Saleem’s hyperbolic role, as a messianic figure who 
represents the nation, is unsustainable and ultimately leads to his physical 
destruction” (44). To “register the excessive force” is a different way of saying “to 
represent the effect of these forces” on Saleem. In this reading, registering the 
aforementioned horrors takes place discursively as hyperbole in this case is a 
device based on the utterance whose effect stops when such utterance is 
adequately recorded.  
 Saleem’s hyperbolic role is unsustainable, but not only because he 
mistakes himself for a messianic figure but because the narrative’s movement 
refuses to support that role. If we think of hyperbole as the unceasing movement 
toward the inevitable, we are bound to recognize that the central issue is not only 
related to Saleem’s inflated sense of self-worth, but to the underlying premise 
which makes his hyperbole a possibility in the first place. As a device at the 
novel’s nuclear, then, hyperbole rearranges Saleem’s position within the totality 
                                                
50 This is, after all, the same distinction that makes it possible to reach a fuller evaluation 
of the different operation of the comic and the absurd.  
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of his world, pushing him to the very centre via the exploitation of metaphor so 
he could organically discover that his drive for meaning, for reaching the very 
centre is not the only problem leading to his ultimate downfall, but that the true 
problem lies in the metaphorical postulation of the centre itself—a centre which 
turns out to be empty, hallow, and purely hypothetical. “I am coming to the 
conclusion that privacy,” Saleem says toward the end of his narrative, “the small 
individual lives of men, are preferable to all this inflated macrocosmic activity. 
But too late” (435). The point itself, it must be said, is made too late as the 
narrative’s structural movement has already made it clear.  
Rather than constructing a register, the novel obliterates the idea of the 
register itself by demonstrating the inadequacy of the representational imaginary 
which would give such a register its power. If we think about the reading of 
hyperbole as enabling the creation of a register in conjunction with Borges’ story, 
we would begin to see the problem with this reading: it would be the equivalent 
of interpreting the story as if the cartographers use hyperbole to make concrete 
the territory of the empire. Their desire, however, is not to make the territory 
concrete but to achieve the perfection of the map. The focus and brevity of 
Borges’ story make impossible an interpretation of hyperbole as a way to make 
the territory concrete—a “safety mechanism” that Rushdie’s novel lacks as a 
result of its proliferation of metaphors.  
 The absence of this safety mechanism also allows Morton to interpret the 
metaphor’s symbol—Nehru’s letter—as if it were the enabler of hyperbole rather 
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than one of its effects. The letter congratulates Saleem on the “happy accident51 of 
[his] moment of birth,” (the crucial keyword which Saleem ignores) but, more 
importantly, describes him as “the newest bearer of that ancient face of India 
which is also eternally young” and promises him that “we shall be watching over 
your life with the closest attention; it will be, in a sense, the mirror of our own” 
(122). According to Morton, the letter gives Saleem the prerogative “to imagine 
himself as a figure of national importance. Indeed, Nehru’s letter provides 
Saleem with a license to employ frequent hyperbolic descriptions of how events 
in his own family life influence and even cause events of national significance” 
(36). Given that the novel’s nucleus is the metaphorical implications of Saleem’s 
birth, the letter—which is, after all, only the effect of that unique 
correspondence—cannot be seen as the license of hyperbole. The license of 
hyperbole is already embedded at the novel’ core (the correspondence of the two 
births and the metaphor that ensues), a core without which neither hyperbole 
nor the narrative itself would be possible. 
 The play with metaphors through making them literal is not unique to 
Midnight’s Children but is a more general mechanism found across the genre of 
magic realism. Faris illustrates this very well by providing a long list of examples 
from novels that literalize metaphors (110-14). She sets this mechanism apart in 
Midnight’s Children only for the “metafictional awareness” (112) pervading it, 
something she hypothesizes is “the result of Rushdie’s position as a later magical 
                                                
51 Emphasis added. 
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realist, more self-conscious about its characteristic techniques than his 
predecessors (112).  
 There are in Midnight’s Children many localized instances of literal 
metaphors, some of which are nothing more than amusing linguistic games. 
Examples of this include Saleem’s new found ability upon his arrival in Pakistan 
“to smell the vengeful odours leaking out of [his aunt’s] glands” (307) or his 
“powers of sniffing-out-the-truth, of smelling-what-was-in-the-air, of following 
trails” (307). Others go beyond linguistic games in that they hold a distinctive 
suggestive power, such as the time when Saleem feels as though the world of his 
childhood is falling apart, an idea delineated by his using adhesive tape to put 
together his broken globe. “I clanked my tin sphere around the Estate,” he says, 
“secure in the knowledge that the world was still in one piece (although held 
together by adhesive tape) and also at my feet” (266). There is no denying the 
suggestive power of this mechanism. Nevertheless, what is of far greater 
significance than these localized instances is the novel’s central metaphor itself, 
which is the only one capable of what Faris holds to be inherent to magic 
realism’s literal metaphors, namely the capacity to take “us beyond 
representation conceived primarily as mimesis to re-presentation” (115).  
 The metaphor of the nation as individual usually works in one direction: 
the nation is posited as having the characteristics of the individual—it is born, 
grows, has values, etc. In Midnight’s Children, however, this relationship is also 
activated from the other direction in that Saleem comes to stand for the totality of 
the nation. In other words, while the relationship of nation/Saleem is 
metaphorical, the obverse relationship of Saleem/nation is metonymical. 
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“Metonymy,” Søren Frank says in Salman Rushdie: A Deleuzian Reading, “helps 
indicating the distributive forces of the word through its endless, dynamic, and 
displacing qualities. Whereas metaphor distributes and renews through the 
complex relation between similarity and difference, the distributive force of 
metonymy works through an interminable logic of fragmentation” (171). From 
this perspective, literalizing the metaphor does not only debunk the metaphor 
itself by turning it into its opposite. The literal metaphor also gives Saleem the 
impetus to imagine his relationship to the nation as metonymic. The side by side 
qualities of metonymy, however, end up inflicting irreparable damage to the 
illusion of similarity and correspondence which the metaphor creates. This 
readjustment of the relationship of metaphor and metonymy—of arranging them 
side by side—highlights further the weakness of metaphor. 
 Though I disagree with his central thesis which places undue emphasis on 
nationalist discourse’s role in fashioning “nationalism as cultural politics,”52 
Anshuman Mondal proposes a productive description of the ways in which 
metaphor and metonymy serve as instruments for identification. He begins with 
a general reflection on representation saying that it is “double-edged” in the 
sense that “it has two meanings which are not unrelated to each other. On the 
one hand, it is ‘discursive’ – a description of a thing, a painting, a photograph – 
                                                
52 In the first chapter of his book Nationalism and Post-Colonial Identity, Anshuman 
Mondal writes that “nationalism is…a form of cultural politics. It is political because it 
is a movement which desires to seize control of (liberate), or break away from and 
create its own (secede) state; or, indeed, break away and join another state which 
would satisfy its own principle of national self-determination (irredentism)…it is 
cultural because it bases the legitimacy of its own actions upon the uniqueness of its 
national culture (22). 
 177 
and on the other, its political sense, it is a form of institutional practice. In both 
cases, representation substitutes for the ‘thing itself ‘“(5). There are, Mondal says, 
two conclusions to be drawn from this basic remark about representation. He 
describes the first of which as “the most valuable insight” of twentieth-century 
philosophy, though it is by now largely taken for granted: it is the “idea that life 
is lived in and through representations (of both sorts)” (5).  
 The other conclusion, which is of special concern to the discussion at 
hand, relates to the change taking place as a result of the passage from pre-
modern societies to modern ones in which the notion of identity gains notable 
import. “In modernity,” he explains,  
a number of processes converged that produced a reorientation in 
notions of representation of both kinds. On the one hand, there is a 
gradual displacement of the sovereign as the metaphoric 
embodiment of sovereignty – first of God, then of the state – by the 
metonymic ‘assembly’ representing the sovereignty not of a 
dynastic state but of the ‘people’: the nation-state. (5)53 
 
While its focus is on sovereignty, this argument is of a more general nature in 
that the implication is the passage from the regime of metaphor to the regime of 
metonymy. In addition, one should not interpret this characterization as if the 
passage from one phase of social organization to another necessarily involves the 
complete shedding of previous forms of identification. While this might hold 
sway in other contexts, it remains not applicable to the context of nationalism, 
which has the tendency to appear entirely novel despite drawing on older 
                                                
53 In The New Science, Giambattista Vico suggests that metaphor is an ancient residue 
which humans deployed to mitigate their ignorance of the world (116-7).   
 178 
regimes of association and identification such as religion, mythology, and 
traditional customs. Nationalism’s appeal is very much a consequence of its 
ability to form a convincing amalgamation of elements drawn both from the 
present as well as from an immemorial past. The question of metaphor and 
metonymy, therefore, is no different as “this shift towards the metonymic in both 
the cultural and political fields is nonetheless triangulated by a ‘metaphor’: the 
nation” (6).  
 But if this is indeed the case, how can we, then, explain the survival of 
metaphor even in nations who are described as having sophisticated postmodern 
societies? Metaphor survives the onslaught of modernity through its parasitical 
reliance on metonymy. Metonymy is the proverbial fig leaf as “unlike 
metaphoric or symbolic representations, metonymic representations are 
relatively less polysemous and thus appear54 to be more ‘transparent’” (Mondal 
5). With this in mind, it becomes clear that there is a second decisive step to be 
made after “killing” the metaphor through ideal coextensivity: a step involving 
the dispelling of the metaphor’s illusion of similitude and correspondence by 
introducing metonymy not as it appears to be—the symbol of the subject’s 
influence on the nation or as the mark of transparency. Rather, it is to introduce it 
as part of an arrangement whereby it becomes metaphor’s nemesis. 
3.7 The Last Word 
Midnight’s Children plots the organic adjustment of Saleem’s understanding of his 
national identity using the resources of narrative, the grounds of all identities. In 
                                                
54 Emphasis added. 
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Reading for the Plot, Peter Brooks points out via Rousseau that this linkage 
between narrative and identity is nothing short of the fundamental catalyst of 
modern narrative:   
The question of identity, claims Rousseau – and this is what makes 
him at least symbolically the incipient of modern narrative – can be 
thought only in narrative terms, in the effort to tell a whole life, to 
plot its meaning by going back over it to record its perpetual flight 
forward, its slippage from the fixity of definition. To understand 
me, Rousseau says … the reader must follow me at every moment 
of my existence. (33)  
 
Moving through Midnight’s Children, the reader recognizes that it is narrative 
which grants Saleem the opportunity of vacillating between identity and 
difference in the same way he vacillates between his tragic desire for meaning 
and his ultimate end—to be absurd. This desire is the same desire that also 
moves “the reader through narrative…If the motor of narrative is desire, 
totalizing, building ever-larger units of meaning, the ultimate determinants of 
meaning lie at the end, and narrative desire is ultimately, inexorably, desire for the 
end” (Brooks 52).  
 In the process of isolating the stylistic condition I call “directional,” 
Rushdie’s novel ties in all these strands together by interrogating the 
rudimentary desire for meaning and by pushing the limits of national identity 
which serves as the motor of narrative meaning. In doing so, Midnight’s Children 
does not ignore the cultural depositories of nationalism which postulate an 
identity that draws on pre-modern elements as well as on forms of association 
that become possible only with the onset modernity. As this discussion moves to 
a consideration of the fraught relationship between modernity and nationalism, 
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it remains to be stressed that Midnight’s Children mobilizes the narrative 
mechanisms discussed in this chapter without ever positing the subject as 
impotent—as one who simply stands powerless on the receiving end of 
invincible discourses, thus abdicating all responsibility for the role he plays in 
the game of identity formation. 
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Chapter 4  
4 National Identity and the Intrinsic Difference of 
Modernity 
Modernity is defined by the power of the simulacrum. 
Gilles Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum”  
Conversely, it could be argued that the equation of ‘identity 
politics’ with postmodernity is, quite simply, wrong. Instead, 
‘identity politics’ as such is precisely what nations and nationalisms 
are about. From this perspective, modernity is not an enclave of 
pure instrumental reason but rather the harbinger of a new type of 
politics hitherto unknown in the world: cultural politics. 
Anshuman Mondal, Nationalism and Post-Colonial Identity 
Modernity, [for Charles Baudelaire], can be defined as the 
paradoxical possibility of going beyond the flow of history through 
the consciousness of historicity in its most concrete immediacy, in 
its presentness. 
Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity 
After discussing the manner in which the narrative schemes of Little Mountain 
and Midnight’s Children mediate the interaction between the two principles of 
individuality and nationality, I now arrive at this study’s final chapter, one 
concerned with addressing the arguably most vital question of any analytical 
enterprise: so what? To flesh out this question and possibly pose it less 
provocatively, is the purpose of this analysis the elaboration on the stylistic 
approaches of rescuing the individuality principle from the violence of 
similitude? Is it part of a postmodernist celebration of a narrative-based, aesthetic 
positing of a distinctive identity capable of making its presence felt in a world 
characterized by anonymity and brimming with similitude? The short answer is 
a resounding “no.”  
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4.1 So What? 
Before I attempt a more thorough answer, I want to state a few remarks 
concerning what my analysis does not seek to propose. The narrative schemes 
analyzed so far, repetition and fragmentation in Little Mountain, hyperbole and 
digression in Midnight’s Children, have all been seen as signs of literary 
movements. Under such rubric (i.e., localized signs defining broader movements 
or literary trends), the reflections of Midnight’s Children’s narrator contained in 
his “manifesto” on narration may also serve as definitive signs of the text’s 
postmodernist outlook. Moreover, the narrator’s hopeless quest for larger 
meaning coupled with the narrative’s simultaneous deployment of the absurd 
could also serve as a justification for the influential argument that Rushdie’s 
novel indeed belongs to the canon of the postmodernist novel. While making 
such a claim is not wrong per se, a claim of this sort overshadows the novel’s 
more significant contributions outlined in the third chapter for the sake of 
proving yet once more that literature of or about the so-called third-world merits 
serious consideration, not necessarily as a result of its own specific aesthetic 
qualities but for its coevalness (read: similarity) to what is being written 
elsewhere.  
A comparable argument could be proposed with regard to the specific 
approach to narration by repetition, fragmentation of narrative cohesiveness, 
focalization, and point of view the reader encounters in Khoury’s novel, though 
it is not at all clear whether the definitive verdict in this case would grant Little 
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Mountain the status of belonging to the canon of modernism or postmodernism.55 
Khoury’s novel, as we have seen, is presented as having finally pushed ahead 
and entered into the realm of the contemporary novel, leaving behind the 
lagging or still developing tradition of the Arabic novel.  
My intention, however, is not to use the analysis of the novels’ literary 
devices either to celebrate their aesthetic “maturity” or to argue for their 
inclusion (and by extension, their authors’) into one literary club or another, be it 
the club of modernism, postmodernism, or to world literature.56 Instead, what I 
pursue in this final chapter is in many ways a continuation of the line of thought 
established in the second and third chapters, namely looking at the way in which 
these same narrative elements (which, I concede, could undeniably be read as 
markers of literary modernism or postmodernism) should actually be read as 
treating a more basic yet more intractable question, doing so through intervening 
to achieve a readjustment of modernity’s relationship to nationalism as well as 
providing an opportunity to rethink conventional assessments of the advent of 
modernity.  
This readjustment is especially remarkable as it is brought about through 
narrative elements which are not in any clear or definitive way inimical to 
conventional ways of positing “national consciousness.” Instead, their specific 
                                                
55 Starkey writes that Khoury’s work is “variously described as ‘modernist’ or even 
‘post-modernist’” (149). 
56 World literature is undoubtedly a slippery designation. I think it is more productive to 
think of this designation as a network than a body of specific works. Thinking of 
world literature as a network allows us to define the works based on their impact or 
influence and would prevent us from delimiting the designation through criteria, 
criteria which would be in need to constant readjustment.     
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intervention in narrative, as elaborated upon in the previous two chapters, 
engenders a force which could be seen as one that strives to tackle the resilient 
suppositions of national consciousness rather than serve as its diametric 
opposition. These narrative elements, by virtue of their dialectal forgetting of the 
corrosively sacred force of national consciousness, end up creating stylistic 
conditions whose influence reaches beyond the questions of nationalism and 
national identity. This is so mainly because they push against the set of 
assumption normally associated with what is termed as the “condition of 
modernity” by penetrating under the groundwork from which modern identity 
emanates. 
It is now time to go back to the question with which I begin this chapter. Is 
the purpose of the analysis limited to elaborating stylistic approaches which 
celebrate individuality? If the short answer to this question is simply, “no,” 
according to what terms, then, the longer one about identity, similitude, and 
difference is to be pursued? In order to show the ramifications of the particular 
treatment of the principles of individuality and nationality in these case studies, 
the longer answer must add to the central categories henceforth interrogated 
(those of individual identity and the nation) the undeniably broader category 
within which the former two operate—modernity.  
As a way of integrating the inescapable problematics of modernity into 
this analysis, I start with an exposition whose goal is two-fold: to narrow down 
the broad, umbrella term “modernity” so as to focus on those issues applicable to 
the context at hand before providing an overview of the ubiquitous problems 
relating to definitions, interpretations, and critiques that arise almost anytime 
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modernity is invoked. With this two-fold goal taking up a significant portion of 
this chapter, the focus then shifts to demonstrating the necessity—perhaps even 
the urgency—of an alternative assessment of modernity and to explaining how 
the narrative-based critique of national identity also leads to the undoubtedly 
more daunting task of interrogating the standard assessments of modernity. This 
task is especially daunting in those contexts that experienced the ramifications of 
modernity’s introduction as part of the projects of colonialism and imperialism.      
4.2 Points of Intersection and Definitions 
The inherently broad term “modernity” is inseparable from the question of 
national consciousness. The term “modernity,” however, also describes a pattern 
of social organization, an aesthetic attitude, and serves as a general marker for a 
historical period. The fluid nature of the term and the multiplicity of its possible 
significations make the task of identifying its many points of contact with 
nationalism especially onerous as such task would have to crisscross a significant 
number of academic disciplines. Nevertheless, despite this difficulty and 
regardless of which one of the previous signifieds one chooses, the preliminary 
starting point is likely to be that without the type of identification with 
anonymous others made possible by modernity’s re-imagined conception of time 
and space, the idea of the nation as well as its by-product, national identity, 
would be unthinkable.  
 In the first chapter, I show—via Benjamin and Anderson—how 
“homogenous, empty time,” or the time of modernity as they would have it, is a 
crucial component of the process that resulted in the rise and spread of national 
consciousness as well as of the resilient sense of hypothetical togetherness it 
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engenders. In The Consequences of Modernity, Anthony Giddens complicates this 
further when he suggests that “the ‘emptying of time’ is in large part the 
precondition for the ‘emptying of space’ and thus has causal priority over it” 
(18). One of the conclusions to be taken from Giddens’ suggestion is that this 
“coordination across time is the basis of the control of space” (18). The condition 
within which national consciousness develops, then, indicates that issues relating 
to time—the mainstay of narrative—are not to be taken lightly in the face of the 
overwhelming concreteness of issues relating to hegemony over actual places.  
 Considering the operations of national affiliation independent from the 
fundamental question of time would simply lead to the assumption that control 
over places is the issue deserving the most critical attention. This—perhaps 
understandably partial—assumption is manifested in most definitions of 
nationalism, which tend to narrow its scope to an unrelenting (vicious or benign, 
illegitimate or justified) desire for sovereignty over concrete places by fluidly 
defined “peoples.” While this is indeed a partial definition (in both senses of the 
term), it is not patently incorrect. The maintaining of this view, however, 
explains as to why the study of nationalism has been, for the most part, the 
domain of social sciences in general and political science in particular. Given that 
this is the case, a study of nationalism, even one whose subject matter revolves 
around literary texts, cannot proceed without taking stock of the findings 
accumulated by scholars in the social sciences. 
 The introduction of the problematics of modernity to the discussion 
ensures for one thing that the scope of nationalism is not unduly reduced either 
to contestations over geography or to a tool deployed at well in the rhetorically 
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oriented game of geopolitics. As Giddens explains, “the development of ‘empty 
space’ may be understood in terms of the separation of space from place” (18). 
This separation shows that it as an error to study nationalism by focusing 
exclusively on actual places since doing so means ignoring the crucial issue at 
stake—the nationalization of abstract space rather than direct hegemony over 
geography.   
 Giddens’ point about the emptying of time and space as well as the 
resulting separation between place and space could be summed up as follows. 
The relationship between the condition of modernity and nationalism could be 
seen in two essential ways: first, in the way in which modernity’s “empty time” 
either facilitates or even predates the creation of space as empty or devoid of 
local distinguishing markers, a space whose principal feature is no longer its 
attachment to a specific, localized place; second, it could be seen in how the 
fundamental contestation of nationalism is concerned with the politics of 
defining the identity of the rightful heir of a given space rather than with the 
concrete force which determines actual political sovereignty over places.  
 The politics of definitions takes its cue from the binding of “empty time” 
with “empty space.” This binding, which arises only in modernity, creates 
“conditions under which time and space are organized so as to connect presence 
and absence” (Giddens 14), thus making possible the sense of hypothetical 
togetherness we call national consciousness. Giddens call this process 
“disembedding,” which he defines in Modernity and Self-Identity as “the lifting 
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out of social relationships from local contexts and their recombination across 
indefinite time/space distances” (242).57 The binding of empty time/space 
(perhaps more adequately, the virtual rebinding) is a capacity limited to 
“modern societies (nation-states)” (14), in which the invocation of time also 
entails the invocation space and vice versa. “Virtually no pre-modern societies,” 
Giddens adds, “were as clearly bounded as modern nation-states” (14).  
 These basic changes to conceptions of time and space ushered by 
modernity shape the tenets of nationalism and thus the sense of identification it 
engenders. More specifically, however, placing the necessary emphasis on these 
changes leads to recognizing that modernity, as Mondal puts it, “is not an 
enclave of pure instrumental reason but rather the harbinger of a new type of 
politics hitherto unknown in the world: cultural politics” (2). This is made 
possible by the specific emphasis placed on collective abstract identity as the 
basis of what Mondal terms as “cultural politics.”  
 It is, therefore, crucial to acknowledge that cultural products, especially 
those with a capacity to manipulate the sense of time and space in sophisticated 
ways, ought to receive the proper attention for their role not only in combining 
the ingredients necessary for the rise of national identities but also in showing 
                                                
57 This notion of “disembedding” is very similar to Anderson’s notion about the abstract 
confidence one has with regard to the simultaneous existence of all other national 
subjects and their activities without the need for any immediate experience (Anderson 
24). Giddens’ “disembedding,” however, could be interpreted as an expansion of 
Anderson’s notion so as to include, in addition to relations between national subjects, 
the relations between subjects which transcend national boundaries. This forms a key 
component of Giddens’ analysis of high (or late) modernity as “the radicalising or 
globalising of basic traits of modernity” (244).    
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how the process of chipping away at the basic tenets of national consciousness is 
only the beginning of a needed reassessment in the way modernity itself is 
understood. The critique of national identity, then, represents a crucial step of 
engaging in this reassessment, a reassessment that engages with modernity by 
targeting its most ubiquitous manifestation.  
 The symbiotic relationship between nationalism and modernity is at work 
irrespective of whether one thinks that modernity represents a shift in the 
configuration of social relations which ultimately and necessarily gave rise to 
nationalism, as Gellner holds, or that nationalism was the indispensable “road” 
that eventually led society into modernity, as Greenfeld’s counter-argument 
states, an argument succinctly captured in the title of her book, Nationalism: Five 
Roads to Modernity. Greenfeld’s treatment of five nationalisms—English, French, 
Russian, German, and American—is guided by this principal counter-argument. 
In her own words, the nature of the book’s argument could be described as 
follows:  
The focus of the book—throughout—is a set of ideas…at the core of 
which lies the idea of the ‘nation,’ which I believe forms the 
constitutive element of modernity. In this belief, I reverse the order of 
precedence…Rather than define nationalism by its modernity, I see 
modernity as defined by nationalism. (18)58   
 
                                                
58 Emphasis in original.  
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Nationalism for Greenfeld is not a constitutive element of modernity, but the 
constitutive one.59 This is crucial as it implicitly gives nationalism so great an 
influence so as to be the determinant component governing not only the political 
and social spheres in modernity but also the aesthetic one, especially when one 
considers the extent to which the aesthetic sphere contributes to the particular 
types of identifications which later come to form an integral part of “collective 
memories.”  
 This is not to suggest that Greenfeld’s sweeping argument ought to be 
accepted uncritically, but that it indicates the almost unanimous agreement that 
nationalism and modernity are simply inseparable. According to Greenfeld, 
nationalism is the indispensable road without which none of the societies 
analyzed in her book could have shed their pre-modern past—represented either 
by religious affiliations, hierarchical communal bonds, or by the medieval “body 
politic” with the king/queen as its naturally ordained head—and thus arrive at 
modernity—represented in the political sphere by the rule of law and legitimate 
governance in the name of the people. This development is tacitly posited by 
Greenfeld as the teleological endpoint of a metaphorical road. However, if we 
continue with this metaphor, taking it to its logical conclusion, modernity turns 
out to be a dead-end that allows no further movement or change. 
 If we put aside the question of historical precedence and with it the cause-
                                                
59 In the introduction to the collection of essays, Nationalism and the Mind, Jonathan R. 
Eastwood, Greenfeld’s former student, claims that this reversal of roles “represented a 
major breakthrough in a field of study long stifled within the confines of an old 
unproductive paradigm in which the phenomenon [of nationalism] was regarded as a 
product of the ‘structures’ and processes of modernization” (vii).  
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and-effect relationship which seems critical to these two theorists of 
nationalism,60 we would recognize that both Gellner and Greenfeld would tacitly 
agree that it would not be possible to say anything of substance about 
nationalism and national identity without invoking the shift from the pre-
modern condition into that of modernity. Modernity, in other words, casts a long 
shadow on nationalism, either as the creator or enabler of its ideas or as the 
inevitable and teleological conclusion of its guiding premises.  
 Not only is modernity crucial to this discussion as a result of its 
connection to the type of identification that makes it possible to speak of the 
normative abstraction that is national identity, it also provides the basis or the 
blueprint of those features that we associate so closely with such identity. At the 
outset of his discussion on national and cultural politics, Mondal makes this very 
point, writing that “even those who argue that the ‘core’ features of nations pre-
dated modernity itself…concede that it was the advent of modernity that 
radically transformed those features into what we would now recognize as 
nations” (15). This also means that the continuity of identity “characteristics” or 
“traits” that do manage to cross the threshold separating pre-modern and 
modern societies are not to be taken as a temporal yardstick which determines 
                                                
60 The cause-and-effect dynamic and the question of succession also plays a role in 
Giddens view of empty time and space, though less so in his overall assessment of 
modernity. This could be seen in his view that rather than the successor of modernity, 
postmodernity, he argues in The Consequences of Modernity, is the radicalization of the 
conditions of modernity itself: “Rather than entering a period of post-modernity, we 
are moving into one in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more 
radicalised and universalised than before. Beyond modernity, I shall claim, we can 
perceive the contours of a new and different order, which is ‘post-modern’; but this is 
quite distinct from what is at the moment called by many ‘post-modernity’ (3)”  
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how far a given society has made it (or failed to make it) into the condition 
modernity. Even if “pre-modern” traits seem to prevail in some contexts, the 
question of their survival is not what is important. Rather, the crucial question 
has to do with how they are deployed in what might be termed as “the condition 
of nationalism.”   
 Taylor begins his “Nationalism and Modernity” by calling attention to 
how disconcerting it is to witness the mixing of “an unquestionably modern 
discourse—self-determination, rule of the people, etc.—with other elements 
which seem to us alien to (what we understand as) modernity” (191). This 
seemingly strange mixture of incompatible elements ceases to be disconcerting 
once one appreciates how these various elements are all “linked to modernity, 
both to central features of its political culture, and to the stresses and malaise to 
which it gives rise” (Taylor 191). Rather than a mark of a fundamentalism 
belonging to a bygone era or a falling back on notions of pure ethnicity, these 
seemingly pre-modern elements still play out in the domain of identity politics—
a quintessentially modern domain. Taylor’s exploration of this phenomenon 
illustrates that rather than a mark of pre-modern tendencies, these seemingly 
“out of place” elements are thoroughly modern because they are guided by the 
two basic paradigms of modern nationalism: by both the conception of time 
developed by Anderson and the non-hierarchical direct access to society which 
forms a key component of Gellner’s theory of nationalism.  
 The final point to be made with regard to the views of Greenfeld and 
Gellner is related to the features they ascribe to modernity. A crucial thing one 
quickly discovers while reading Greenfeld’s Five Roads to Modernity and Gellner’s 
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Nations and Nationalism is that aside from their valuable insights with regard to 
the specific operations of nationalism within the institutions of society, both 
Gellner and Greenfeld treat modernity as if it were a condition affecting only the 
way societies conduct concrete transactions, whether such transactions are 
conducted between equal subjects or between the subject and the institutions 
responsible for the governing of behaviour. Rather than modernity as an 
unwieldy term, as a perpetually shifting concept, or as a multi-faceted condition 
affecting society, culture, politics, the arts, as well as the subject’s awareness of 
time and space in different ways, modernity for these theorists61 is posited 
principally as being limited to the material process of organizational and 
bureaucratic modernization. These material processes in turn result in the change 
of attitudes formed in the other spheres.   
4.3 Modernity and Its Splits 
Both Greenfeld and Gellner develop their views on nationalism’s 
interconnections with modernity on the presupposition that the term 
“modernity” refers only to the modernity which Matei Calinescu describes in his 
Five Faces of Modernity as the industrial bourgeois modernity. In addition to 
making the critical distinction between bourgeois and aesthetic modernity, 
Calinescu demonstrates that the modernity of which Greenfeld and Gellner 
                                                
61 I would be unfair to add Giddens to this list as he goes beyond this material approach 
to understanding modernity. This is the case because of nature of his analysis which 
pays adequate attention to both material and nonmaterial aspects of modernity. See 
his discussion of the mechanisms of trust and risk (7), perception of time and space 
(17), reflexivity (36), and trust and personal identity (120), to highlight just a few sites 
in which he goes beyond and complements the material manifestations (institutions, 
bureaucracy, etc.) of social phenomena.   
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speak has also been in perpetual conflict with aesthetic modernity. Moreover, 
Calinescu’s distinction between aesthetic and bourgeois modernity is not only 
crucial to any discussion of modernity’s influence on nationalism but is also 
especially pivotal to a discussion of the ways in which the idea of the nation (as 
part of the “bundle” of modernity) has operated outside of Europe and North 
America. 
 To start with, the distinction is crucial because the aesthetic and industrial 
varieties, far from simply constituting different manifestations of a single 
phenomenon, are in fact two oppositional, even inimical forces. Calinescu 
couches this idea of the enmity between the two modernities in one of his book’s 
central arguments. He elaborates on this point when he emphasizes that 
“aesthetic modernity should be understood as a crisis concept involved in a 
threefold dialectical opposition to tradition, to the modernity of bourgeois 
civilization (with its ideals of rationality, utility, progress), and finally, to itself, 
insofar as it perceives itself as a new tradition or form of authority” (10). While 
modernity’s oppositional relationship to tradition is generally taken into account 
regardless of the theorist’s background or discipline, the other two tend to be 
either downplayed or not taken into account altogether. What will guide the 
discussion to follow are the latter two oppositions, namely aesthetic modernity’s 
resistance to industrial modernity (often confused with the process of 
modernization) and its acute self-awareness with respect to the possibility that it 
too could at a future date reappear in the guise of yet another tradition. 
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 Starting with the first opposition, then, I now turn to Calinescu’s chapter 
entitled “The Idea of Modernity.” Under the heading “The Two Modernities,” 
Calinescu points out that  
it is impossible to say precisely when one can begin to speak of the 
existence of two distinct and bitterly conflicting modernities. What 
is certain is that at some point during the first half of nineteenth 
century an irresistible split occurred between modernity as a stage 
in the history of Western civilization—a product of scientific and 
technological progress, of the industrial revolution, of the sweeping 
economic and social changes brought about by capitalism—and 
modernity as an aesthetic concept. Since then, the relations between 
the two modernities have been irreducibly hostile, but not without 
allowing and even stimulating a variety of mutual influences in 
their rage for each other’s destruction. (41) 
 
This split between the two modernities helps us appreciate the operation behind 
nationalism’s alignment with modernity as well as understand as to why 
nationalism tends to be perceived as aligning itself more with bourgeois 
modernity than with the aesthetic one. There is no doubt that this perception is 
justified, especially if one’s focus is limited to the rhetorical strategies deployed 
by nationalism’s proponents who utilize the romantic elements of aesthetic 
modernity merely as a support for their project of advancing the goals of 
bourgeois modernity. What emerges is a more complex picture than the one 
engendered by the perceived, straightforward alignment between nationalism 
and bourgeois modernity, one which is often characterized by nationalism’s 
opponents as an alignment of convenience. This pragmatic alignment, it should 
be added, is especially critical in those instances where tradition proves a force to 
be reckoned with.  
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 As a movement reliant on the support of the masses, nationalism deploys 
elements of bourgeois modernity in order to acquire the legitimacy it needs by 
way of establishing consensus. What is left out from the equation, however, are 
the mutual influences as well as the “productive hostility,” without which both 
modernities would lose their force or even their raison d’être. As we shall see 
later, applying pressure on the premises of national identity as well as 
highlighting the split at its very core constitutes an engagement with the inherent 
split in modernity itself.  
 At the risk of oversimplification, one could imagine that each modernity 
contains a rudimentary impulse. While the impulse of aesthetic modernity is the 
thoroughly present and independent sense of individuality, the impulse of 
bourgeois modernity is a sense of homogeneity anchored to a clearly defined 
idea of progress, historicity, and “sweeping economic and social changes” that 
seek very much to form a new and stable tradition—a new tradition that 
redeploys any recyclable elements from what existed in the past. In other words, 
aesthetic modernity encourages the individual to think independently by way of 
what Giddens terms as “radical doubt” (3) in his Modernity and Self-Identity, even 
if that means going against the accepted norms on which there is a more or less 
broad social consensus. Bourgeois modernity, on the other hand, discourages 
such independent (and potentially disruptive) individual initiative and 
encourages trust, conformity, and consensus.  
 After highlighting the split between the two modernities, Calinescu 
elaborates on the nature of bourgeois modernity explaining that 
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with regard to the first, bourgeois idea of modernity, we may say 
that it has by and large continued the traditions of earlier periods in 
the history of the modern idea. The doctrine of progress, the 
confidence in the beneficial possibilities of science and technology, 
the concern with time (a measurable time, a time that can be bought 
and sold and therefore has, like any other commodity, a calculable 
equivalent in money), the cult of reason, and the ideal of freedom 
defined within the framework of an abstract humanism, but also 
the orientation toward pragmatism and the cult of action and 
success. (41-2) 
 
The pragmatist nature of bourgeois modernity, as opposed to the critical ethos of 
aesthetic modernity, makes its closer alliance with the surviving traces of 
traditional values not surprising at all. This pragmatist nature and the resulting 
mutually beneficiary alliance also explains the currency of the common rhetorical 
formula according to which only those elements of modernity that are 
compatible with tradition are to be accept. The rest are conveniently described as 
either unnecessary or incompatible.  
 The nature of aesthetic modernity, on the other hand, could be understood 
through its manifestation as a rebellion against the traditional values cast anew 
which Calinescu enumerates in the previous quote. It is, in other words, 
characterized by an outlook that is keen on perpetually maintaining its status of 
non-alliance with the bourgeois ethics which underlie industrial modernity: 
By contrast, the other modernity, the one that was to bring into 
being the avant-gardes, was from its romantic beginnings inclined 
toward radical antibourgeois attitudes. It was disgusted with the 
middle-class scale of values and expressed its disgust through the 
most diverse means, ranging from rebellion, anarchy, and 
apocalypticism to aristocratic self-exile. So, more than its positive 
aspirations (which often have very little in common), what defines 
cultural modernity is its outright rejection of bourgeois modernity, 
its consuming negative passion. (Calinescu 42) 
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Unlike industrial modernity’s facility for pragmatic alignment, aesthetic 
modernity finds in the attitude of non-alignment an opportunity not only to 
question the values proposed by bourgeois modernity but also to enact its own 
conceptual view on the value assigned to pastness and presence. This point will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next section. In the meantime, it is important 
to make clear that the cultural-aesthetic modernity does not define itself through 
a simplified opposition or by a mere rejectionist attitude (neither to bourgeois 
values not to the old conception of pastness and presence), even if the above-
quoted passage might appear to suggest so. Doing so, after all, would amount to 
little more than a restaging of the old quarrel between the ancients and the 
moderns.  
 Rather, what takes place in the case of cultural modernity is an 
embracement of a perpetually re-enacted difference that should not be mistaken 
for the embracement of the arguably mundane “value of novelty” (Calinescu 47). 
Deleuze expresses eloquently this critical development brought about by 
modernity as an aesthetic concept in his essay “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 
where he succinctly points out that “modernity is defined by the power of 
simulacrum” (55).  
 Keeping in mind the discussion in the previous chapter on the 
simulacrum, we can begin to understand that the power of aesthetic modernity is 
not so much related to its declared opposition to its pragmatist nemesis, which 
might be compared to the Platonic copy—posited as inferior to the model itself 
but seen as the best thing to which we have access. Instead, the power of 
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aesthetic modernity—comparable to the simulacrum—is its general capacity to 
disrupt the status quo necessary for the temporal continuity that bourgeois 
modernity requires, irrespective of the specific form that status quo happens to 
take. Though Deleuze does not explicitly make the distinction between the two 
modernities in this essay, there is little doubt that what he has in mind is the 
aesthetic one. 
 The other point to be made about the quarrelling two modernities is that 
the split between cultural and industrial modernities also leads to the 
establishment of two co-existing discursive traditions concerned with modernity. 
Though co-existing and developing side by side, these discursive traditions still 
hold the potential of being appropriated or invoked separately, thus quickly 
ceasing—at least at the discursive level—to have the mutual and dialectical 
influence to which Calinescu points.  
4.4 The Time of Aesthetic Modernity 
One of the earliest examples (if not the very first) of the discourse on aesthetic 
modernity appears in Charles Baudelaire’s “The Painter of Modern Life,” an 
essay which Baudelaire begins by describing his fascination with a sketch-maker 
who chooses not to sign his sketches. This man (Constantine Guys), who prefers 
to remain anonymous, “was not precisely an artist, but rather a man of the world in 
a very restricted sense” (Baudelaire 6).62 By being such, Baudelaire explains later, 
the sketch-maker knows and understands his (contemporary) world. He is, 
consequently, part of this teeming and perpetually unfolding world, unlike the 
                                                
62 Emphasis in original. 
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traditional artist who is removed from it by several degrees and who is “a 
specialist, a man wedded to his palette like the serf to the soil” (Baudelaire 7).  
 What is so characteristic about this man, in short, is his modernity which 
is not necessarily defined by a newly developed approach meant to comprehend 
better the nature of the contemporary world but by his attitude to that world. One 
could put it in the following way: it is as an attitude that comes to life as a 
particular and necessarily singular way of making an identification with or of 
internalizing the external stimuli that the contemporary world has to offer.     
 More specifically, Baudelaire explains in this formative text, modernity 
stands for “the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half whose other half 
is the eternal and the immutable” (13). By being a singular half added to an 
eternal and immutable half—”consisting of the most general laws of art” 
(Calinescu 50)—aesthetic modernity simultaneously ceases to signify simply that 
which is “new” and escapes the fate of becoming yet another “periodizing label”:  
Because of its newly discovered but deep hostility to the past, 
modernity can no longer be used as a periodizing label. With 
characteristic logical rigor, Baudelaire means by modernity the 
present in its ‘presentness,’ in its purely instantaneous quality. 
Modernity, then, can be defined as the paradoxical possibility of going 
beyond the flow of history through the consciousness of historicity in its 
most concrete immediacy, in its presentness (Calinescu 49-50).63  
 
Baudelaire’s choice to describe modernity as ephemeral, fugitive, and contingent 
reveals that modernity for him is first and foremost a form of liberation from 
                                                
63 Emphasis added. 
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aesthetic stipulations rather than a newly written aesthetic contract: it is a 
perpetually fleeting key which unlocks the shackles of convention and tradition, 
neutralizes the primacy of pastness which confers on tradition its hollowed 
status, and, finally, unravels the influential idea that posits tradition as “a model 
or an example to future artists. Separated from tradition (in the sense of a body 
of works and procedures to be imitated), artistic creation becomes an adventure 
and a drama in which the artist has no ally except his imagination” (Calinescu 
50). Thus, modern art, according to Baudelaire, is art at whose core is a sense of 
continuously relived, immanent presentness—with as many specific forms as 
there are possible combinations of the two halves—rather than a desire to 
recreate a copy of a past masterpiece in a contemporary guise.  
 Calinescu describes this aesthetic value which Baudelaire celebrates (or 
even inaugurates), writing that “what we have to deal with here is a major 
cultural shift from a time-honored aesthetics of permanence, based on a belief in 
an unchanging and transcendent ideal of beauty, to an aesthetics of transitoriness 
and immanence, whose cultural values are change and novelty” (3). In addition 
to this preoccupation with sketching the present (almost haphazardly) at the 
expense of the already established model, Baudelaire’s cultural modernity also 
comes to stand for an open-ended possibility as well as for a potentiality (what 
Deleuze would call virtuality) which seeks to redefine both aesthetic objective 
and method so that they both begin to place the contingent and fleeting 
difference of the present precisely in the position where the comforting 
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similitude of the copy used to be. “Romanticism,” which Baudelaire associates 
with modernity,64 
is… not only ‘the most recent, the most contemporary form of the 
beautiful,’ but also—and this point deserves to be stressed—it is 
substantially different from everything that has been done in the 
past. The awareness of this dissimilarity is actually the starting 
point in the search for novelty, another cardinal concept of 
Baudelaire’s poetics. (Calinescu 47)65  
 
While the terms “novelty” and “dissimilarity” might strike us as the crux of the 
matter, it is in fact the awareness of the novelty and dissimilarity that matters the 
most. Instead of characterizations that are determined by the concreteness of 
how finished works appear (or ought to appear), the concept of modernity which 
Baudelaire inaugurates is instead focused on characterizations of modernity 
which are determined by an awareness, an attitude, a way of knowingly 
interpreting the externality of the world, and even as “a way of acting and 
behaving” (384), as Paul de Man encapsulates modernity’ nature in his essay 
“Literary History and Literary Modernity.”  
                                                
64 With regard to Baudelaire’s terminology, Calinescu says the following: “Today, we 
might speak of the romanticism Baudelaire had in mind as largely ‘antiromantic,’ or 
‘modern,’ if we consider ‘modern’ as an antonym for ‘romantic,’ according to a more 
recent terminological opposition for which Baudelaire’s critical influence is directly 
responsible” (47). 
65 Emphasis in original. 
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 De Man’s essay (whose argument Calinescu critiques for being too 
sweeping while still holding it as deserving a lengthy consideration)66 takes 
Nietzsche as its starting point. Couched as part of a discussion that begins with 
Nietzsche, specifically his concept of forgetfulness of the past or history as a 
means of enacting the genuinely creative act, de Man goes on to indicate that this 
Nietzschean concept is applicable not only to Baudelaire’s concept of modernity. 
Rather, de Man argues, the desire to forget the past and start anew, taking the 
present as a fresh moment of origin, has actually been the perennial condition of 
all literature. “The appeal of modernity,” de Man insists,  
haunts all literature. It is revealed in numberless images and 
emblems that appear at all periods—the obsession with a tabula 
rasa, with new beginnings—that finds recurrent expression in all 
forms of writing. No true account of literary language can bypass 
this persistent temptation of literature to fulfill itself in a single 
moment. The temptation of immediacy is constitutive of a literary 
consciousness and has to be included in a definition of the 
specificity of literature. (392) 
  
To write the (truly) original literary text is to start anew or, at least, to start with 
an obsession with beginnings. Forgetfulness and beginnings, for de Man, come 
together as part of a single and purposive movement that defines the essential 
quality of all literary texts, irrespective of period or aesthetic characteristics. 
Admittedly, one cannot help it but take issue (as Calinescu rightly does) with this 
                                                
66 Calinescu writes that he does “not wish to argue here with de Man’s view that all 
literature embodies in some fashion the ‘unsolvable paradox’ of modernity. My own 
opinion is that modernity in general, and literary modernity in particular, are aspects 
of a time consciousness that has not remained the same throughout history, and that 
Baudelaire’s theory of modernity cannot be enlarged to account for the whole of 
literature” (51). 
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sweeping and arguably overstretched concept of modernity as de Man outlines 
it.  
 The principal sticking point with this argument is that it goes so far as to 
empty out literary modernity of any specific or recognizable content it could 
possibly have. This position remakes the concept of modernity into what may be 
regarded as a purely formal concept that could potentially be applied to all 
literature, regardless of the shape it takes or the historical moment out of which it 
arises. I will come back to this crucial point shortly—the concept of modernity as 
a content and as a form—but, before doing so, I would like to sketch out briefly 
how Calinescu and de Man agree and where they diverge as the position I want 
to propose is situated between the two.  
 What should be highlighted with regard to de Man’s position, then, is his 
critical assertion that modernity “invests its trust in the power of the present 
moment as an origin, but discovers that, in severing itself from the past, it has at 
the same time severed itself from the present” (390). If taken at face value, this 
assertion could be mistakenly associated with the idea that the turning of the 
artist’s back on the inescapable influences from past (by way of deliberate 
“ruthless forgetting”) would do very little to erase the stubborn traces which that 
past always manages to leave on the present, even if the present happens to be 
postulated in an abstract fashion as a spontaneous and definitive moment of 
origin. 
 Stopping at this face value reading, however, would be insufficient; it 
would be insufficient because the active and purposive nature of ruthless 
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forgetting makes this “way of behaving” quite different from the passive 
negativity of an uncomplicated a-historical position. I am not interested in the a-
historical position as there is very little to be gained by exploring such tendency. 
The purposive nature of ruthless forgetting, on the other hand, indicates 
something else. For the main part, it indicates a willful response to the crisis that 
modernity presents the artist with, a crisis originating out of the necessity of 
living and being fully aware of the split which Calinescu illustrates so well in his 
analysis of Baudelaire’s essay. Only the modern artist, Baudelaire suggests, has 
an awareness of the split.  
 The question remains, how does this split relate to the act of ruthless 
forgetting? To forget ruthlessly is part of the problematic of past and present. 
Being aware and “living the split” of industrial and aesthetic modernities is in 
many ways a corollary of having an awareness of the “two halves,” one of which 
is timeless, i.e., having a constant value and is handed down successively from 
past, to present, to future, the other is fleeting and ever-changing, i.e., having a 
value only insofar as it is that value is produced by the momentary present. From 
this, one begins to see that the split of the two modernities has a temporal 
dimension; it is not, in other words, separate from aesthetic modernity’s 
complicated positing of the past and the present. 
 By way of examining this positing further, I want to discuss modernity’s 
peculiar relationship to both the present and the past, before returning to de 
Man’s essay. On the one hand, modernity’s relationship to the temporal division 
of past and present necessitates the existence of a moment of recognition—a 
moment of discovery that has been somehow already known—that the pastness 
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of tradition is always a fundamental constituent of the freshness of the present. 
On the other, modernity’s relationship to the division of fixity and potentiality 
transcends the need for a singular moment. Modernity, as such, deals with the 
questions of time and creativity by simultaneously giving each its sphere of 
operation while collapsing the two into a single unit that later becomes the new 
modern work.    
 Put another way, willful forgetfulness of the past is not simply a naïve 
negation of the inescapable power of tradition, but rather a necessary 
requirement for generating that forceful moment of recognition whereby the 
newness of the present is not compromised and the power of tradition is not 
taken too lightly. De Man, however, goes even further in his critique, suggesting 
that this relationship between past and present forms a vicious circle so that “the 
more radical the rejection of anything that came before, the greater the 
dependence on the past” (400). The suggestion here is that dealing with the 
consequences of what comes before is best done by conceding its necessarily 
continual presence rather than consigning it to the past through the assumption 
that the abstract temporal division would actually protect against “leakage,” to 
use the useful metaphor from Midnight’s Children.    
 With the vicious circle of rejection and dependence in mind, let us turn to 
the preceding pages of de Man’s text where he comments directly on 
Baudelaire’s essay, writing that 
Yet his modernity too, like Nietzsche’s, is a forgetting or a 
suppression of anteriority: The human figures that epitomize 
modernity are defined by experiences such as childhood or 
convalescence, a freshness of perception that results from a slate 
 207 
wiped clear, from the absence of a past that has not yet had time to 
tarnish the immediacy of perception. (396) 
 
This human figure, the flâneur, moves through the crowds with a perceived 
lucidity and freshness. His lucidity and freshness is built not on the presently 
ignored ruins of the past but on the presupposition that being on the posterior 
end of the constantly readjusted temporal division is somehow sufficient to 
achieve the highly prized condition of modernity. It is highly prized because its 
immediacy and contingency would cleanse us of the stink and staleness of the 
past.   
 Modernity’s peculiar relationship to time could be best illustrated in the 
divergence between Calinescu and de Man with regard to how the concept of 
aesthetic modernity is to be articulated. Before Calinescu calls attention to de 
Man’s two insights which he claims to have been very helpful to him, he 
suggests leaving aside what he holds as de Man’s unacceptable generalizations—
the assertion that “modernity” is the impulse of all literature and the transferring 
of “all the problems of history… to the plane of language and écriture” (52). What 
Calinescu wants to retain “from de Man’s article is both his excellent analysis of 
‘Le Peintre de la vie moderne’ and the suggested opposition between modernity 
and historical time.67 Both are actually very helpful for the understanding of a 
specific stage in the development of modernity’s concept, if not of the essence of 
literature or history (52).  
                                                
67 Emphasis in original. 
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 It should be noted that the concession Calinescu makes is not as generous 
as it might seem. The delimiting of the opposition between modernity and 
history to a specific stage is Calinescu’s way of minimizing what could be termed 
as the excesses of de Man’s reading. In other words, it is a way of accepting the 
insights as such without necessarily subscribing to the overstretched (or a-
historical) definition of modernity that de Man offers. Despite acknowledging 
the benefits of de Man’s ideas to the formulation of his own position, Calinescu 
remains adamant to indicate that, although 
there is indeed a conflict between modernity and history, … this 
conflict itself has a history. As far as literature and the arts are 
concerned, one may even point to an approximate date: 
Baudelaire’s poetics of modernity can be taken as an early 
illustration of the revolt of the present against the past—of the 
fleeting instant against the steadiness of memory, of difference 
against repetition. (52) 
 
As a preface to the discussion to follow, it is worth pointing out that it is a 
mistake to treat the present and the past as if they were only temporal labels. 
Treating them as such cannot be considered wrong per se, but such a treatment is 
an indication that the view in question is incomplete. Calinescu’s treatment of 
modernity could be seen as proceeding with the presupposition that the past and 
the present are indeed temporal labels, with an exception being made for 
aesthetic modernity which escapes the fate of becoming yet another term 
pointing to a definitive historical period. As a literary historian, Calinescu is 
right. However, what remains missing is a critical aspect of the revolt described 
in the above quotation, a revolt that does take place in a specific historical context 
but one whose functioning is reliant on a recognizable formal procedure.   
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 The question of whether the past and the present ought to count for more 
than temporal labels is the meeting site where the position of de Man and that of 
Calinescu could enter into a fruitful dialogue. While Calinescu insists on 
focusing his attention on the historical contextualizing of various postulations of 
the past and the present, de Man is determined to eschew such meticulous 
historical contextualization. Avoiding such a historical contextualization is 
perhaps understandable given de Man’s ambitious project to re-imagine nothing 
less than our conception of history. What is to be noted is that each of the two 
positions suffers from a shortcoming that is largely the result of the very 
different objectives of each of the two projects.  
 These shortcomings are a function of not acknowledging sufficiently that 
in addition to being temporal labels, the past and the present also function on a 
different level of signification whereby the present additionally stands for 
potentiality or virtuality, as encapsulated in Deleuze’s formulation of difference, 
and the past additionally stands for tradition or its perceived or actual fixity. The 
concept of modernity, especially its highly complex articulation of pastness and 
presentness, can neither be taken as a purely formal procedure, as de Man’s 
position suggests,68 nor could it be filled to the brim with historical content, all 
while paying little attention to the formal procedure that informs the concept’s 
very essence.   
                                                
68 I should perhaps emphasize the word suggests as de Man does not argues explicitly 
for this position. 
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 If the preceding discussion (and especially the divergence between 
Calinescu and de Man) is to reveal anything that could help in reaching a more 
accurate assessment of modernity, it would show that modernity in general and 
aesthetic modernity in particular ought not to be interpreted only as a condition 
with a set of definite and recognizable characteristics or features; rather, 
modernity should be taken as a label pointing to a procedure through which the 
Baudelairean “two halves” come together and take shape. Taken as such, 
modernity has the potential of putting on as many faces as there are possible 
combinations between the enduring elements of tradition and the fleeting 
elements of presentness. “Modernity,” Taylor writes, “is not a single wave” (205). 
From this perspective, there are not only “five faces of modernity,” but an 
infinite, “virtual,” number of modernities. Modernity, to add a crucial 
addendum, is a universal procedure (its form) whose mechanism of enactment is 
always singular (its content). This answer, however, gives rise to a conundrum: 
do the infinite faces of modernity imply that “to each his own modernity”?69  
4.5 A Modernity of the Other? 
My discussion of modernity thus far has concentrated on two problems that 
consistently surface in the discourse on modernity: the condition’s inherently 
split character as well as its complicated relationship to the temporal division of 
past and present, which is after all a function of its dialectical opposition to 
                                                
69 The idea of alternative modernities has been proposed as a way of dealing with this 
question. I am hesitant to adopt this idea because of its relativist tone. The same way I 
argue for the readjustment of our understanding of national identity instead of 
proposing a new one, I similarly argue for a readjustment of our understanding of 
modernity instead of proposing alternative ones.  
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(rather than rejection of) tradition as Calinescu rightly points out. Continuing 
along the same lines, then, I turn to two other problems that surface in a different 
context, only this time this second set of problems surfaces in the discourse on 
what I refer to as “traveling modernity.” 
 I use this term as a neutral alternative to explanations which adopt the 
view that the appearance in other parts of the world of attitudes and modes of 
thought connected to modernity could simply be seen as a process of 
appropriation and borrowing of European modernity. The problem with views 
based on borrowing is not one of political correctness. Rather, I think that ideas 
about borrowing and appropriation lead to the misunderstanding that 
modernity outside of the European landscape reappears elsewhere either in the 
same form, with slight modifications, or as an utterly corrupted version of its 
former self. If we understand modernity’s dialectical opposition to tradition 
correctly, we would recognize that its dialectical opposition to a different 
tradition means that it is more fitting to call it a “traveling modernity” rather 
than a borrowed one.    
 The second set of problems, then, results from the diffusion of modernity 
into new contexts, a diffusion that is associated with the colonial project. As an 
illustration of this association, I quote a helpful summation from Waïl Hassan’s 
Tayeb Salih: Ideology and the Craft of Fiction. Hassan begins the introduction to his 
book on the celebrated Sudanese novelist with a summation that clearly 
illustrates the first of modernity’s second set of problems:  
Customarily, 1798 is cited as the beginning of the modern era in the 
Arab world. That year, in a remarkably pristine instance of imperial 
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harnessing of power and knowledge, Napoleon Bonaparte arrived 
in Egypt at the head of an army of occupation that included a 
legion of scientists who were to compose the monumental 
Description de l’Égypte. It has since become an intellectual habit, 
both in Europe and in the Arab world, to divorce the colonial from 
the scientific mission, recasting the latter in terms of advantages or 
gifts compensating for the naked aggression of the former. (1) 
  
Hassan’s summation calls attention to an intellectual habit to divorce the two 
sides of the colonial enterprise. The rise of postcolonial studies and the scrutiny 
that Orientalist discourse receives have done a great deal to remedy this 
problem. What is interesting, though, is that it is also problematic to associate too 
closely the supposed gifts of modernity with the aggression of colonialism. 
 To associate modernity too closely with colonialism is to run the risk of 
eliding the fact that modernity, by definition, is multi-sided. Therefore, the 
tribulations of modernity within the colonial project is actually comparable (not 
from historical standpoint, but from a structural one) to the tribulations of 
modernity within the European context. Knowing that modernity is a more 
complex phenomenon (containing mutually inimical elements) than the 
discourse on reason, rationality, and progress makes it out to be, it is not at all 
surprising that modernity’s advent in a new territory would also be riddled with 
complications relating to its face which is indeed created out of conflicted 
features.  
 Focusing on the jarring combination of the aggression of colonialism with 
the presumed beneficence of scientific modernity would lead one to lose track of 
an essential aspect of modernity—its split nature. Add to this the other risk 
pertaining to the potential of such a focus to be especially hindering because it 
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keeps the assessment of modernity at the level of critiquing a tradition of 
discourse the falsity and duplicity of whose claims are amply apparent. In light 
of these risks, then, it is essential to move beyond this criticism of modernity 
whose basis rests upon the undeniable historical fact that modernity’s advent in 
the so-called third-world went hand in hand with the colonial enterprise. To do 
so (far from being either a “defence of modernity” or a reassertion of what is 
sometimes termed as its “values”) would make it possible for a different type of 
critique to emerge—a critique in the sense of “assessment” rather than 
“criticism.”  
 The point to keep in mind before discussing the second problem is that by 
drawing attention to the double-sidedness of modernity, Hassan’s remark 
highlights a resilient, deep-seated ambivalence toward modernity in the 
postcolonial world. As such, his characterization—despite its focus on the 
rhetorical and discursive levels—is a useful reminder that any appraisal of 
modernity is bound to run into this sticking point. As Calinescu’s analysis 
shows, modernity after all has had a double-sidedness since at least the first half 
of the nineteenth century. In The Name of Identity, Amin Maalouf articulates this 
ambivalence even more bluntly than Hassan does: “when modernity bears the 
mark of ‘the Other’ it is not surprising if some people confronting it brandish 
symbols of atavism to assert their difference” (72). 
 Viewed with suspicion for its association with colonial expansion, 
modernity additionally suffers from the ease with which its (always partial) 
discourse can be appropriated, even by those on opposing ends of a given issue. 
Mondal, for instance, explains how colonial discourse which 
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suggested that India could not be a nation because it was not 
modern and was not a single homogeneous nation [led to the 
response by nationalists who] became convinced of the need to 
reform Indian society in order to modernize it; this was a matter of 
such fundamental importance that all nationalists had to engage 
with it. Modernization and social reform became, in principle, 
axiomatic within Indian nationalist discourse. (50)  
 
What was required, Mondal explains, is nothing less ambitious than the 
redefinition of tradition so that it becomes “consonant with the principles of 
modernity” (50). This discursive division between modernity and whatever 
existed before it becomes possible through simplifying modernity’s concept of 
time and by assuming that modernity could actually be treated as an import—as 
if it were separate from tradition or as being wieldy enough to be instituted via 
purely concrete means. Rather than recognizing that modernity is constituted by 
difference and that it is established as part of an uneasy but ultimately 
productive coexistence with what preceded it, nationalist discourse tries to make 
a pragmatic pact with bourgeois/industrial modernity in the hope of cutting off 
modernity in its totality from the very domain which sustains as well as 
invigorates its most beneficial energies.      
 This problem is not unique to India. The problem of reconciling 
modernity with tradition is as perennial as the phenomenon of nationalism itself. 
Whereas the first is deployed within nationalist discourse partly as proof of 
having a future-oriented outlook, the latter is seen with one eye as a proof of 
former glory and/or historical continuity, with another as an impediment to be 
overcome, irrespective of the feasibility of such undertaking. This is precisely 
where aesthetic modernity’s “disruptiveness” comes into play. Aesthetic 
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modernity disrupts what is presented as a seamless continuity of pastness and 
presence in a comparable way to the simulacrum’s disruption of what appears as 
a seamless continuity between the copy and the model. Aesthetic modernity’s 
work is to put up a challenge to the false discourse which posits the advent of 
modernity along the lines the following formula: tradition as the model and 
modernity as the copy. 
 Though the contours of this arguably intransigent problem could be 
observed wherever the idea of nationalism took root, the specificities of the 
discursive approaches meant to treat it are understandably different in the Arab 
world. In his comprehensive study, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, the 
novelist and sociologist Halim Barakat70 calls the final product of the above-
described process a distorted and inverted modernity (23).71 “This 
                                                
70 With regard to the rise of nationalism, Barakat argues that “the dominance of 
nationalist ideas during this period [1918-1945] must be explained in terms of the 
imperialist oppression that befell Arabs and not in terms of the emulation of European 
models” (251-2). In other words, he also frames the question of nationalism between a 
response to outside forces or emulation of a foreign idea. 
71 In his analysis of modernity and tradition, Barakat draws on Hisham Sharabi: 
“Generalizing the patriarchal nature of the Arab family to other institutions has been 
more fully and broadly developed by Sharabi in a later major work, Neopatriarchy: A 
Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (1988). By patriarchy, Sharabi understands ‘a 
universal form of traditional society,’ in contrast to modernity (which ‘occurred in its 
original form in Western Europe’). He further argues that the Arab renaissance in fact 
deformed rather than displaced the patriarchal structure of Arab society, in the sense 
that modernization produced a hybrid society and culture. What developed was 
neopatriarchy, a system that is neither traditional nor modern. The central feature of 
this new system has continued to be ‘the dominance of the father (patriarch), the 
center around which national as well as the natural family are organized. Thus 
between ruler and ruled, between father and child, there exist only vertical relations: 
in both settings the paternal will is the absolute will, mediated in both society and the 
family by a forced consensus based on ritual and coercion’” (264). 
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modernization,”72 Barakat explains, “has not only failed to break down 
patriarchal relations and forms, it has provided the ground for producing a 
hybrid—the present neopatriarchal society, which is neither modern nor 
traditional, but which limits participation by its members because of the 
continued dominance exercised by single leaders” (23). Modernity, Barakat 
suggests, is expected to “breakdown” older forms in order to be deemed 
successful. One cannot argue in favour of patriarchal forms, but to expect 
modernity to break them down is too optimistic. It is an optimistic expectation 
because of its underlying assumption that modernity simply replaces (or at least 
ought to replace) that which existed before, or that its manifestation in a given 
milieu would necessarily resemble its manifestation elsewhere.  
 After an active struggle lasting “a century and a half to meet the 
challenges of modern times,” Barakat writes, the final product of this struggle 
between local and borrowed elements is nothing short of an amalgamation of 
contrasting social structures. As such, the mixture of contrasts and variations that 
is postcolonial Arab society makes any meaningful generalization virtually 
impossible:  
                                                
72 Notice that there is no meaningful distinction being made between modernity and 
modernization. This general lack of nuance with regard to these labels is widespread 
and is not specific to Barakat. Amin Maalouf, for instance, treats the achievements of 
what Calinescu calls cultural and industrial modernities as if they were the 
achievements of a single, homogeneous process rather than two distinct processes 
which tend to express fierce hostility toward each other, not to mention that he uses 
the concepts of modernization, westernization, and modernity interchangeably (78-
79). While modernization can be undertaken in material terms, modernity has to 
penetrate deep enough in the social fabric so as to give rise to a new worldview—
rather than to skyscrapers. Modernism, as Calinescu rightly points out, is a single face 
of modernity which enacts such a new worldview (or an artistic mediation of it) in the 
aesthetic arena. 
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The result has been a battle between the old and the new in every 
aspect of human life. Confrontations between vehemently opposed 
forces have led to a strenuous process of rebirth. The intensely 
transitional nature of contemporary Arab society makes 
generalization difficult. Arab society today is neither traditional nor 
modern, old or new, capitalist or socialist or feudal, Eastern or 
Western, religious or secular, particularistic or universalistic in its 
cultural orientations. (Barakat 22) 
 
As Mondal explains, the discourse of modernity in India was deployed in an 
attempt to stamp out the multifarious traditions of the subcontinent in order to 
establish the cultural homogeneity required for a cohesive and functioning 
nation-state. In the Arab world, however, the situation necessitated the 
accommodation of what was—and to a large extent still is—seen as a unitary 
tradition because this unifying tradition represented the main pillar supporting 
nationalism in its pan-Arab incarnation. It is for this reason that (pan-) nationalist 
discourse in the Arab world has deployed tradition at the expense of its 
interpretation of modernity rather than choosing to deploy the discourse of 
(industrial) modernity to lessen the affective impact of tradition. This is 
understandable considering that tradition was posited as the main source of 
pride around which the masses can coalesce, in addition to representing the hope 
for a potential rebirth that would establish continuity between the past and the 
presence.    
 These critiques remain hampered by their continuing to revolve around 
the axis of similitude. The claim that modernity in these contexts is distorted 
could only be made on the assumption that it is possible for it to be authentic in 
the sense of replicating its course elsewhere. It would, therefore, be questionable 
to claim that modernity either succeeded or failed, nor is it possible to determine 
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whether its fight against tradition has been either won or lost. Doing so would be 
to begin by posing the wrong question. In postcolonial contexts, the introduction 
of modernity is a point of no return: it is neither possible for tradition to remerge 
nor for modernity to stamp it out. With this in mind, Baudelaire’s enthusiasm for 
the theoretical clean cut modernity makes between the past and the present is 
certainly not applicable here—that is, if we assume it were really applicable even 
in Baudelaire’s own context.   
4.6 An Alternative Critique 
What one cannot fail to notice that the lines of criticism of modernity outlined 
above have a decidedly descriptive nature—how the discourse of modernity was 
deployed coupled with a description of the adverse results of such a deployment. 
The core idea driving this criticism revolves around the notion that the main 
issue with modernity’s face in those contexts is related to its appearance either as 
corrupted or as an outright foreign transplant. While this might be true in a 
strictly historical sense, this criticism remains lacking in that it does not provide a 
thorough assessment—rather than answering the question “how the advent of 
modernity took place?” the true question ought to be “in what way could the 
project of modernity be best reassessed?” It is no surprise that the descriptive 
approach, despite its indispensable historical insights, produces only part of the 
picture—the part that focuses either on interrogating industrial modernity or on 
pointing out the falsehood of the discourse on modernity proposed mainly by 
the nationalists. In some cases, it does not even move beyond the problems 
inherent in the process of modernization, which is itself only a single component 
of industrial modernity.  
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 In his recent book, The Trials of Arab Modernity, Tarek El-Ariss attempts to 
provide an alternative to these critiques of modernity. In order to do so, he 
proposes to analyze a select number of texts, a number of which are associated 
with the Arab renaissance of the nineteenth century (known in Arabic as al-
Nahda). Rather than follow the wide-spread practice of highlighting the 
historical, sociological, and political aspects of these texts, he instead reads them 
by focusing “on the body as a site of rupture and signification… [in order to 
shift] the paradigm for the study of modernity in the Arab context from 
questions of representation and cultural exchange to an engagement with a 
genealogy of symptoms and affects” (2).73 
 Though I disagree with the letter of his proposed reinterpretation of Arab 
modernity, I very much subscribe to the spirit of his reassessment, the mere 
existence of which responds to the urgency of undertaking such work as well as 
the necessity to rethink the project of modernity itself: 
This study reframes Arab modernity (hadatha) as somatic condition, 
which takes shape through accidents and events (ahdath) emerging 
in and between Europe and the Arab world, the literary text and 
political discourse. Focusing on travelers and literary characters as 
they wander, run, take shelter, crouch, faint, panic, and go mad, I 
identify the simultaneous performances and contestations—or 
trials—of modernity. (3) 
                                                
73 Despite the author’s intention of going beyond traditional interpretations of 
modernity, a quick look at the book’s table of contents reveals that the book still 
adheres more or less to the conventional narrative of Arab modernity which is based 
on providing historical surveys: its starts with Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), 
moves through Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq (1804-1886) before getting to Tayeb Salih’s 
(1929-2009) famous novel, culminates with an examination of contemporary novelists, 
and ends with discussion on blogging. What he manages to do, however, is leave 
behind the crippling question of the success and failure of modernity. 
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Explaining modernity by way of examining its performative aspect could be 
traced back to Baudelaire’s essay. However, the spirit animating El-Ariss’s 
reading remains refreshing. This reading comes out of a conviction whose 
underlying impetus is an acknowledgement of the shortcomings of previous 
interpretative models according to which modernity stood mainly for a 
teleological or utilitarian project. This project was associated with a more or less 
clearly defined objectives as well as with the assumption that its success could be 
judged according to the familiar criterion of similitude.  
 Most important, the development of new approaches to the evaluation or 
interpretation of modernity entails first of all the divergence “from the linear 
genealogy of Arab modernity starting with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt (1798) 
and Haykal’s Zaynab (1913), which is considered to be the first Arabic novel” (El-
Ariss 8-9). Doing so is necessary for the above mentioned reason but also so as to 
avoid the pitfall of reducing the question of modernity to the colonial enterprise: 
“rather than reduce modernity to the European colonial project deployed though 
an identifiable set of social, political, and discursive practices, it’s necessary to 
perform instead a careful exploration of spaces of critique within [modernity’s] 
literary manifestations and instances unraveling in Arabic texts” (El-Ariss 11). 
This self-awareness ascribed to the modernity of the Arabic texts that El-Ariss 
analyzes is a fundamental aspect of modernity’s formal procedure. If we are to 
interrogate modernity as it is manifested in text, the first step would entail the 
abandoning of the conventional critiques of modernity whose pillars rest on the 
models of aesthetic representation and political discourse. 
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 The spirit animating the analysis of El-Ariss, for one thing, leads to the 
conclusion that the so-called neopatriarchy (alongside other terms used to 
describe a stunted or deformed modernity) is not so much the definitive proof 
exposing the face of the “failed project of modernity.” A close look at the 
discourse of critics of modernity reveals the tendency to interpret the project of 
modernity as a project of transference. As such, the project’s success or failure is 
decided on the basis of its degree of resemblance.  
 The fact that the same criterion of similitude is deployed in the assessment 
of national identity is not a coincidence. The symbiotic relationship between 
modernity and nationalism indicates that we are dealing with the same problem, 
only that this problem has various manifestations. Continuing with this idea, one 
could say that, as modernity’s offspring or begetter (depending on which side of 
the cause-and-effect argument one takes), national identity ought not to be 
judged on whether its (always perceived) effect is beneficial, destructive, or 
ethically justifiable. Rather, the judgment ought to be based on whether it is 
borrowed in line with the paradigm of similitude or newly re-imagined in 
accordance with the paradigm of difference. As such, modern forms of 
identification come to be seen as arising out of modernity’s perennial split and 
not out of the reproducibility of its condition. Put in other words, they are forms 
of identifications that deliberately expose the split between difference and 
similitude so as not to embrace similitude at the expense of suppressing the 
difference which lies at the heart of all identities. 
 By way of concluding this chapter, I want to highlight two key points to 
be distilled from the preceding discussion. Knowing that modernity is always in 
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a perpetual dialectical opposition to tradition, it would be misleading to judge its 
success or failure outside of the Western context through the degree of its 
resemblance to the modernity that originally emerged in Europe. The project of 
modernity as such cannot succeed or fail because it can neither be assessed from 
a teleological perspective, nor could its accomplishments be measured on the 
basis of resemblance. As Calinescu argues, modernity is a crisis concept whose 
mode of operation relies on perpetually responding to the specific crisis at hand 
rather than on providing functional solutions to it.  
 As is the case with nationalism, then, modernity emerges as a response to 
a problem, not as a portable set of mechanisms or reform objectives as certain 
(sometimes even opposed) discursive traditions would have us believe; 
modernity appears as a way of engendering new forms of identification to 
replace preceding ones which are no longer in tandem with the society’s 
condition. Its form and shape will ultimately be determined by the problem to 
which it initially responds, not by its degree of similitude to the modernity that 
developed elsewhere, under different circumstances, and in response to a 
different crisis.  
 In addition, “reflexivity” is an indispensable, constituent element of 
modernity. As Giddens explains in Modernity and Self-Identity, modernity creates 
the “trust in institutions,” a trust in faceless institutions upon which national 
identity is predicated. Its reflexivity, however, promotes radical doubt not only 
insofar as institutions are concerned but also with regard to other aspects of 
modern society, including the conceptual mechanisms of identification. This 
radical doubt should be considered to be an endemic force that works from 
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within the trust-promoting mechanisms—as a corrosive agent intrinsic to that 
same national identity. Giddens elaborates on this point, writing that 
Modernity is a post-traditional order, but not one in which the 
sureties of tradition and habit have been replaced by the certitude 
of rational knowledge. Doubt, a pervasive feature of modern 
critical reason, permeates into everyday life as well as philosophical 
consciousness, and forms a general existential dimension of the 
contemporary social world. Modernity institutionalises the 
principle of radical doubt and insists that all knowledge takes the 
form of hypotheses: claims which may very well be true, but which 
are in principle always open to revision and may have at some 
point to be abandoned. (Giddens 2-3)  
  
While it is the condition of modernity that makes possible the development of 
national consciousness—or, as Mondal would have it, the cultural politics whose 
functioning is dependent on national identities—the same condition contains 
within it the seeds of radical doubt that make it possible for non-normative forms 
of identifications to emerge. It is, from this perspective, misleading to see in 
modernity a complete replacement of previous forms of social organization or to 
assume that it is necessary to go beyond the premises of modernity to achieve a 
state of affairs in which the pernicious sameness of national consciousness ceases 
to be the fundamental parameters for identification between the self and the 
other. 
 This is the point at which one begins to grasp the broad significance of the 
narrative-based critique of national identity. Not only does this critique represent 
a refusal to engage nationalist discourse on its own territory, it also mobilizes the 
perennial doubt which imbues the experiences of individuals in modern society. 
The critique of national identity, then, reaches the heart of the trouble with 
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modernity by targeting modernity’s ubiquitous surrogate. From this 
perspectives, accentuating difference in national identity constitutes both a 
countering of the discursive assumptions that underlie nationalism as well as a 
readjustment of the way modernity is understood and, thus, critiqued. Placing 
pressure on national identity’s assumptions of similitude is the same procedure 
holding the potential of remaining the other of the two main camps concerned 
with modernity: from the one advocating the enactment of modernity according 
to the model/copy formula and from the reactionary forces which reject 
modernity precisely because of that. If the narratives which posit national 
identity as difference do not provide serviceable solutions to the most intractable 
problems facing the modern national community, they at least carve out the 
space required for beginning to ask the right questions.  
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Conclusion: The Promise of a Re-Imagined Community? 
The effects of power are both immensely durable and fragile… the 
subject, far from being powerless to intervene in the operations of 
discursive power, has the ability to shape and reorganize the 
discursive formation itself.  
Anshuman Mondal, Nationalism and Post-Colonial Identity 
It is the map that precedes the territory.  
Jean Baudrillard, Simulations 
 
When considered against the background of nationalism, narratives tend to be 
interpreted as supportive of its cause, as critical of it, or as exhibiting at least a 
suspicion of its operation. The reading of Little Mountain and Midnight’s Children 
offered here aims to transcend this line of interpretation for the sake of 
proposing an analytical judgment that would not be persuaded into accepting 
the text’s discursive pronouncements. This analytical judgment is not meant to 
suggest that it would not be possible to find instances where the unraveling of 
the premises of national identity as described in this study actually coincides 
with a decidedly critical discourse. Instead, it is meant to underscore the danger 
which lies in those instances where the seemingly critical discourse coincides 
with a structure that has the capacity to undermine silently what could rightly 
appear as critical discourse.  
 As an example of this structural capacity to undermine critical discourse, I 
want to consider the narrative of Günter Grass’s The Tin Drum. In “Saleem 
Fathered by Oskar,” Patricia Merivale compares the literary strategies of 
Midnight’s Children and The Tin Drum. After enumerating the considerable 
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overlap of literary strategies in the two novels, Merivale alludes to what I find to 
be the most decisive overlap: “the ‘literal’ connections between the heroes and 
history are deliberately strained” (18). “Both Grass’s and Rushdie’s heroes,” she 
says, “are… ‘handcuffed to history,’ obliged to bear witness to their times, ‘with 
no getting away from the date’ for either of them. Year by year, event by event, 
the ‘times’ build up their selves as well as their stories” (6). They both, however, 
“retreat, at thirty, to ‘the fringes’ of life, an insane asylum and a pickle factory” 
(Merivale 8). The narrator’s retreat is an essential structural element in both 
novels. Writing the narrative from this vantage point gives the narrator the 
prerogative to rearrange narrative discourse in such a way as to add a critical 
shade of meaning: to mount a structural form of resistance in the face of 
nationalism’s logic of identity. In both novels, the retreat becomes the site at 
which the binding of the nation and the narrative’s central figure is structurally 
unraveled. For the purposes of undertaking such a project, the image of the 
insane asylum is just as fitting as that of the pickle factory.  
 It would be superfluous to analyze Grass’s novel in line with the analysis 
of Midnight’s Children and Little Mountain offered in this study. What I want to 
do, instead, is offer a brief comparison of the transformation which the narrative 
of The Tin Drum undergoes in the film adaptation. I draw attention to this 
transformation because it serves as a concise illustration of how a narrative 
could keep its critical discourse, but is ultimately stripped of the structural 
unraveling of national identity. In “A Different Drummer,” Carol Hall describes 
part of the transformation as follows: 
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In Günter Grass’s novel, Oskar, the thirty-year-old narrator, retells 
his picaresque tale of anti-development from the scrubbed bed of a 
mental hospital. In the film, the offscreen child-voice of Oskar takes 
us episodically and in chronological order from the conception of 
his mother to his twentieth year. The decision to relinquish the 
perspective of the omniscient, older Oskar was central to 
Schlöndorff’s vision of the film as a whole. (237) 
  
This decision is explained as being necessary for creating a successful cinematic 
adaptation.74 Rather than the requirements for cinematic adaptation, what I find 
interesting are the consequences of that adaptation. In light of the preceding 
analysis, the transformation results in a narrative which leaves the visceral bond 
intact— though the narrative in the film is inspired by one whose structure 
unravels the binding of character and nation. 
 In both film and novel, Oskar’s stunted growth serves as an important 
narrative mechanism. Oskar ceases to grow with the rise of National Socialism 
and resumes right after the end of the war. The novel’s third part, removed in its 
entirety from the film version, undertakes the crucial step of unraveling the bond 
made so explicit in the connection between the personal and the national. Made 
through critical plot points, this connection remains intact in the film as the 
narrative concludes with the fall of National Socialism and the resumption of 
Oskar’s growth. As such, the end result is a narrative whose discourse condemns 
                                                
74 I think that cinematic adaptations of novels are not required to be faithful to the text. 
The comparison between novel and film, therefore, should not be seen as implicitly 
arguing for fidelity to the text. Rather, I bring up this comparison only to illustrate the 
interaction between the discursive and structural elements of narrative—which 
happens to be quite lucid in this particular example—in light of this study’s central 
argument.  
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National Socialism but maintains Oskar’s visceral bond to the German nation as 
such.  
 It is essential, then, to recognize that the logic of nationalism is reliant on a 
law of representation, which, though drawing on discursive elements, is 
ultimately guided by a structural procedure. Because this is an essentially 
modern structural procedure governing identification between the one and the 
many, the distinctive tackling of national identity in Little Mountain and 
Midnight’s Children is not merely an exercise in “identity politics.” Rather, 
tackling the intricate problematics of national identity is ultimately an expression 
of the novels’ implicit engagement with the daunting project of reassessing 
modernity’s legacy. This conclusion comes about as part of the assertion that a 
holistic assessment of modernity’s role in the domain of the nation must take 
stock of the fundamental forces of similitude and difference—it must, in other 
words, lay bare the inherent split at the heart of nationalism’s incessant drive for 
similitude.  
 Since both Little Mountain and Midnight’s Children do precisely that, the 
image of national identity each creates is not only a new or alternative 
reenactment of that identity, one which brings to the fore this underlying split, 
neither by “ruthlessly forgetting” that identity’s tradition nor by simply 
incorporating the forces of similitude and difference. Most crucially, this critique 
of national identity gains its momentum by allowing difference to reclaim its 
rightful space. In some ways, this narrative tension between similitude and 
difference mirrors the hostility resulting from the enmity of the two modernities, 
each trying to consume the other. Highlighting the fundamental split of 
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difference at the heart of national identity—exposing the weakness of 
similitude—constitutes the core of the process which organically develops the 
uneasiness about identity as similarity. 
 From this standpoint, posing the right question about nationalism’s 
function in the time to come does not require an investigation as to whether 
national identity happens to be genuine, a pure construct, or even imagined. 
Instead, the right question involves inquiring as to whether or not national 
identity should be imagined without annulling the difference at its heart. This is not 
so much the promise of re-imagining a new national community. It is, rather, a 
more modest promise of reassessing the national community itself. What the 
narratives analyzed in this study do is take apart the elemental building blocks of 
national identity which was developed based on the model of similitude—on the 
old Platonic paradigm of model and copy. In doing so they express the 
possibility and willingness to interrogate nothing less than the most formidable 
pattern of identification to which the project of modernity has given rise. These 
narratives show, in addition, that the identity of modernity is always an “other,” 
a difference aware of its being such. Even the conventional identity of modernity 
that is associated with what Mondal terms as an “enclave of pure reason” has in 
its own time been an “other” to a state of affairs within which the principal 
mechanism of identification was ordained by a transcendental authority.  
 On the theoretical level, this identity may be described as identity set 
against itself. This theoretical formula is translated in Little Mountain in the form 
of a fragmented narrative set against its own primeval desire to unfold, with its 
forward movement repeatedly stunted by the unbearable burden of repetition. In 
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Midnight’s Children, it is translated in the form of a narrative that undoes its own 
efforts to produce the meaning it hopelessly desires to produce—its primeval 
desire to be a “proper” national narrative.  
 National identity, in the final analysis, amounts to more than a deformed 
child of political discourse. Given that the seeds of doubt about national identity 
already exist at its very core, it is far more forceful to create the condition within 
which the seeds of difference could grow rather than expect rhetorical attacks to 
achieve what they are ultimately incapable of achieving.  
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